

QUESTION 46

Christ's Passion in Itself

Next we have to consider the things that pertain to Christ's exit from the world: first, concerning His passion (questions 46-49); second, concerning His death (question 50); third, concerning His burial (question 51); and, fourth, concerning His descent into hell (question 52).

Concerning the passion, there are three things to consider: first, the passion itself (question 46); second, the efficient cause of the passion (questions 47-48); third, the fruit or effect of the passion (question 49).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Was it necessary for Christ to suffer in order to liberate men? (2) Was any other mode of human liberation possible? (3) Was this mode the most fitting? (4) Was it fitting for Christ to suffer on a cross? (5) What about the great extent of His suffering (*de generalitate passionis eius*)? (6) Was the pain that He suffered in His passion the greatest pain of all? (7) Did His whole soul suffer? (8) Did His passion impede the delight of enjoying [God] (*gaudium fruitionis*)? (9) What about the time of the passion? (10) What about the place of the passion? (11) Was it fitting for Christ to be crucified along with thieves? (12) Should the passion of Christ Himself be attributed to the divine nature (*divinitati attribuenda*)?

Article 1

Was it necessary for Christ to suffer in order to liberate the human race?

It seems that it was not necessary for Christ to suffer in order to liberate the human race (*non fuerit necessarium Christum pati pro humani generis liberatione*):

Objection 1: The human race can be liberated only by God—this according to Isaiah 45:21 (“Am I not the Lord, and there is no other God besides me? A just God and a savior, there is none besides me”). But no necessity falls upon God, since this would be incompatible with His omnipotence. Therefore, it was not necessary for Christ to suffer.

Objection 2: The necessary is opposed to the voluntary. But Christ suffered by His own will; for Isaiah 53:7 says, “He was offered because he willed it himself.” Therefore, it was not necessary for Him to suffer.

Objection 3: As Psalm 24:10 says, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.” But it does not seem necessary that [Christ] should suffer from the side of God's mercy, which is such that just as He gives gifts for free, so it seems that He forgives debts freely, without satisfaction. Likewise, neither does it seem necessary that Christ should suffer from the side of God's justice, insofar as man merited eternal damnation. Therefore, it seems that it was not necessary for Christ to suffer in order to liberate men.

Objection 4: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the angelic nature is more excellent than the human nature. But Christ did not suffer in order to repair angelic nature, which had sinned. Therefore, it seems that it was not necessary for Him to suffer in order to save the human race, either.

But contrary to this: John 3:14-15 says, “Just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” This is understood as having to do with His being lifted up on the cross. Therefore, it seems that Christ had to suffer.

I respond: As the Philosopher teaches in *Metaphysics* 5, ‘necessary’ is said in many ways:

In one way, what is necessary is such that, given its nature, it is impossible for it to be otherwise. And it is clear that in this sense it was not necessary for Christ to suffer, either insofar as He is God or

insofar as He is a man (*neque ex parte Dei neque ex parte hominis*).

In a second way, a thing is said to be necessary because of something exterior to it. If this exterior thing is an *efficient* or *moving cause*, it makes for a *necessity of coercion*, as when someone cannot get away because of the violence of what is detaining him. On the other hand, if the exterior thing inducing the necessity is an end, a thing will be *necessary on the supposition of that end*—more specifically, a thing will be necessary when the given end cannot exist at all, or cannot exist in a fitting way, if that sort of thing is not assumed to be present (*nisi tali praesupposito*).

Thus, it was not necessary for Christ to suffer by a *necessity of coercion*, either on the part of God, who arranged for Christ to suffer, or on the part of Christ Himself, who suffered voluntarily. However, Christ's suffering was indeed necessary by a *necessity of the end*. There are three ways in which this can be understood:

First, on the part of those of us who have been liberated by Christ's passion—this according to John 3:14 (“... the Son of Man must be lifted up [in order] that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting”).

Second, on the part of Christ Himself, who merited the glory of exaltation through the humility of His passion. And what is relevant here is Luke 24:26, which says, “It was necessary for the Christ to suffer and so to enter into His glory.”

Third, on the part of God, whose decree about the passion of the Christ was foretold in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observance of the Old Covenant (*observantia veteris testamenti*). And this is what our Lord is talking about in Luke 22:22, “The Son of Man goes His way as it has been determined,” and in Luke 24:44-46, “These are the words which I spoke to you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled that are written in the Law of Moses and the prophets and the Psalms concerning me ... Thus it is written; and thus the Christ had to suffer and to rise again from the dead.”

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through with respect to a necessity of coercion on the part of God.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through with respect to a necessity of coercion on the part of Christ.

Reply to objection 3: Man's being liberated by Christ's passion fit in with both God's mercy and His justice:

(a) It fit in *with God's justice*, because through His passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race and man was liberated through Christ's justice.

(b) It fit in *with God's mercy*, because, since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 2, ad 2), man was unable in his own right to make satisfaction for the sin of the whole of human nature, God gave His Son to man as the maker of satisfaction—this according to Romans 3:24-25 (“... having been justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as the propitiator because of His faith”). And this bespoke a more abundant mercy than if He had forgiven the sins without any satisfaction having been made. Hence, Ephesians 2:4-5 says, “God, who is rich in mercy, because of the charity beyond measure by which He loved us even when we were dead in our sins, has made us alive in Christ.”

Reply to objection 4: As is clear from what was said above in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 64, a. 2), the sin of an angel was not redeemable in the way that the sin of a man is.

Article 2

Was there another possible way of liberating human nature than through the passion of Christ?

It seems that there was no other possible way of liberating human nature than through the passion of Christ (*non fuit possibilis alius modus liberationis humanae naturae quam per passionem Christi*):

Objection 1: In John 12:24-25 our Lord says, “Unless the grain of wheat falling to the ground dies, it remains itself alone; but if it dies, it brings forth much fruit.” In commenting on this passage Augustine says, “He was calling Himself the grain.” Therefore, if He had not suffered death, He would not in any other way have brought forth the fruit of our liberation.

Objection 2: In Matthew 26:42 our Lord says to the Father, “My Father, if this chalice cannot pass unless I drink of it, your will be done.” He is speaking here of the chalice of His passion. Therefore, the passion of Christ was unable to be omitted. Hence, Hilary says, “The reason why the chalice was not able to pass if He did not drink it is that we cannot be restored except by His passion.”

Objection 3: God’s justice required that man be liberated from sin through Christ’s making satisfaction by His passion. But Christ is not able to bypass His own justice. For 2 Timothy 2:13 says, “If we do not believe, He remains faithful, He cannot deny Himself.” But He would be denying Himself if He denied His own justice, since He is Justice itself. Therefore, it seems that it was not possible for man to be liberated in any way other than by Christ’s passion.

Objection 4: What is false cannot fall under the Faith. But the ancient fathers believed that the Christ would suffer. Therefore, it seems that it could not have happened that Christ would not suffer.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “We assert that the way in which God deigned to liberate us through the mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ, is good and in keeping with God’s dignity, but we will also show that another way was possible for God, whose power all things are equally subject to.”

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be called possible or impossible: (a) *simply and absolutely speaking*, and (b) *on a supposition*.

Thus, simply and absolutely speaking it was possible for God to liberate man in a way other than through Christ’s passion, since, as Luke 1:37 says, “Nothing is impossible for God (*non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum*).”

