

## QUESTION 15

### The Weaknesses Belonging to His Soul that Christ Took On in His Human Nature

Next we have to consider the weaknesses (*defectus*) that pertain to Christ's soul. And on this topic there are ten questions: (1) Did sin exist in Christ? (2) Did the stimulant to sin (*fomes peccati*) exist in Christ? (3) Did ignorance (*ignorantia*) exist in Christ? (4) Was Christ's soul passible (*passibilis*)? (5) Did sensed pain (*dolor sensibilis*) exist in Christ? (6) Did sadness (*tristitia*) exist in Christ? (7) Did fear (*timor*) exist in Christ? (8) Did wonder or amazement (*admiratio*) exist in Christ? (9) Did anger (*ira*) exist in Christ? (10) Was Christ simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender [of God's essence] (*simul viator et comprehensor*).

#### Article 1

##### Did sin exist in Christ?

It seems that sin existed in Christ (*in Christo fuerit peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** Psalm 21:2 says, "My God, my God, why have You forsaken me? Far from my salvation are the words of my sins (*longe a salute mea verba delictorum meorum*)." But these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as is clear from the fact that He Himself uttered them on the cross. Therefore, it seems that sins (*delicta*) existed in Christ.

**Objection 2:** In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, "In Adam all have sinned," viz., because in him they existed in their origin (*quia in eo originaliter fuerent*). But Christ likewise existed in Adam in His origin. Therefore, He sinned in Adam.

**Objection 3:** In Hebrews 2:18 the Apostle says, "In that which He Himself suffered and in which He was tempted, He is able to help those who are likewise tempted." But we especially need His help in opposition to sin. Therefore, it seems that sin existed in Him.

**Objection 4:** 2 Corinthians 5:21 says, "God made Him," viz., Christ, "who did not know sin, sin for our sake." But what has been made by God truly exists. Therefore, sin truly existed in Christ.

**Objection 5:** As Augustine says in *De Agone Christiano*, "In the man Christ the Son of God presented an example to us." But a man needs an example not only for living uprightly, but also for repenting of his sins. Therefore, it seems that Christ had to sin in order that He might give us an example of repenting of sin.

**But contrary to this:** In John 8:46 Christ Himself says, "Who among you will convict me of sin?"

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 14, a. 1), Christ took on our weaknesses (a) in order to make satisfaction for us, (b) in order to attest to the reality of His human nature, and (c) in order to give us an example of virtue. Given these three things, it is clear that it was not fitting for Him to take on the weakness of sin:

For, first, sin contributes nothing to making satisfaction and, at the very least, impedes the power to make satisfaction, since, as Ecclesiasticus 34:23 says, "The Most High does not approve of the gifts of the wicked."

Similarly, the reality of Christ's human nature is not shown by sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whose cause is God; instead, it is something contrary to human nature that was introduced "by being sown by the devil," as Damascene puts it.

Third, He could not have given an example of virtue by sinning, since sin is contrary to virtue.

And so Christ did not in any way take on the weakness of sin, either original sin or actual sin—this according to 1 Peter 2:22 ("He committed no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth").

**Reply to objection 1:** In one way, as Damascene explains in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, things are said of Christ in accord with a *natural* and *hypostatic* property (*secundum proprietatem naturalem et hypostaticam*), as when it is said that He became a man or that He suffered for us, whereas, in a second

way, in accord with a *personal* and *relative* property (*secundum proprietatem personalem et habitudinalem*), things are said of Him in our person which do not in any way belong to Him in His own right.

Hence, among the seven rules of Tichonius that Augustine cites in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3, the first is posited with respect to “our Lord and His body,” viz., when “Christ and the Church are thought of as one person.” Accordingly, Christ is speaking in the person of His members when He says “the words of my sins,” and it is not the case that sin existed in the Head Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 10, Christ did not exist in Abraham and in other fathers in all the same ways in which we ourselves exist in them. For we existed in Adam both (a) according to the seminal power and (b) according to the corpulent substance, because, as Augustine says in the same place, “In the semen there is a visible corpulence and an invisible power, and both come from Adam. By contrast, Christ took up the visible substance of flesh from the flesh of the virgin, but the power of His conception came not from male semen, but in a wholly different way and from above.” Hence, Christ existed in Adam not according to the seminal power, but only according to the corpulent substance. And so Christ received human nature from Adam not actively, but only materially (*non active sed solum materialiter*), whereas He received it actively from the Holy Spirit, in the same way that Adam himself received his body materially from the slime of the earth and actively from God. Because of this, Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He existed only with respect to the matter.

**Reply to objection 3:** By His temptation and passion Christ provided us with help by making satisfaction for us. But sin does not work toward making satisfaction; instead, as has been explained, it impedes it. And so it was not necessary for Him to have sin within Himself. Instead, it was necessary for Him to be altogether free of sin; otherwise, the punishment that He sustained would have been owed for His own sin.

**Reply to objection 4:** God made Christ sin—not, to be sure, in the sense that Christ had sin in His own right, but because He made Him a sacrifice for sin. As Hosea 4:8 says, “They shall eat the sins of my people,” that is, the priests, who, in accord with the Law, ate the sin-offerings. And it is along these lines that Isaiah 53:6 says, “The Lord placed on him the iniquities of all of us,” viz., because He handed him over to be the sacrifice for the sins of all men.

An alternative reply is that God made Christ sin in the sense that, as Romans 8:3 puts it, He made Him to “have the likeness of sin.” And that is why He assumed a passible and mortal body.

**Reply to objection 5:** A penitent can give a laudable example not by the fact that he has sinned, but by voluntarily undergoing the punishment for the sin. Hence, Christ gave the greatest example of all to penitents when He willed to submit Himself to the punishment for the sins of others instead of for His own sin.

## Article 2

### Did the stimulant to sin (*fomes peccati*) exist in Christ?

It seems that the stimulant to sin existed in Christ (*in Christo fuerit fomes peccati*):

**Objection 1:** The stimulant to sin and the body’s passibility or mortality are derived from the same principle, viz., the removal of original justice, through which the lower powers of the soul were subordinated to reason and the body was subordinated to the soul. But the passibility and mortality of the body existed in Christ. Therefore, the stimulant to sin likewise existed in Him.

**Objection 2:** As Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, “It was by the consent of the divine will (*beneplacito divinae voluntatis*) that the flesh was permitted to suffer and to do what was proper to

it.” But it is proper to the flesh to desire in a disordered way what is pleasurable to it (*proprium est carni ut concupiscat delectabilia sibi*). Therefore, since, as a Gloss on Romans 7:8 explains, the stimulant to sin is nothing other than disordered sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), it seems that the stimulant to sin existed in Christ.

**Objection 3:** As Galatians 5:17 says, it is by reason of the stimulant to sin that “the flesh has desires in opposition to the spirit.” But the stronger and the more worthy of the crown the spirit is shown to be, the more it dominates over the enemy, viz., concupiscence of the flesh—this according to 2 Timothy 2:5 (“He will win no crown unless he legitimately struggles”). But Christ had the strongest and most victorious spirit of all, and He was the most worthy of the crown—this according to Apocalypse 6:2 (“A crown was given to Him, and He went out victorious, in order to win victory”). Therefore, it seems that the stimulant to sin should have existed especially in Christ.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 1:20 says, “What is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit.” But the Holy Spirit excludes sin, and He excludes the inclination toward sin, which is what the term ‘stimulant’ implies. Therefore, the stimulant to sin did not exist in Christ.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 7, aa. 2-9), Christ had grace and all the virtues in the most perfect way. But as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 56, a. 4), a moral virtue, which resides in the non-rational part of the soul, makes that part of the soul subject to reason, and the more so the more perfect the virtue is.

Now the character of the stimulant to sin involves the sensual appetite’s being inclined toward that which is contrary to reason. So, then, it is clear that the more perfect a given individual’s virtue is, the weaker the power of the stimulant is in him. Therefore, since virtue existed in Christ to the most perfect degree, it follows that the stimulant to sin did not exist in Him. In addition, this sort of weakness cannot be ordered toward making satisfaction, but instead inclines one toward the opposite of satisfaction.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from *Ethics* 1, the lower powers belonging to the sentient appetite are naturally able to obey reason, but not the bodily powers, either the powers of the bodily humors or, again, the powers of the vegetative soul. And so the perfection of virtue, which has to do with right reason, does not exclude the passibility of the body, whereas it does exclude the stimulant to sin, the character of which consists in the sentient appetite’s resistance to reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The flesh naturally desires what is pleasurable to it, but the flesh of a man, who is a rational animal, desires this in the manner and order that belongs to reason. And as is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, it is in this way that Christ’s flesh, by the concupiscence of the sentient appetite, naturally desired food and drink and sleep and other things of this sort, which are desired in accordance with right reason. However, from this it does not follow that Christ had the stimulant to sin, which involves desiring what is pleasurable outside of the order of reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some degree of fortitude of spirit is shown by the fact that the spirit resists the concupiscence of the flesh that is opposed to it, but greater strength of spirit is shown if, because of its virtue, the spirit is totally prevented from being able to have sentient desires that are opposed to the spirit. And so this belonged to Christ, whose spirit reached the highest degree of fortitude. And even though He did not experience *interior* attacks from the stimulus to sin, He nonetheless experienced *exterior* attacks from the world and the devil, and by conquering them He merited the crown of victory.