However, given that a certain supposition is made, it *was* impossible. For since it is impossible for God’s foreknowledge to be mistaken and for His will or His disposition of things to be thwarted, then given God’s foreknowledge and preordination of Christ’s passion, it was not simultaneously possible for Christ not to suffer and for man to be liberated in some way other than through His passion. And as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 13 and q. 22, a. 4 and q. 23, a. 6), the same line of reasoning holds for all those things that were foreknown and preordained by God.

Reply to objection 1: Our Lord is speaking here on the supposition of God’s foreknowledge and preordination, according to which it had been ordained that the fruit of human salvation would not follow except by Christ’s suffering.

Reply to objection 2: And we should understand in a similar way what is posed in the second objection: “If this chalice cannot pass unless I drink of it ...”—namely, “because You have disposed things in this way.” That is why He adds, “Your will be done.”

Reply to objection 3: The justice in question depends on [the supposition that] the divine will is requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. Otherwise, if God had willed to liberate man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted contrary to justice. For the judge who cannot, while

preserving justice, remit a sin or a punishment, is a judge who has to punish a sin committed against someone other than himself—e.g, against another man or against the whole republic or a ruling superior. However, God has no superior, but is Himself the supreme and common good of the whole universe. And so if He remits a sin that has the nature of a fault because it is committed against Himself, He does injury to no one, just as any man who remits an offense committed against himself acts mercifully and not unjustly. And that is why David, in asking for mercy, said, “I have sinned against you alone” (Psalm 50:6), as if to say, “You are able to forgive men without injustice.”

Reply to objection 4: Human faith, as well as the divine Scripture on which faith is built, depend on God’s foreknowledge and ordination. And so the argument for necessity which arises from presupposing them is the same as the argument for necessity which arises from God’s foreknowledge and will.

Article 3

Was the mode of liberation through the passion of Christ more fitting than any other mode?

It seems that some other mode of human liberation was more fitting than human liberation through the passion of Christ (*alius modus convenientior fuisset liberationis humanae quam per passionem Christi*):

Objection 1: In its own operation nature imitates God’s work in the sense that it is moved and regulated by God. But nature does not do through two things what it can do through just one. Therefore, since God could have liberated man by His own will alone, it does not seem to have been fitting for Christ’s passion to be added to liberating the human race.

Objection 2: Things that are effected by nature are effected more fittingly than things that are effected through violence, since, as *De Caelo* puts it, the violent is “a sort of exception,” i.e., chance happening, compared to what is in accord with nature. Therefore, it would have been more fitting for Christ to liberate man by a natural death than for Him to suffer.

Objection 3: It seems most fitting for someone who holds on to a thing violently and unjustly to be despoiled of it by a superior power; hence, Isaiah 52:3 says, “You were given away for free, and you were redeemed without money.” But the devil had no right over man, whom he had deceived by guile and whom he held subject to servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore, it seems that it would have been most fitting for Christ to despoil the devil by His power alone, without His passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “There was no other more fitting manner of healing our misery” than through Christ’s passion.

I respond: A given mode is more fitting for attaining an end to the extent that more things expedient to the end come together because of that mode. But through [the mode of] man’s being liberated by Christ’s passion, many things pertaining to man’s salvation come together, over and beyond the liberation from sin.

For, first of all, through this mode man comes to know how much God loves him, and man is thereby prompted to love the One in whom the completion of human salvation consists. Hence, in Romans 5:8-9 the Apostle says, “God commends His love to us by the fact that when we were still His enemies, Christ died for us.”

Second, through this mode He gives us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the rest of the virtues which are shown to us in the passion of Christ and which are necessary for human

salvation. Hence, 1 Peter 2:21 says, “Christ died for us, leaving us an example, that we might follow in His footsteps.”

Third, through His passion Christ not only liberated man from sin but also, as will be explained below (q. 48, a. 1 and ques. 49, aa. 1 and 5), merited for him justifying grace and the glory of beatitude.

Fourth, through this mode the greater necessity of preserving himself immune from sin is made known to man—this according to 1 Corinthians 6:20 (“You have been bought at a great price; glorify God and carry Him in your body”).

Fifth, it contributes to a greater [human] dignity that just as a man had been conquered and deceived by the devil, so, too, it would be a man who conquered the devil; and just as a man merited death, so by dying, a man conquered death. As 1 Corinthians 15:57 puts it, “Thanks be to God, who gave us victory through Jesus Christ.”

And so it was more fitting for us to be liberated by Christ’s passion than by God’s will alone.

Reply to objection 1: Nature, too, in order to do something more fittingly, prefers two things to one, e.g., two eyes for seeing. And the same is clear in other cases.

Reply to objection 2: As Chrysostom explains, “Christ had come in order to destroy not His own [inevitable] death—which He did not have, since He is Life—but the death of men. Hence, He did not set aside His body by its own proper death, but sustained a death inflicted on Him by men. But even if His body had become sick and fallen apart in the sight of everyone, it would not have been fitting that He, who had healed the sicknesses of others, should have his own body afflicted with sickness. On the other hand, if He had, somewhere by Himself, laid aside His body without any sickness and then re-appeared, He would not have been believed when He spoke of His resurrection. For how could Christ’s victory over death be obvious, unless, having suffered that death in the sight of everyone, He proved, by the incorruption of His body, that death had been vanquished?”

Reply to objection 3: Even though the devil had unjustly assailed the man, nevertheless, the man had, because of his sin, been justly left by God under servitude to the devil. And so it was fitting for man to be liberated from servitude to the devil through justice, by Christ making satisfaction for man through His passion. And, as Augustine explains in *De Trinitate* 13, it was also fitting, in order to conquer the pride of the devil, who is “a deserter of justice and a lover of power,” that Christ should “overcome the devil and liberate man not solely through the power of the divine nature, but also through justice and through the humility of the passion.”

Article 4

Was it fitting for Christ to suffer on a cross?

It seems that it was not fitting for Christ to suffer on a cross (*Christus non debuerit pati in cruce*):

Objection 1: The reality (*veritas*) ought to correspond to the prefigurement. But in all the sacrifices of the Old Testament that prefigured Christ, the animals were slain with a sword and afterwards cremated in a fire. Therefore, it seems that Christ should have suffered not on a cross, but by means of a sword or by means of fire.

Objection 2: Damascene claims that it was not fitting for Christ to take on “dishonorable afflictions” (*detractibiles passiones*). But death on a cross seems to be the most dishonorable and ignominious sort of death; hence, Wisdom 2:20 says, “Let us condemn him to a shameful death.” Therefore, it seems that it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified.

Objection 3: As is clear from Matthew 21:9, it is said of Christ, “Blessed is he who comes in the

name of the Lord.” But death on a cross is the death of a curse—this according to Deuteronomy 21:23 (“Cursed by God is he who hangs on a tree”). Therefore, it seems that it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified.

But contrary to this: Philippians 2:8 says, “He became obedient unto death, even death on a cross.”

I respond: It was absolutely fitting for Christ to suffer death on a cross.

First, in order to give an example of virtue (*propter exemplum virtutis*). For as Augustine explains in *83 Quaestiones*, “God’s Wisdom took on a man (*hominem suscepit*) to give us an example of how to live correctly. But living correctly involves not fearing what ought not to be feared. Now there are men who, even though they do not fear death itself, are nonetheless fearful about the manner of their death. Therefore, it had to be shown by the cross of this man that no kind of death should be feared by a man who lives correctly. For among all the kinds of death, none was more execrable or more fear-inspiring than this kind.”

Second, because this type of death was the most fitting of all for making satisfaction for our first parent’s sin, which stemmed from the fact that, against God’s command, he consumed an apple from the forbidden tree. And so it was fitting that Christ, in order to make satisfaction, should allow Himself to be affixed to a tree, thus restoring what Adam had taken—this according to Psalm 68:5 (“I then paid back what I had not stolen”). Hence, in a sermon on the passion Augustine says, “Adam disdained the command, taking from the tree, but what Adam lost, Christ found on the cross.”

The third reason is that, as Chrysostom puts it in a sermon on the passion, “He suffered upon a high crucifix—and not under a roof—in order that the nature of the air itself might be cleansed. Indeed, the earth felt a similar benefit, cleansed by the oozing of the blood from His side.” And in commenting on John 3:14 (“... so must the Son of Man be lifted up ...”), he says, “Hearing ‘lifted up’, you understand being suspended on high, so that He who had sanctified the earth by walking on it now sanctifies the air.”

The fourth reason is that, as Chrysostom explains, by the fact that He dies on a cross, He prepares for us an ascent into heaven. And this is why He says in John 12:32-33, “I, if I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself.”

The fifth reason is that [this kind of death] is fitting for the universal salvation of the whole world. Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says, “The shape of the cross, extending out to the four endpoints from the central point of contact, signifies the power and providence, diffused everywhere, of Him who was suspended on it.” Chrysostom likewise says that on the cross “He dies with outstretched hands in order to draw [to Himself] with one hand the people of the Old [Testament] and with the other hand those who are from among the gentiles.”

The sixth reason is that this type of death signifies diverse virtues. Hence, in *De Gratia Veteris et Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, “He chose this type of death on purpose, in order that He might be the teacher of the width and the height and the length and the depth” of which the Apostle speaks in Ephesians 3:18. “For the *width* is in the transverse piece of wood that is fixed above, and this has to do with *good works*, since the hands are stretched out there. The *length* is what is seen from that transverse beam to the ground, where it in some sense stands, i.e., persists and perseveres; and this is attributed to *longanimity*. The *height* is in that part of the tree that remains over from the transverse beam to the top, i.e., to the head of the one who is crucified, since He is the highest desire of those of *good hope*. On the other hand, the part of the tree which is fixed and hidden from view and from which the entire cross arises, signifies the *depth* of *gratuitous grace*.” And as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, “The wood on which the members of the sufferer were fixed was also the chair of the master who teaches.”

The seventh reason is that this kind of death corresponds to many prefigurements (*plurimis figuris respondet*). For as Augustine explains in a sermon on the passion, a wooden ark saved the human race from the waters of the deluge; and when the people of God were leaving Egypt, Moses divided the sea

with a wooden staff; and the same Moses dipped a wooden rod into the water and changed the bitter water to sweetness; and at the touch of a wooden staff a salutary wave gushed forth from the spiritual rock; and in order to defeat Amalek, Moses extended a wooden staff with his hands upraised; and God's Law is entrusted to the wooden Ark of the Covenant—so that by all these things one gets closer and closer to the wood of the cross by certain steps, as it were.

Reply to objection 1: As Exodus 27:1 has it, the altar of holocausts, on which animal sacrifices were offered, was made of wood, and in this respect the reality corresponds to the prefigurement. However, as Damascene notes in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, "It is not necessary for it to correspond in every respect, because in that case it would no longer be a likeness, but the reality itself." More specifically, as Chrysostom puts it, "The reason why He was not beheaded, as John's was, and why He was not sawed in two, as Isaiah was, was so that His body might submit to death whole and undivided and not provide an excuse for those who want to divide the Church."

Now in the place of material fire, it was the fire of charity that was involved in the holocaust of Christ.

Reply to objection 2: Christ refused to undergo dishonorable sufferings that involved [interior] defects of knowledge or of grace or, again, of virtue. But He did not refuse to undergo those dishonorable sufferings that involved injuries inflicted from the outside; indeed, as Hebrews 12:2 says, "He endured the cross, despising the shame."

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine explains in *Contra Faustum* 14, sin is cursed and, as a result, so are the death and the mortality that arise from sin. "Now the flesh of Christ was mortal and bore a resemblance to the flesh of sin." And because of this Moses called it 'cursed', just as the Apostle called it 'sin' when he said in 1 Corinthians 5:21, "He who did not know sin became sin for our sake," viz., through the punishment for sin. "Nor is the ignominy greater because he said, 'He is cursed by God'. For if God had not hated sin, He would not have sent His son to take our death upon Himself and destroy it. Therefore, acknowledge that it was for our sake that He whom you confess to have died for us took the curse upon Himself." Hence, Galatians 3:13 says, "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having been cursed for us."

Article 5

Did Christ undergo all sufferings?

It seems that Christ underwent all sufferings (*Christus omnes passiones sustinuerit*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 10 Hilary says, "God's only-begotten testifies that He has completed within Himself every type of human suffering (*consummasse in se omne humanarum genus passionum testatur*) in accomplishing the sacrament of His death, when, with bowed head, He gave up His spirit." Therefore, it seems that He underwent all human sufferings.

Objection 2: Isaiah 52:13-14 says, "Behold, my servant shall understand, He shall be exalted and lifted up, and shall be very high. Just as many were astonished at Him, so shall His appearance be inglorious among men and His form among the children of men." But Christ was exalted insofar as He had every grace and every sort of knowledge, because of which many admirers were astonished at Him. Therefore, it seems that He became inglorious by undergoing every human suffering (*sustinendo omnem passionem humanam*).

Objection 3: As was explained above (aa. 1-3 and q. 14, a. 1), Christ's passion was ordered toward liberating man from sin. But Christ came to liberate men from every type of sin. Therefore, it was

fitting for Him to endure every genus of suffering (*omne genus passionum*).

But contrary to this: John 19:32-33 says, “The soldiers broke the legs of the first and of the other who were crucified with Him, but when they came to Jesus, they did not break His legs.” Therefore, He did not undergo every human suffering (*omnem humanam passionem*).

I respond: There are two possible ways to think about human sufferings (*passiones humanae*):

In one way, with respect to their *species*. And on this interpretation it was not necessary for Christ to suffer every human suffering, since many species of human suffering are contrary to one another, e.g., being destroyed in a fire and being drowned in water (*sicut combustio in igne et submersio in aqua*). For we are now talking about sufferings inflicted from the outside, since, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 4), it was not fitting for Him to undergo sufferings from within, e.g., bodily illnesses.

However, with respect to their *genus*, He *did* undergo every *genus* of human suffering. There are three possible ways to think about this:

First, *on the part of men*. For He suffered something both from gentiles and from Jews, and both from men and from women, as is clear from the servants who accused Peter. Again, He suffered something from the rulers and from their ministers and from the people—this according to Psalm 2:1-2 (“Why this tumult among the nations, and why do the people think up vain things? The kings of the earth have risen up, and the princes have come together, against the Lord and against His Anointed”). He suffered even at the hands of those who were familiar to Him and known to Him, as is clear from Judas handing Him over and Peter denying Him.

Second, the same thing is clear *on the part of those things in which a man can suffer*. For Christ suffered in those *friends* of His who deserted Him; in His *reputation* because of the blasphemies pronounced against Him; in His *honor* and *glory* because of the ridicule and insults heaped upon Him; in His *possessions* by the fact that He was despoiled even of His garments; in His *soul* because of sadness, weariness, and fear; in His *body* because of the wounds and stripes.