### Article 3

#### Did ignorance exist in Christ?

It seems that ignorance existed in Christ (*in Christo fuerit ignorantia*):

**Objection 1:** There were things that truly existed in Christ and belonged to Him with respect to

His human nature, even though they did not belong to His divine nature, e.g., His passion and death. But ignorance befits Christ with respect to His human nature; for in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says that He assumed “an ignorant and servile nature.” Therefore, ignorance truly existed in Christ.

**Objection 2:** An individual is called ignorant because of a lack of knowledge (*per notitiae defectum*). But there was knowledge that was lacking to Christ; for in 2 Corinthians 5:21 the Apostle says, “He who did not know sin was such that God made Him sin for our sake.” Therefore, ignorance existed in Christ.

**Objection 3:** Isaiah 8:4 says, “Before the child knows how to call his father and his mother, the strength of Damascus will be taken away.” But that child is Christ. Therefore, ignorance of some things existed in Christ.

**But contrary to this:** Ignorance is not removed by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance, since He came “to illumine those who live in darkness and in the shadow of death” (Luke 1:79). Therefore, ignorance did not exist in Christ.

**I respond:** Just as the fullness of grace and virtue existed in Christ, so, too, as is clear from what has gone before (q. 7, aa. 2 & 9, qq. 9-12), the fullness of all knowledge existed in Him. But just as the fullness of grace and virtue in Christ excludes the stimulant to sin (*fomes peccati*), so the fullness of knowledge excludes ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, just as the stimulant to sin did not exist in Christ, so neither did ignorance exist in Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which the nature assumed by Christ can be thought of:

In one way, *with respect to the character of its species*. And it is on this score that Damascene claims that the nature is ignorant and servile. This is why he adds, “For the nature of man is the servant of Him who made it, God, and it does not have knowledge of future things.”

In the second way it can be thought of *with respect to what it has because of its union with a divine hypostasis*, and because of this union it has the fullness of knowledge and grace—this according to John 1:14 (“We have seen Him, as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth”). And this is the sense in which the human nature in Christ did not have ignorance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Christ is said not to have known sin because He did not know it through His own experience. However, He did know it through His simple knowledge (*scivit per simplicem notitiam*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The prophet is here talking about Christ’s human knowledge. Therefore, what he is saying is this: “Before the child knows how”—i.e., according to His human knowledge—“to call his father”—Joseph, who was putatively His father—“and his mother”—viz., Mary—“the strength of Damascus will be taken away.”

This should be understood to mean not that at one time He will be a man and not know [how to call His father], but instead that before He knows it, i.e., before the man having human knowledge comes to be, then either (a), in the literal sense, the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria will be taken away by the king of the Assyrians, or (b), in the spiritual sense, as a Gloss of Jerome’s explains it, that the yet unborn child will save His people by a mere invocation.

On the other hand, in *Sermo de Epiphania* Augustine claims that this [prophecy] was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says, “Before He pronounced human words through His human flesh, He received the power of Damascus, viz., riches, in which Damascus trusted, and among riches the principal place is given to gold. The riches themselves were the spoils of Samaria; for Samaria stands for idolatry, since from there the people turned to the worship of idols. Thus, the boy took away the first spoils of idolatry.” And on this reading, “Before the child knows” means “Before the child shows that He knows.”

## Article 4

### Was Christ's soul passible?

It seems that Christ's soul was not passible (*anima Christi non fuerit passibilis*):

**Objection 1:** Nothing is acted upon (*patitur*) except by something stronger, since, as is clear from Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, "the agent is superior to the patient." But no creature was superior to Christ's soul. Therefore, Christ's soul could not have been acted upon by anything.

**Objection 2:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* Tully says that the passions of the soul are certain sicknesses. But there was no sickness in Christ's soul, since a sickness of the soul follows upon sin, as is clear from Psalm 40:5 ("Cure my soul, since I have sinned against you"). Therefore, there were no passions of the soul in Christ.

**Objection 3:** The passions of the soul seem to be the same thing as the stimulus to sin (*fomes peccati*); this is why in Romans 7:5 the Apostle calls them "passions of the sins." But as was explained above (a. 2), the stimulus to sin did not exist in Christ. Therefore, it seems that the passions of the soul did not exist in Him. And so Christ's soul was not passible.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 87:4 says in the person of Christ, "My soul is full of evil things"—not, to be sure, full of sins, but full of human evils, "that is, sorrows (*doloribus*)," as a Gloss on the same verse explains. So, then, Christ's soul was passible.

**I respond:** There two ways in which a soul placed in a body can be acted upon: (a) by a *bodily passion* and (b) by an *animal passion*.

The soul is acted on by a *bodily passion* because of a bodily injury (*per corporis laesionem*). For since the soul is the form of a body, it follows that the *esse* of the soul and the body is one, and so when the body is disturbed by some bodily passion, the soul must be incidentally disturbed, viz., with respect to the *esse* that it has in the body. Therefore, since, as was established above (q. 14, aa. 1 -2), Christ's body was passible and mortal, His soul had to be passible in the way in question.

On the other hand, the soul is said to be acted upon by an *animal passion* in accord with an operation that either is proper to the soul or belongs more principally to the soul than to the body. And although, as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 22, a. 3 and q. 41, a. 1), the soul is said to be acted upon in this way even in its acts of understanding and sensing, it is the passions of the soul which are most properly called the affections of the sentient appetite and which existed in Christ, just like everything else that belonged to the nature of a man. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "Our Lord Himself, having deigned to live in the form of a servant, applied [the passions] whenever He judged that they should be applied. For in Him, in whom there was a real human body and a real human mind, there was no spurious human affection."

However, it must be noted that there are three respects in which passions of this sort existed differently in Christ from the way they exist in us:

First, with respect to their *object*. For in us passions of this sort tend for the most part toward what is illicit—something that did not happen in Christ.

Second, with respect to their *principle*. For in us passions of this sort frequently preempt the judgment of reason, but in Christ all the movements of the sentient appetite arose in accord with reason's regulation (*oriebantur secundum dispositionem rationis*). Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "With the grace of a firmly fixed dispensation, Christ took up these movements with His human mind when He willed to, just as He had become a man when He willed to."

Third, with respect to their *effect*. For in us movements of the sort in question sometimes do not stop in the sentient appetite but instead drag reason along with them. This did not happen in Christ, since by His disposition movements that are naturally appropriate for human flesh remained in the sentient

appetite in such a way that they did not impede reason from doing what was appropriate. Hence, in *Super Matthaenum* Jerome says, “Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed man, was, to be sure, truly saddened, but, lest that passion should dominate His mind, it is said that He ‘began to be sad’ through a passionate inclination (*per propassionem*).” Thus, a passion is understood to be *complete* (*perfecta*) when it dominates the mind, whereas there is a ‘passionate inclination’ (*propassio*) when the passion begins in the sentient appetite, but does not extend itself any further.

**Reply to objection 1:** To be sure, Christ could have suppressed the passions so that they would not come upon Him, especially given His divine power. However, by His own will He subjected Himself to the passions, both the bodily passions and the animal passions.

**Reply to objection 2:** Tully is here talking in accord with the opinion of the Stoics, who did not call just any movements of the sentient appetite ‘passions’. Instead, they called only *disordered* movements ‘passions’. And it is clear that passions of this sort did not exist in Christ.

**Reply to objection 3:** The ‘passions of the sins’ are movements of the sentient appetite that tend toward what is illicit—something that did not exist in Christ, as neither did the stimulant to sin.

## Article 5

### Did real sensible pain exist in Christ?

It seems that real sensible pain did not exist in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit verus dolor sensibilis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Hilary says, “Since with Christ, to die was life, what pain should He be thought to have suffered in the mystery of His death—He who bestows life on those who die for Him?” And later he adds, “The only-begotten God assumed a true man, not ceasing to be God; and even though blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and being suspended [on the cross] elevated Him, and even though these things brought with them the vehemence of the passion, they nonetheless brought no pain.” Therefore, real pain did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 2:** It seems proper to flesh conceived in sin that it is subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was not conceived with sin, but was instead conceived of the Holy Spirit in the virginal womb. Therefore, it was not subject to the necessity of suffering pain.