Third, one can think in terms of *bodily members*. For Christ suffered in His head from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and feet from the driving of the nails; in His face from the blows and the spit; in His whole body from the lashes of the whip. Again, He suffered with respect to every *bodily sense*—in the sense of *touch*, from the scourging and the fixed nails; in the sense of *taste*, from being given vinegar and gall to drink; in the sense of *smell*, from being fastened to the cross in a place reeking with the stench of dead bodies, “which is called [the place of] the Skull (*Calvariae*)” (Luke 23:33); in the sense of *hearing*, from being tormented by the words of those who were blaspheming Him and ridiculing Him; in the sense of *sight*, from seeing His mother weeping along with the disciple whom He loved.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from Hilary should be interpreted as meaning every *genus* of suffering and not every *species* of suffering.

Reply to objection 2: The similarity here has to do with the *magnitude* of the sufferings and graces, and not with the *number* of each—in the sense that just as He was lifted above others in the gifts of grace, so was He lowered beneath others by the ignominy of His sufferings.

Reply to objection 3: As far as *sufficiency* is concerned, one minimal instance of suffering on the part of Christ was sufficient to redeem the human race from all sins. However, as has already been explained, as far as *fittingness* is concerned, it was enough for Him to suffer every genus of suffering.

Article 6

Was the pain involved in Christ's passion greater than all other pains?

It seems that the pain involved in Christ's passion was not greater than all other pains (*dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maior omnibus aliis doloribus*):

Objection 1: The pain of a sufferer increases in accord with the gravity and persistence of the suffering. But some martyrs have suffered graver and more long-lasting passions than Christ suffered, as is clear in the case of Lawrence, who was roasted on a griddle, and in the case of Vincent, whose flesh was lacerated with iron hooks. Therefore, it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest pain.

Objection 2: Mental virtue (*virtus mentis*) mitigates pain to such an extent that the Stoics claimed that sadness or pain (*tristitia*) does not enter into the mind of the wise man. And Aristotle claimed that moral virtue (*virtus moralis*) establishes the mean among the passions. But in Christ there existed the most perfect moral virtue of all. Therefore, it seems that in Christ there was minimal pain (*minimus dolor*).

Objection 3: The more sensitive the one who suffers is, the greater the pain of the suffering. But the soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body senses because of the soul. Yet Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a more sensitive body than Christ, who assumed a human body with natural defects. Therefore, it seems that the pain of a soul suffering in purgatory or in hell, or even the pain of Adam [in the state of innocence] if he suffered, was greater than the pain involved in Christ's passion.

Objection 4: The loss of a greater good causes greater pain. But, by sinning, a sinner loses a greater good than Christ lost by suffering, since the life of grace is better than the life of nature. Again, Christ, who lost His life but was going to rise after three days, seems to have lost something less than those who lose their life but are going to remain in death. Therefore, it seems that Christ's pain was not the greatest pain.

Objection 5: The innocence of the sufferer diminishes the pain of his suffering. But Christ suffered innocently—this according to Jeremiah 11:19 (“I was like a meek lamb who is led off to be a victim”). Therefore, it seems that the pain of Christ's passion was not the greatest pain.

Objection 6: In those things that belonged to Christ, nothing was superfluous. But minimal pain on Christ's part would have been sufficient for the goal of human salvation, since it would have had infinite power because of the divine person. Therefore, it would have been superfluous for Him to take on the greatest pain.

But contrary to this: In Lamentations 1:12 it is said in the person of Christ, “Look and see whether there is any pain (*dolor*) like my pain.”

I respond: As was explained above when we were talking about the weaknesses taken on by Christ (q.15, aa. 5-6), in Christ the sufferer there was genuine (a) sensory pain caused by bodily harm and (b) interior pain, called sadness (*tristitia*), caused by the apprehension of something harmful. And both of these types of pain in Christ were the greatest of all the pains in the present life. There are four reasons for this:

First, because of the *causes of the pain*. For the cause of the *sensory pain* was bodily injury, which involved harshness both because of the extent of the suffering (*propter generalitatem passionis*), of which we have already spoken (a. 5), and also because of the genus of the suffering. For the death of those nailed to a cross is the most bitter of all, since they are pierced in the nerve-laden and highly sensitive parts, viz., the hands and the feet, and since the weight of the hanging body continually

intensifies the pain. And, in addition, the pain is long-lasting, because the individuals do not die immediately like those who are killed by the sword.

On the other hand, the cause of the *interior pain* was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which Christ was making satisfaction by His suffering; hence, He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying with Psalm 21:2, "... the words of my sins." The second cause [of the interior pain] was, specifically, the fall of the Jews and the others who sinned in His death, and especially the fall of His disciples, who were scandalized by Christ's suffering. Again, the third cause [of the interior pain] was the draining away of His bodily life (*amissio vitae coporalis*), which is naturally abhorrent to human nature.

Second, the magnitude of His pain can be thought of in terms of *the susceptibility of the sufferer*. For in His body He had been put together in the very best way, since His body had been formed miraculously by the operation of the Holy Spirit—just as other things that have been effected through miracles are better than their [non-miraculous] counterparts, as Chrysostom points out about the wine into which Christ converted the water at the wedding feast. And so Christ's sense of touch, from which the perception of pain follows, was especially acute. Again, by its interior powers His soul apprehended all the causes of sadness and pain (*omnes causas tristitiae*) in the most powerful way (*efficacissime*).

Third, the magnitude of the pain of the suffering Christ can be thought of in terms of the *purity of the pain*. For in the case of other sufferers the interior pain—and the exterior pain as well—is, because of a special sort of consideration on the part of reason, mitigated through a sort of flow, or overflow, from the higher powers into the lower powers. This did not occur in the case of the suffering Christ, since, as Damascene says, "He permitted each of the powers to do what is proper to it."

Fourth, the magnitude of the pain of the suffering Christ can be thought of in terms of the fact that the passion and the pain *were taken up by Christ voluntarily*, for the sake of the end of liberating human beings from sin. And so He took on a quantity of pain that was proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which followed from it.

Thus, from all these reasons taken together, it is manifestly clear that Christ's pain was the greatest pain of all.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through on just one of the aforementioned reasons, viz., bodily injury, which is the cause of sensory pain. But, as has been explained, the pain of Christ's suffering was intensified to a much higher degree by the other causes.

Reply to objection 2: Moral virtue mitigates interior sadness (*tristitiam interiorem*) in one way and exterior pain (*exteriorem dolorem*) in a different way.

For moral virtue diminishes *interior sadness* directly by establishing a mean in the sadness as in its proper matter. Now as was established in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 64, a. 2 and 2-2, q. 58, a. 10), moral virtue establishes a mean in the passion not with respect to a quantity of the *reality* but with respect to a quantity of *proportion*, so that, namely, the passion does not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics thought that no amount of sadness would be useful for anything, they believed that sadness is completely at odds with reason and that, as a result, it had to be completely avoided by one who is wise. However, as Augustine proves in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the truth of the matter is that sadness is sometimes praiseworthy, viz., when it proceeds from a holy love—as, for instance, when an individual is sad because of his own sins or those of another. It is likewise assumed that sadness is useful for the purpose of making satisfaction for sin—this according to 2 Corinthians 7:10 ("The sorrow that is according to God produces a repentance that leads to stable salvation"). And so in order to make satisfaction for the sins of all human beings, Christ took on a sadness that was maximal in absolute quantity and yet did not go beyond the rule of reason.

On the other hand, moral virtue does not directly diminish *exterior sensory pain*, since this sort of pain does not obey reason, but instead follows the nature of the body. However, moral virtue does

diminish the pain indirectly by an overflow from the higher powers into the lower powers—something that, as has been explained (q. 14, a. 1, ad 2 and q. 45, a. 2), did not happen in the case of Christ.