**Objection 3:** The delight of contemplating divine things diminishes sensitivity to pain; hence, in their passions even the martyrs sustained their pain with more tolerance because of their consideration of God’s love. But Christ’s soul delighted to the highest degree in the contemplation of God, whom, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 2), it saw through His essence. Therefore, Christ’s soul could not have sensed any pain.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 53:4 says, “Surely He has borne our griefs and carried our sorrows (*dolores*).”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 35, a. 7), a bodily wound and the sensing of the wound are required for the reality of sensible pain. But Christ’s body was able to be wounded, since, as has been established (q. 14, aa. 1-2), it was passible and mortal. Nor did he lack sensation of wounds, since Christ’s soul perfectly possessed all the powers of His [human] nature. Thus, no one should doubt that real pain existed in Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** In all these and similar passages Hilary does not mean to exclude real pain from Christ’s flesh, but instead he means to exclude necessity. Hence, after the quoted words he adds, “Nor, when He was thirsty or hungry or weeping, was the Lord shown to have drunk or to have eaten or to have mourned. But in order to prove the reality of the body, the body’s customs were looked to, so that the customs of our nature made up for the customs of our body. Alternatively, when He took drink or food, He acceded not to the body’s necessity, but to its customs.” And as was explained above (q. 14,

aa. 1&3), he was using ‘necessity’ relative to the *first cause* of the weaknesses in question, viz., *sin*, so that Christ’s flesh is said not to have been subject to the *necessity* of those weaknesses because there was no sin in His flesh. Hence, he adds, “For He”—viz., Christ—“had a body, but one which was appropriate to His origin and which did not exist because of the vices belonging to our conception, but which subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His own power.”

Still, as was established above (q. 14, a. 3), with regard to the *proximate cause* of those weaknesses, which is *being composed of contraries*, Christ’s flesh was subject to the necessity of the weaknesses.

**Reply to objection 2:** Flesh that has been conceived in sin is subject to pain not only by the necessity of natural principles, but by the necessity of the guilt that belongs to sin. This latter sort of necessity did not exist in Christ, but only the necessity of natural principles.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 14, a. 1), by the power of Christ’s divinity, beatitude was restricted by a dispensation in such a way that it did not flow over into His body and thus destroy the body’s passibility and mortality. And, in the same way, the delight of contemplation was restricted in His mind in such a way that it did not flow over into the sentient powers and thereby exclude sensible pain.

## Article 6

### Did sadness exist in Christ?

It seems that sadness did not exist in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit tristitia*):

**Objection 1:** Isaiah 42:4 says of Christ, “He will not be sad or agitated.”

**Objection 2:** Proverbs 12:21 says, “The just man will not be sad, no matter what happens to him.” And the Stoics claimed that the reason for this is that no one is sad except because of the loss of his goods. But the just man thinks that his only goods are justice and virtue, which he cannot lose. Otherwise, the just man would be subject to fortune if he were saddened by the loss of goods of fortune. But Christ was just to the highest degree—this according to Jeremiah 23:6 (“This is the name that they will call him: our just Lord.”) Therefore, sadness did not exist in Him.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that all sadness and evil is to be fled from. But no evil or thing to be fled from existed in Christ. Therefore, sadness did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 4:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Sadness has to do with what happens to us unwillingly.” But Christ suffered nothing contrary to His will; for Isaiah 53:7 says, “He was offered up because He Himself willed it.” Therefore, sadness did not exist in Christ.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 26:38 our Lord says, “My soul is saddened unto death.” And in *De Trinitate* 2 Ambrose says, “As a man, He had sadness, for He bore my sadness. I confidently call it sadness, since I preach the cross.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 5), the delight of divine contemplation is restricted in Christ’s mind by a dispensation of God’s power in such a way that it did not flow over into the sentient powers and thereby exclude sensible pain. Now just as sensible pain exists in the sentient appetite, so, too, does sadness. However, there is a difference between their motives or objects. For the object and motive of pain is an injury that is perceived by the sense of touch, as when someone is wounded. By contrast, as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 35, aa. 2&7), the object and motive of sadness is something harmful or bad that is apprehended interiorly, either by reason or by the imagination, as when an individual is saddened by the loss of grace or by the loss of money.

Now Christ’s soul was interiorly able to apprehend something as harmful, both (a) with respect to Himself, as His passion and death were, and (b) with respect to others, e.g., the sins of His disciples or even of the Jews who killed Him. And so just as real pain was able to exist in Christ, so, too, real sadness

was able to exist in Him—though in a way different from the way in which it exists in us, in accord with the three things, [viz., *object*, *principle*, and *effect*], that were designated above (a. 4) when we were talking in general about the passions that belonged to Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sadness is denied of Christ as a complete passion (*secundum passionem perfectam*), but initiated sadness, through a passionate inclination, did exist in him (*fuit tamen in eo [tristitia] initiata secundum propassionem*) (cf. a. 4). For as Jerome says, “To be sad is one thing, to begin to be sad is another.”

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, “Instead of the three disturbances”—viz., sentient desire (*cupiditas*), joy (*laetitia*), and fear (*timor*)—“the Stoics posited three types of *eupatheia*”—that is, good passions—“in the soul of the wise man, viz., *will* (*voluntas*) instead of sentient desire, *joy* (*gaudium*) instead of delight, and, *apprehension* (*metus*) instead of fear. But as regards sadness (*tristitia*), they denied that any such thing can exist in the mind of the wise man, since sadness has to do with something bad that has already occurred, whereas they thought that nothing bad can happen to a wise man.” And the reason for this is that they did not believe anything to be good except the morally upright (*nisi honestum*), which makes men good; and they did not believe anything to be bad except the morally evil (*nisi inhonestum*), by which men become bad.

Now even though the morally upright is the principal good of a man and the morally bad the principal evil of a man, given that they belong to reason itself, which is the principal thing in a man, nonetheless there are certain secondary goods of a man that belong either to the body itself or to exterior things that are of service to the body. And, accordingly, sadness can exist in the mind of a wise man with respect to the sentient appetite when he apprehends bad things of this sort—yet not in such a way that this sadness perturbs reason. And on this score one also sees that “whatever happens to a just man will not sadden him,” because his reason is not perturbed by anything that happens. And it is in this way that sadness existed in Christ not as a [complete] passion, but as a passionate inclination (*secundum propassionem, non secundum passionem*) (cf. a. 4).

**Reply to objection 3:** Every instance of sadness is an evil of punishment (*malum poenae*) and yet not every instance of sadness is a sinful evil (*malum culpae*); it is a sinful evil only when it proceeds from a disordered affection. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “When these affections follow right reason and are applied when and where it is necessary, who would dare to call them morbid or vicious passions?”

**Reply to objection 4:** Nothing prevents a thing from being contrary to the will in its own right (*secundum se*) and yet willed because of the end toward which it is ordered—in the way that bitter medicine is willed not in its own right, but only insofar as it is ordered toward health. And in this sense Christ’s death and His passion, considered in themselves, were involuntary and causes of sadness, even though they were voluntary in relation to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.

## Article 7

### Did fear exist in Christ?

It seems that fear did not exist in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit timor*):

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 28:1 says, “The just man, like a confident lion, will be without terror (*absque terrore*).” But Christ is a just man to the highest degree. Therefore, there was not any fear in Christ.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Hilary says, “I ask those who think this way whether it stands to reason that He would fear death, given that He drove all fear of death out of the apostles and exhorted them to the glory of martyrdom.” Therefore, it does not make sense for fear to have existed in Christ.

**Objection 3:** Fear has to do, it seems, only with an evil that a man cannot avoid. But Christ was able to avoid both the evil of punishment, which He suffered, and the evil of sin, which happens to others. Therefore, no fear existed in Christ.

**But contrary to this:** Mark 14:33 says, “Jesus began to feel dread and to be exceedingly troubled (*coepit taedere et pavere*).”

**I respond:** Just as sadness is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so, too, fear is caused by the apprehension of a future evil. However, if the apprehension of a future evil has complete certitude, then it does not induce terror. Hence, in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher explains that fear exists only where there is some hope of escape; for when there is no hope of escape, then the evil is apprehended as present and so is a cause of sadness rather than fear.

So, then, fear can be thought of in two respects:

In one way, with respect to the fact that the sentient appetite naturally recoils from bodily injury both through *sadness*, if the injury is present, and through *fear*, if it is future. And in this way fear existed in Christ, as did sadness as well.

In the second way, fear can be thought with respect to the lack of certitude surrounding a future event, as when at night we are afraid of a sound when we do not know what it is. And in this respect, as Damascene explains in *De Fide Orthodoxa 3*, fear did not exist in Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** The just man is said to be without terror insofar as ‘terror’ implies the *complete* passion, which turns a man away from the good that belongs to reason (*secundum quod terror importat perfectam passionem avertentem hominem a bono quod est rationis*). And fear did not exist in Christ in this sense, but instead existed in Him only as a passionate inclination (*solum secundum propassionem*). And that is why it is said that Jesus “began to feel dread and to be exceedingly troubled”—by way of a passionate inclination (*quasi secundum propassionem*), as explained above by Jerome (a. 4).