Reply to objection 3: The pain of a suffering separated soul involves the state of future damnation, which exceeds every evil of the present life, just as the glory of the saints exceeds every good of the present life. Hence, when we claim that Christ’s pain is the greatest of all, we are not comparing it to the pain of a separated soul.

Now Adam’s body was unable to suffer unless he sinned and in that way became mortal and passible. And, for the reasons explained above, his body would have suffered less than Christ’s body. From this it is likewise clear that even if, *per impossibile*, one posited that Adam suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would still have been less than Christ’s pain.

Reply to objection 4: Christ was made sorrowful not only by the draining away of His own bodily life, but also by the sins of everyone else, and this latter sorrow on the part of Christ exceeded all the sorrow of all contrite individuals, both (a) because it proceeded from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the sorrow of contrition is intensified, and also because (b) He was made sorrowful by the sins of everyone all at once—this according to Isaiah 53:4 (“Surely, he has borne our sorrows”).

Now Christ’s bodily life was of such great dignity—and especially because of the divine nature united to it—that its loss, even for a short time (*etiam ad horam*), would have to be mourned to a greater degree than the loss belonging to any other man for however long a time. Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that a virtuous man loves his life more to the extent that he knows it to be better, and yet he exposes it for the sake of virtue. And, similarly, Christ exposed His most beloved life for the good of charity—this according to Jeremiah 12:7 (“I have given my beloved soul into the hands of her enemies”).

Reply to objection 5: The innocence of the sufferer diminishes the pain of his suffering with respect to the number [of types of suffering]. For when a guilty individual suffers, he experiences pain not only because of his torment (*de poena*) but also because of his sin (*de culpa*), whereas the innocent individual experiences pain only because of his torment. Yet this pain is intensified by his innocence insofar as he apprehends the harm inflicted on him as more undeserved (*ut magis indebitum*). Hence it is that others are even more reprehensible if they do not have compassion on Him—this according to Isaiah 57:1 (“The just man perishes, and there is no one who reflects on this in his heart”).

Reply to objection 6: Christ wanted to liberate the human race from its sins not only by His power, but also by His justice. And so He paid attention not only to (a) what great power His suffering would have because of the divine nature united to it, but also to (b) how much pain on His part, given His human nature, would be sufficient for so great an act of making satisfaction.

Article 7

Did Christ suffer with His whole soul?

It seems that Christ did not suffer with His whole soul (*Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam*):

Objection 1: When the body suffers, the soul suffers incidentally (*per accidens*) insofar as it is the actuality of the body (*inquantum est corporis actus*). But the soul is not, with respect to each of its own parts, the actuality of the body, since, as is explained in *De Anima* 3, there is no body that the intellect is the actuality of. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not suffer with His whole soul.

Objection 2: Each power of the soul is acted upon by its object (*patitur a suo obiecto*). But as

Augustine explains in *De Trinitate* 12, the higher part of reason has for its object the “eternal notions (*rationes aeternae*), which it directs itself toward thinking about and consulting.” But Christ was unable to suffer any harm from the eternal notions, since they were not contrary to Him in any respect.

Therefore, it seems that He did not suffer with His whole soul.

Objection 3: When a sentient passion touches upon reason, it is then called a ‘complete passion’. But as Jerome explains, only passionate inclinations (*propassiones*), and not complete passions, existed in Christ. Hence, in *Epistola ad Ioannem Evangelistam* Dionysius says, “He underwent the sufferings inflicted on Him only in His judging (*passiones sibi illatas patiebatur secundum iudicare solum*).” Therefore, it seems that He did not suffer with His whole soul.

Objection 4: Suffering causes pain (*passio dolorem causat*). But there is no pain in the speculative intellect, since, as the Philosopher says in *Topics* 1, “There is no sort of sadness opposed to the delight that comes from the act of considering.” Therefore, it seems that Christ did not suffer with His whole soul.

But contrary to this: Psalm 87:4 says, in the person of Christ, “My soul is filled with evil things,” where a Gloss explains, “[He means] not vices, but either sorrows by which His soul suffers along with His flesh, or else evils, viz., evils belonging to a perishing people, which He suffers along with them.” But His soul would not have been filled with these “evils things” if He were not suffering with His whole soul. Therefore, Christ suffered with His whole soul.

I respond: ‘Whole’ is said in relation to parts, and it is the powers of the soul that are called its parts. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer either (a) insofar as it suffers *in its essence* (*secundum suam essentiam*) or else (b) insofar as *all its powers suffer*.

However, we have to take into account that there are two ways in which a given power of the soul can suffer. In one way, *by its proper passion* (*passione propria*), and this is insofar as it is acted upon by its object, in the way that the power of sight suffers from a superabundance of light. In a second way, a given power suffers *when the subject in which it is grounded suffers*, as when the power of vision suffers because the sense of touch is affected in the eye, upon which the power of sight is grounded, e.g., when the eye is poked or, again, when the eye is distempered by a fever.

So, then, one should reply that if we understand the whole soul in terms of *its essence* (*ratione suae essentiae*), then it is clear that the whole soul of Christ suffered. For the whole essence of the soul is conjoined to the body in such a way that the whole soul exists in the whole body and whole soul exists in each part of the body. And so when Christ’s body suffered and was disposed toward separating from His soul, His whole soul suffered.

On the other hand, if we understand the whole soul in terms of *all its powers*, then, speaking of the *proper passions* of the powers, the soul suffers in all of its *lower powers*, since, as is clear from what was explained above (a. 5), in each of the lower powers, which operate with respect to temporal things, there was something that was a cause of Christ’s pain. However, on this score *higher reason* did not suffer in Christ on the part of its object, viz., God, who was a cause of delight and joy for Christ’s soul and not a cause of pain.

But as regards the mode of suffering by which a power is said to suffer *because of its subject*, all the powers of Christ’s soul suffered. For all the powers of Christ’s soul are rooted in its essence, which the suffering reached when the body, whose actuality the soul is, suffered.

Reply to objection 1: As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 77, aa. 6 and 8), even though the intellect, insofar as it is a power, is not the actuality of the body, nonetheless, the essence of the soul, in which the intellective power is rooted, is the actuality of the body.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through with respect to suffering that comes from the proper object—a sort of suffering that the higher reason in Christ did not undergo.

Reply to objection 3: Pain is called a complete passion (*passio perfecta*) through which the soul is perturbed when the suffering of its sentient part goes so far as to shift reason away from rectitude in its act, with the result that it follows the passion and does not have free choice with respect to its act. But as has been explained, in the case of Christ the suffering of the sentient part does not reach to [higher] reason but is instead found in its subject, [i.e., the essence of the soul].

Reply to objection 4: The speculative intellect cannot have pain or sadness from its object, i.e., from truth considered absolutely, which is its fulfillment (*quod est perfection eius*). However, pain, or the cause of pain, can belong to it in the way already explained.

Article 8

Did Christ's soul as a whole delight in beatific enjoyment during the time of the passion?

It seems that Christ's soul as a whole did not delight in beatific enjoyment during the time of the passion (*anima Christi, in articulo illius passionis, non tota fruereetur fruitione beata*):

Objection 1: It is impossible to suffer pain and at the same time to rejoice, since pain and joy are contraries. But as has been established (a. 7), Christ's soul as a whole suffered pain during the time of the passion. Therefore, it could not have been the case that it had enjoyment as a whole.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher explains that if sadness is vehement, it impedes not only the contrary pleasure, but any sort of pleasure as well, and vice versa. Now as has been shown (a. 6), the pain of Christ's passion was the greatest of all and, similarly, as was established in the First Part of the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 34, a. 3), His delight in enjoyment is the greatest of all. Therefore, it was impossible for Christ's soul as a whole to have suffered and to have had enjoyment at the same time.