**Reply to objection 2:** Hilary is excluding fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sadness, viz., by invoking the *necessity* to fear. But still, in order to prove the reality of His human nature, Christ took on fear *voluntarily* in the same way that He took on sadness voluntarily.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though Christ could have avoided future evils by means of His divine power, nonetheless, those evils were unavoidable or, at least, not easily avoidable, given the weakness of His flesh.

## Article 8

### Did wonder or amazement exist in Christ?

It seems that wonder or amazement did not exist in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit admiratio*):

**Objection 1:** In *Metaphysics 1* the Philosopher says that wonder is caused by an individual’s seeing an effect and not knowing the cause, and so wonder belongs only to someone who is ignorant. But as has been explained (a. 3), ignorance did not exist in Christ. Therefore, wonder did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 2:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa 2* Damascene says, “Amazement (*admiratio*) is a fear that arises from imagining something great,” and this is why in *Ethics 4* the Philosopher says, “A magnanimous individual is not amazed.” But Christ was magnanimous to the highest degree. Therefore, amazement did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 3:** No one is amazed at what he himself can do or make. But Christ was able to do or to make any great thing existing in reality (*facere potuit quidquid magnum erat in rebus*). Therefore, it seems that He was not amazed by anything.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 8:10 says, “Hearing this,” viz., the words of the centurion, “Jesus

was amazed.”

**I respond:** Properly speaking, wonder or amazement (*admiratio*) has to do with something new and out of the ordinary (*de novo aliquo insolito*). But in Christ there could not have been anything new and out of the ordinary with respect to His divine knowledge nor, again, with respect to the human knowledge by which (a) He had cognition of things in the Word or by which (b) He had cognition of things through infused [intelligible] species. However, there could have been something new to Him and out of the ordinary with respect to His *experiential knowledge*, in accord with which He could have happened upon something new and out of the ordinary every day.

And so if we are talking about Christ as regards His divine knowledge or beatific knowledge or even His infused knowledge, then wonder or amazement did not exist in Christ. By contrast, if we are talking about Him as regards His experiential knowledge, then wonder or amazement was able to exist in Him. And He took up this affection for our instruction—more specifically, in order that he might teach us to be amazed by what He Himself was likewise amazed by. Hence in *Super Genesim Contra Manicheos* 1 Augustine says, “The fact that our Lord was amazed is a sign that we ourselves should be amazed by things that it is still necessary to be so moved by. Hence, such movements of His are signs not of a disturbed mind, but of one who is giving instruction (*sed docentis magisterium*).”

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though there is nothing that Christ is ignorant of, something by which wonder or amazement would be caused could still have occurred for the first time (*de novo*) to His experiential knowledge.

**Reply to objection 2:** Christ was amazed by the centurion’s faith not because it was great in relation to Himself, but because it was great in relation to others.

**Reply to objection 3:** He could have done or made all things given His divine power, in accord with which amazement did not exist in Him, but instead, as has been explained, He was amazed only with respect to His human experiential knowledge.

## Article 9

### Did anger exist in Christ?

It seems that anger did not exist in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit ira*):

**Objection 1:** James 1:20 says, “The anger of a man does not bring about the righteousness of God.” But everything that Christ did belonged to God’s righteousness, since, as 1 Corinthians 1:30 says, “He was made righteousness for us by God.” Therefore, it seems that anger did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 2:** Anger (*ira*) is opposed to gentleness or meekness (*mansuetudo*). But Christ was gentle to the highest degree. Therefore, anger did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, “Anger that arises from a moral failing (*ira per vitium*) blinds the mind’s eye, whereas anger that arises from zeal (*ira per zelum*) disturbs the mind’s eye.” But in Christ the mind’s eye was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore, in Christ anger that comes from a moral failing did not exist, and neither did anger that comes from zeal.

**But contrary to this:** John 2:17 speaks of the fulfillment of Psalm 68:10: “Zeal for Your house has consumed me.”

**I respond:** As was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 46, a. 3 and *ST* 2-2, q. 158, a. 2), anger (*ira*) is an effect of sadness (*tristitia*). For from sadness inflicted on an individual, what follows in him, as regards his sentient appetite, is a desire to repel the injury inflicted on himself or on others. And so anger is a passion composed of sadness and a desire for retribution (*ex tristitia et appetitu vindictae*).

Now it has been explained (a. 6) that sadness was able to exist in Christ. Again, the desire for retribution is sometimes sinful, viz., when an individual seeks retribution for himself outside the order of

reason. And so anger could not have existed in Christ in this way; for this is called anger arising from a *moral failing (ira per vitium)*.

By contrast, sometimes the desire for retribution exists without sin and is indeed praiseworthy, viz., when an individual desires retribution within the order of justice. And this is called anger arising from *zeal*. For in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “The one who is consumed by zeal for the house of God is he who wishes to correct all the perverse things he sees, and if he cannot correct them, he endures them and groans.” Such was the anger in Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Gregory explains in *Moralia* 5, there are two ways in which anger exists in a man:

For sometimes the anger *precedes reason* and drags reason along with it into action. And in such a case anger is properly said to operate, since an operation is attributed to the principal agent. And this is the way in which one understands that “the anger of a man does not bring about the righteousness of God.”

By contrast, sometimes the anger *follows upon reason* and is, as it were, reason’s instrument. And in such a case the operation, which is an operation of justice, is attributed to reason and not to the anger.

**Reply to objection 2:** Anger which violates the order of reason is opposed to gentleness, but not anger which is moderated and reduced to the mean by reason. For gentleness occupies the mean in the case of anger.

**Reply to objection 3:** In us, according to the natural order, the powers of the soul mutually impede one another in such a way that when the operation of one power is intense, the operation of a second power is weakened. And from this it follows that even if a movement of anger is moderated by reason, it in some way impedes the eye of a contemplating soul.

However, in the case of Christ, through an adjustment belonging to the divine power, each power was permitted to do what was proper to it in such a way that one power was not impeded by another. And so just as the delight of the contemplating mind did not impede the sadness or pain of the lower part [of the soul], so too, conversely, the passions of the lower part in no way impeded the act of reason.

## Article 10

### Was Christ simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender [of God’s essence]?

It seems that Christ was not simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender [of God's essence] (*Christus non fuerit simul viator et comperhensor*):

**Objection 1:** Being a wayfarer (*viator*) involves moving toward the end of beatitude, whereas being a comprehender (*comperhensor*) involves resting in the end. But it cannot simultaneously belong to the same individual that he is both moving toward the end and resting in the end. Therefore, it could not have been simultaneously the case that Christ was both a wayfarer and a comprehender.

**Objection 2:** To move toward beatitude, or to obtain it, belongs to a man with respect to his soul and not with respect to his body; hence, in *Epistola ad Dioscorum* Augustine says, “What flows over into the lower nature, i.e., the body, is not beatitude, which is proper to what enjoys and understands..” But even though Christ had a passible body, it was still with respect to His mind that He fully enjoyed God. Therefore, Christ was a pure comprehender and not a wayfarer.

**Objection 3:** The saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in graves, enjoy beatitude with their souls, even though their bodies are subjected to death; and yet they are called simply comprehenders and not wayfarers. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, even though Christ’s body was mortal, nevertheless, since His mind was enjoying God, it seems that He was a sheer comprehender and in no way a wayfarer.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 14:8 says, “... you will be like a peasant on the land, like a wayfarer who turns aside to tarry for a while.”

**I respond:** An individual is called a wayfarer because he is tending toward beatitude, whereas an individual is called a comprehender from the fact that he has already obtained beatitude—this according to 1 Corinthians 9:24 (“Run in such a way as to comprehend”) and Philippians 3:12 (“I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend”).

Now as was established in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 4, a. 6), a man’s complete beatitude consists in the soul and in the body—in the soul, to be sure, with respect to what is proper to it, insofar as the mind sees and enjoys God, while in the body, insofar as the body “will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption,” as 1 Corinthians 15:42 puts it.

Now before His passion, Christ saw God fully with His mind, and so He had beatitude with respect to what is proper to the soul. However, He lacked beatitude with respect to other things, since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 4 and q. 14, aa. 1-2), (a) His soul was passible and (b) His body was passible and mortal. And so He was at the same time (a) *a comprehender*, insofar as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and (b) *a wayfarer*, insofar as He was tending toward beatitude with respect to what He was lacking of beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is impossible to be moving toward the end and resting in the end in the same respect. But there is nothing to prevent this in different respects, in the way that a man is *knowledgeable* with respect to what he already knows and *learning* with respect to what he does not yet know.

**Reply to objection 2:** Beatitude is seated properly and principally in the soul with respect to the mind. However, secondarily, and, as it were, instrumentally, goods of the body are required for beatitude—in the way that the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 1 that exterior goods are *organically* of service to beatitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** The line of reasoning is not the same for the souls of the dead saints and for Christ, and this for two reasons:

First, because the souls of the saints are not now passible in the way that Christ’s soul was.

Second, because their bodies are not now doing anything by which they tend toward beatitude, in the way that Christ, by the passions that belonged to His body, was tending toward beatitude as regards the glory of the body.