Objection 3: As is clear from Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, beatific enjoyment (*fruitio beata*) involves the cognition of and love for divine things. But not all the powers of the soul attain to knowing and loving God. Therefore, it is not the case that Christ's soul as whole had enjoyment.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says that Christ's divinity "permitted His flesh to do and suffer what was proper to it." Therefore, by parity of reasoning, since it was proper to Christ's soul, insofar as He was beatified, that it should have enjoyment, His passion did not impede His having enjoyment.

I respond: As was previously explained (a. 7), the 'whole soul' can be understood either as the *essence* of the soul or as *all the parts* of the soul.

Now if it is understood as the *essence* of the soul, then in this sense Christ's whole soul had enjoyment insofar as it is the subject of the higher part of the soul, the role of which is to enjoy the divine nature—so that just as the suffering is, by reason of the essence, attributed to the higher part of the soul, so, too, conversely, the enjoyment is, by reason of the higher part of the soul, attributed to the essence.

On the other hand, if we take Christ's 'whole soul' as *all the parts* of His soul, then in this sense it is not the case that His whole soul had enjoyment, either (a) directly, since enjoyment cannot be the act of every part of the soul, or (b) by way of overflow, since, as long as Christ was a wayfarer (*viator*), there was no overflow of glory from the higher part [of the soul] into the lower part or from the soul into the body. But, conversely, since the higher part of His soul was not impeded by the lower part with respect to what is proper to it, it follows that the higher part of the soul had complete enjoyment (*perfecte fruebatur*) while Christ was suffering.

Reply to objection 1: The delight of enjoyment is not directly contrary to the pain of the passion, since they do not have to do with the same thing. For nothing prevents contraries from existing in the

same thing, though not with respect to the same thing. And so the delight of enjoyment can belong to the higher part of reason through its proper act while the pain of the passion exists in its subject. On the other hand, the pain of the passion belongs to the essence of the soul on the part of the body, whose form it is, whereas the delight of enjoyment belongs to the essence of the soul on the part of the power which is the subject of the enjoyment.

Reply to objection 2: This passage from the Philosopher is true by reason of the overflow which naturally occurs from one power of the soul into another. But as was explained above (a. 6), this did not occur in the case of Christ.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to the whole soul as regards its powers.

Article 9

Did Christ suffer at the appropriate time?

It seems that Christ did not suffer at the appropriate time (*Christus non fuerit convenienti tempore passus*):

Objection 1: Christ's passion was prefigured by the immolation of the paschal lamb (*per immolationem agni paschalis*); hence, in 1 Corinthians 5:4 the Apostle says, "Christ our paschal lamb (*Pascha*) has been sacrificed." But the paschal lamb was sacrificed on the fourteenth day toward the evening, as Exodus 12:6 prescribes. Therefore, it seems that Christ should have suffered then. But this is clearly false, since at that time He was celebrating the passover (*Pascha*) with this disciples—this according to Mark 14:12 ("On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they used to immolate the paschal lamb ...")—whereas He suffered on the following day.

Objection 2: Christ's passion is called His exaltation (*eius exaltatio*)—this according to John 3:14 ("... so must the Son of Man be lifted up (*exaltari*)"). But as is clear from Malachi 4:2, Christ is called "the sun of justice." Therefore, it seems that He should have suffered at the sixth hour, when the sun is at its highest point (*quando sol est in maxima exaltatione*). But the contrary of this seems to be reported in Mark 15:25 ("It was the third hour, and they crucified Him").

Objection 3: Just as the sun reaches its highest point each day at the sixth hour, so it reaches its highest point each year at the summer solstice. Therefore, Christ should have suffered at the time of the summer solstice rather than at the time of the spring equinox.

Objection 4: The world was illuminated by Christ's presence in the world—this according to John 9:5 ("As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world"). Therefore, it would have been fitting for human salvation if He had lived for a longer time in this world, with the result that He would have suffered in His old age rather than at a young age.

But contrary to this: John 13:1 says, "Jesus, knowing that the hour had come for Him to pass out of this world to the Father ..." And John 2:4 says, "My hour has not yet come." In commenting on these passages, Augustine says, "When He had done as much as He thought sufficient, then His hour came not by necessity, but by His will, not by the circumstances, but by His power." Therefore, He suffered at the appropriate time.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), Christ's passion was subject to His will. But His will was governed by divine wisdom, which, as Wisdom 8:1 says, "orders all things fittingly and agreeably." And so one should reply that Christ's passion was enacted at the appropriate time. Hence, in *Quaestiones Novi et Veteris Testamenti* it says, "Our Savior did all things at the proper places and times."

Reply to objection 1: Some claim that Christ suffered on the fourteenth day of the month, when the Jews used to sacrifice the paschal lamb (*Pascha immolabant*). Hence, John 18:28 says that the Jews “did not go into the praetorium” of Pilate on the very day of the passion, “in order that they might not be defiled, but might eat the passover (*ut manducarent Pascha*).” In commenting on this, Chrysostom says, “The Jews celebrated the passover on that day, but Christ celebrated the passover on the previous day, holding His own slaughter back until Friday (*sextae feriae*), when the old passover was celebrated (*quando vetus Pascha fiebat*).” And this seems to be consonant with what John 13:1-5 says, viz., that “before the day of the passover feast ... when supper was done ... Christ washed the feet of the disciples.”

However, what Matthew 26:17 says seems to be contrary to this: “On the first day of the unleavened bread the disciples came to Jesus and said, ‘Where do you want us to prepare for you to eat the passover?’” From this it is clear that, as Jerome says, “since the first day of the unleavened bread was the fourteenth day of the first month, when the lamb was sacrificed and the moon was full,” Christ ate the supper on the fourteenth day of the month and He suffered on the fifteenth day. And this is even clearer from what Mark 14:12 says, viz., “On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the paschal lamb (*quando Pascha immolabant*), etc.”, and from what Luke 22:7 says, viz., “the day of the unleavened bread came, on which it was necessary for the paschal lamb to be killed (*occidi Pascha*).” And this is why some claim that Christ ate the passover (*Pascha manducavit*) with His disciples on the appropriate day, i.e., the fourteenth of the month, “thus demonstrating,” as Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaem*, “that right up to the last day He did nothing contrary to the Law,” whereas the Jews, preoccupied with procuring the death of Christ and acting contrary to the Law, postponed their celebration of the passover meal until the next day. And it is because of this that it is said of them that they did not want to enter the praetorium on the day of Christ’s passion, “that they might not be defiled, but might eat the passover.”

However, this, again, seems to conflict with the words of Mark when he says, “On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the paschal lamb ...” Therefore, Christ and the Jews celebrated the old passover together (*simul vetus Pascha cebraverunt*). And, as Bede points out in *Super Marcum*, “Even though Christ, who is our paschal lamb (*qui est Pascha nostrum*), was crucified on the following day, i.e., on the fifteenth day of the month, nevertheless, on the night when the lamb was sacrificed, handing down to His disciples the mysteries of His body and blood that were to be celebrated, and being held and bound by the Jews, He made sacred the beginning of His own sacrifice, i.e. of His passion.”

Now when John 13:1 says, “Before the day of the passover feast,” this is understood to have been the fourteenth of the month, which occurred on Thursday (*tunc evenit feria quinta*). For the fifteenth day of the month was the most solemn day of the passover feast for the Jews. And so the same day that John calls the day before the passover feast, Matthew calls the first day of the unleavened bread, since according to the rite of a Judaic feast, the solemnity began in the evening of the preceding day. Now when it is said that they were going to eat the passover on the fifteenth of the month, one should note that the word ‘*Pascha*’ here does not mean the paschal lamb, which had been sacrificed on the fourteenth day, but instead it means the paschal food, i.e., the unleavened bread, which had to be eaten by those who were [ritually] clean. Hence, in the place cited above Chrysostom gives an alternative explanation, viz., that the word ‘*Pascha*’ can be taken “for the whole feast” of the Jews, which lasted for seven days.

Reply to objection 2: Augustine explains in *De Consensu Evangeliorum*, “As John [19:14] relates, ‘it was around the sixth hour’ when our Lord was handed over by Pilate to be crucified. For it was not the full sixth hour, but ‘around the sixth hour,’ i.e., when the fifth hour was over and some of the sixth hour had begun—up to the point that, after the sixth hour had been completed and Christ was hanging on the cross, the darkness began. Now it is understood that it was at the third hour that the Jews clamored for our Lord to be crucified, and it is shown that in all truth they crucified Him when they

clamored out at that time. Therefore, lest anyone should attribute the idea of such a great crime to the soldiers rather than to the Jews, [Mark] says: ‘It was the third hour, and they crucified Him’, in order that those who clamored for His crucifixion at the third hour should be found to have crucified Him.

“Even though there are some who want the preparation (*parasceve*) to be understood as the third hour of the day, John recalls it by saying, ‘It was the preparation (*parasceve*), about the sixth hour’. For *parasceve* means ‘preparation’. But the true passover, which was celebrated in the passion of our Lord, began to be prepared from the ninth hour of the night, i.e., from when all the leaders among the priests said, ‘He is deserving of death’. According to John, then, ‘the preparation at the sixth hour’ lasts from that hour of the night right up until Christ’s crucifixion, whereas, according to Mark, it is the third hour of the day.”

Still, there are some who claim that this discrepancy is due to a transcribing error among the Greeks, since the characters by which the numerals ‘3’ and ‘6’ are represented are somewhat alike.

Reply to objection 3: As it says in *De Quaestione Novi et Veteris Testamenti*, “Our Lord willed to redeem and reform the world by His passion at the time of year at which He had created it, i.e., at the equinox. It is at that time that the day increases over the night, because by our savior’s passion we are brought from darkness to light.” And it is because perfect illumination will occur in Christ’s second coming that the time of the second coming is compared to the summer in Matthew 24:32-33, where He says, “When the branch [of the fig tree] is now tender and the leaves break forth, you know that summer is near. Even so, when you shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the door.” And this will also be the greatest exaltation of Christ.

Reply to objection 4: There are three reasons why Christ wished to suffer at a young age:

First of all, in order that He might thereby commend His love to a greater degree, because He gave His life for us when it was in its most perfect state.

Second, because, just as with sickness, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 4), it was not fitting that a diminution of nature should appear in Him.

Third, in order that, dying and rising at a young age, Christ might show ahead of time in His own case the future quality of those who rise. Hence, Ephesians 4:13 says, “... until we all attain to the unity of the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, to perfect manhood, to the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ.”

Article 10

Was the place where Christ suffered appropriate?

It seems that the place where Christ suffered was not appropriate (*non convenienti loco Christus passus fuerit*):

Objection 1: Christ suffered in His human flesh, which was conceived by the virgin in Nazareth and born in Bethlehem. Therefore, it seems that He should have suffered in Nazareth or Bethlehem, and not in Jerusalem.

Objection 2: The reality should correspond to the prefigurement. But Christ’s passion was prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Law, and sacrifices of this sort were offered in the temple. Therefore, Christ likewise should have suffered in the temple and not outside the city gates.

Objection 3: The medicine should correspond to the disease. But the passion of Christ was the medicine for the sin of Adam, and Adam was buried in Hebron and not in Jerusalem; for Joshua 14:15 says, “Now the name of Hebron was formerly called Kiriath-arba; Adam, the greatest in the land of the

Enacims, was laid there.”

But contrary to this: Luke 13:33 says, “It cannot be that a prophet should suffer outside of Jerusalem.”

I respond: As is asserted in *83 Quaestiones*, “Our savior did all things in their proper places and at their proper times.” For just as all things are in His hands, so too with places. And so just as Christ suffered at the appropriate time, so, too, He suffered in the appropriate place.

Reply to objection 1: It was most appropriate for Christ to suffer in Jerusalem:

First of all, because Jerusalem had been the place chosen by God for sacrifices to be offered to Him, and those figurative sacrifices prefigured Christ’s sacrifice, which was the true sacrifice—this according to Ephesians 5:2 (“He delivered Himself up for us, a fragrant victim and sacrifice to God”). Hence, Bede says in a homily, “As the hour of His passion got closer, our Lord willed to get closer to the place of His passion,” viz., Jerusalem, where He arrived five days before the passover, just as, according to the precept of the Law, the paschal lamb was to be led toward the place of immolation five days before the passover, i.e., on the tenth day of the month.

Second, since the power of His passion had to be diffused to the whole world, He wanted to suffer in the middle of the inhabitable world, i.e., in Jerusalem. Hence, Psalm 73:12 says, “But God is our king before the ages, He has worked His salvation in the middle of the earth,” i.e., in Jerusalem, which is called [by Jerome] “the naval of the earth.”

Third, because it fit in the best with His humility—so that, namely, just as He chose the most shameful kind of death, so, too, it was part of His humility that He did not refuse to suffer disgrace in so celebrated a place. Hence, in a sermon on the Epiphany Pope Leo says, “He who had taken on the form of a servant chose Bethlehem for His birth and Jerusalem for His passion.”

Fourth, in order to show that the wickedness of killing Him had risen up from the leaders of the people. And that is why He wanted to suffer in Jerusalem, where those leaders lived. Hence, Acts 4:27 says, “... there assembled together in this city against Your holy child Jesus, whom You had anointed, Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with gentiles and the people of Israel ...”

Reply to objection 2: There are three reasons why Christ suffered outside the gates and not in the temple or inside the city:

First of all, in order that the reality might correspond to the prefiguration. For as is commanded in Leviticus 16:27, the calf and the goat, which were offered in the most solemn sacrifice for the expiation of the whole people, were burned outside the camp. Hence, Hebrews 13:11-12 says, “The bodies of those animals, whose blood is brought into the holies by the high priest for sin, are burned outside the camp. For this reason Jesus likewise suffered outside the gates in order that He might sanctify the people by His blood.”

Second, in order that He might give us an example of how to shun a worldly way of living (*exemplum exeundi a mundana conversatione*). Hence, in the same place it is added, “Let us therefore go to Him outside the camp, taking on His reproach” (Hebrews 13:13).

Third, as Chrysostom puts it in a sermon on the passion, “Our Lord did not want to suffer under a roof, not in the Jewish temple, lest the Jews might prevent the salvific sacrifice, and lest you might think He was offered only for that people. And so it occurred outside the city and outside the walls, in order that you might realize that it is a universal sacrifice offered for the whole world, that it is a purification for everyone (*quod communis est purificatio*).”

Reply to objection 3: As Jerome explains in *Super Matthaeum*, “Someone interpreted ‘the place of the skull (*Calvariae locum*)’ (Matthew 27:33) as the place where Adam was buried, and claimed that it was so called because the skull of an ancient man was buried there—a pleasing interpretation, and one that appeases the ears of the people, but nonetheless not true. For beyond the city and outside the walls

there were places in which the heads of the condemned were cut off—thus the name ‘Calvary’, i.e., ‘the skulls’. Jesus was crucified there in order that the banners of martyrdom might be erected over what had formerly been the site of the condemned. By contrast, Adam was buried near Hebron, as we read in the book of Joshua son of Nun.”

Now Jesus had to be crucified in the common place of the condemned, rather than beside Adam’s grave, in order to show that the cross of Christ was the remedy not only for Adam’s personal sin, but also for the sin of the whole world.

Article 11

Was it fitting for Christ to be crucified along with thieves?

It seems that it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified along with thieves (*non fuerit conveniens Christum cum latronibus crucifigi*):

Objection 1: 2 Corinthians 6:14 says, “What does justice have in common with iniquity?” But Christ was made justice for us by God, whereas iniquity belongs to thieves. Therefore, it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified along with thieves.

Objection 2: In commenting on Matthew 26:35 (“Even if I have to die with you, I will not deny you”), Origen says, “It does not belong to men to die along with Jesus, who died for everyone.” And in commenting on Luke 22:33 (“I am prepared to go with you both to prison and to death!”), Ambrose says, “The passion of our Lord has those who emulate it, but it does not have equals.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, it does not seem fitting for Christ to suffer along with thieves.

Objection 3: Matthew 27:44 says, “The thieves who were crucified with Him reproached Him.” But Luke 23:42 says, “One of those who were crucified with Christ said to Him, ‘Remember me, Lord, when you come into your kingdom’.” Therefore, it seems that in addition to the blaspheming thieves, there was crucified with Him another who did not blaspheme. And so it seems that what the evangelists reported about His being crucified with thieves was muddled (*inconvenienter ab evangelistis narratum quod Christus fuerit cum latronibus crucifixus*).

But contrary to this: In Isaiah 53:12 it had been prophesied, “He was numbered among the wicked.”

I respond: Christ was crucified between thieves—to be sure, by one plan answering to the intention of the Jews and by another plan answering to God’s ordination.

For as regards the intention of the Jews, Chrysostom remarks that they crucified two thieves, one on each side of Him, “in order that He might be made to participate in the suspicion surrounding them. But it did not turn out that way. For nothing is now said of them, whereas His cross is honored everywhere. Kings, laying aside their crowns, take up the cross—on their purple robes, on their diadems, on their weapons, on the consecrated table. The cross shines forth everywhere.”

On the other hand, as regards God’s ordination, Christ was crucified along with thieves, [first of all], because, as Jerome says in *Super Matthaëum*, “As Christ becomes cursed with the cross for our sake, so for the salvation of everyone He is crucified among the guilty as if He were guilty.”

Second, as Pope Leo puts it in a sermon on the passion, “Two thieves were crucified, one on His right and one on His left, to make clear, by the very appearance of the scene of torture, the separation that is going to be made among all human beings by His [last] judgment.” And in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “The cross itself, if you think about it carefully, was a seat of judgment. With the judge seated in the middle, the one who believed was liberated, and the one who insulted Him was condemned. He was

even then signifying what He was going to do to the living and the dead, that He was going to place some on His right and others on His left.”

Third, according to Hilary, “The two thieves are set on His right and on His left to show that the whole diversity of the human race is called to the sacrament of His passion. But because of the difference between believers and unbelievers, a division is made into right and left, with one of the two, those placed on the right, being saved by the justification of faith.”

Fourth, because, as Bede says, “The thieves who were crucified with our Lord signify those who, believing in and confessing Christ, submit either to the agony of martyrdom or to the institutes of a stricter observance. But those who do this for the sake of everlasting glory are denoted by the faith of the thief on the right, whereas those who do it for the sake of human praise imitate the intention and action of the thief on the left.”

Reply to objection 1: Just as Christ did not have to die but submitted to death voluntarily in order to conquer death by His power, so, too, He did not deserve to be placed with the thieves but He instead willed to be counted among the wicked in order to destroy wickedness by His power. Hence, in *Super Ioannem* Chrysostom says, “To convert the thief upon the cross, and lead him into paradise, was no less a feat than splitting the rocks (cf. Matthew 27:51).”

Reply to objection 2: It is not fitting for anyone else to suffer *for the same reason* along with Christ. Hence, Origen adds in the same place, “All were in their own sins, and all had to have someone else die for them and not they for others.”

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Consensu Evangeliorum*, “We can understand Matthew to have used the plural for the singular when he said, ‘The thieves reproached him’.”

An alternative reply, taken from Jerome, is that “at first both of them blasphemed and, afterwards, one of them, having seen the signs, came to believe.”

Article 12

Should Christ’s passion be attributed to His divine nature?

It seems that Christ’s passion should be attributed to His divine nature (*passio Christi sit eius divinitati attribuenda*):

Objection 1: 1 Corinthians 2:8 says, “If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.” But the Lord of glory is Christ with respect to His divine nature (*secundum divinitatem*). Therefore, Christ’s passion belongs to Him with respect to His divine nature.

Objection 2: The principle of human salvation is the divine nature itself (*est ipsa divinitas*)—this according to Psalm 36:39 (“The salvation of the just is from the Lord”). Therefore, if Christ’s passion did not belong to His divine nature, then it seems that it could not be fruitful for us.

Objection 3: The Jews were punished for the sin of killing Christ as murderers of God Himself, which is shown by the magnitude of the punishment. But this would not be the case if the passion did not belong to the divine nature. Therefore, the passion of Christ belonged to the divine nature.

But contrary to this: In *Epistola ad Epictetum* Athanasius says, “Remaining God by nature, the Word is impassible (*natura Deus manens verbum est impassibile*).” But what is impassible cannot suffer. Therefore, Christ’s passion did not belong to His divine nature.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 2, aa. 1-3 and 6), the union of the human nature and the divine nature is effected in a person and *hypostasis* and suppositum, and yet the distinction between the natures remains, with the result that the person and hypostasis of the divine nature is the same as the

person and hypostasis of the human nature, and yet what is proper to each nature is preserved (*ut sit eadem persona et hypostasis divinae et humanae naturae, salva tamen utriusque naturae proprietate*). And that is why, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 4), the passion has to be attributed to the *suppositum* of the divine nature—not by reason of the divine nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature. Hence, in a synodal letter by Cyril it says, “If anyone does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh, let him be anathema.” Therefore, Christ’s passion belongs to the *suppositum* of His divine nature by reason of the passible assumed nature, but not by reason of the impassible divine nature.

Reply to objection 1: The Lord of glory is said to be crucified not insofar as He is the Lord of glory but insofar as He is a passible man.

Reply to objection 2: As is said in a certain homily at the Council of Ephesus, “The death of Christ, having become, as it were, the death of God,” viz., through the union in a person, “destroyed death, since it was God and man” who suffered. “For it was not the nature of God that was wounded; nor did the nature of God undergo sufferings through some sort of change in it.”

Reply to objection 3: As is said in the same place, “The Jews did not crucify a mere man, but instead thrust their presumptions upon God. For suppose that a prince speaks his word and that it is committed to writing on a parchment and sent out to the cities, and that someone rebellious destroys the document. He will be given a sentence of death, not so much for tearing up the document as for destroying the imperial word. Let not the Jew, then, feel secure, as if he were crucifying a mere man. For what he saw was, as it were, a parchment, but what was concealed in that parchment was the imperial Word, the Son by nature, not uttered by any tongue.”