

QUESTION 11

The Knowledge Infixed in, i.e., Infused into, Christ's Soul

Next we have to consider the knowledge infixed in, i.e., infused into, Christ's soul (*de scientia indita vel infusa animae Christi*). And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Did Christ know all things through this sort of knowledge? (2) Was He able to make use of this knowledge without turning toward phantasms? (3) Was this sort of knowledge comparative (*collativa*)? (4) How does this sort of knowledge compare with angelic knowledge? (5) Did this sort of knowledge involve habits? (6) Was this sort of knowledge divided by diverse habits?

Article 1

Did Christ have cognition of all things by His infused knowledge?

It seems that Christ did not have cognition of all things by His infused knowledge (*secundum hanc scientiam Christus non cognoverit omnia*):

Objection 1: The knowledge under discussion was infused into Christ to perfect the power of His intellect. But the passive intellect that belongs to the human soul seems to be in potentiality not to all things absolutely speaking, but only to those things (a) with respect to which it can be actualized by the active intellect, the proper activator of the passive intellect, and (b) which are knowable by natural reason. Therefore, Christ does not by the knowledge under discussion have cognition of those things that go beyond natural reason.

Objection 2: As *De Anima* 3 explains, phantasms are related to the human intellect as colors are related to sight. But the perfection of the visual power does not involve having cognition of things that are altogether without color. Therefore, neither does the perfection of the human intellect involve having cognition of things that there cannot be phantasms of, viz., the separated substances. So, then, since knowledge of the sort under discussion was in Christ in order to perfect His intellectual soul, it seems that He did not have cognition of the separated substances by knowledge of this sort.

Objection 3: The perfection of the intellect does not involve having cognition of singular things. Therefore, it seems that Christ's soul did not have cognition of singular things by the knowledge under discussion.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 11:2-3 says, "He will be filled with the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, of knowledge and of counsel"—under which all knowable things are included. For wisdom involves the cognition of all divine things; understanding involves the cognition of all immaterial things; knowledge involves the cognition of all conclusions; and counsel involves the cognition of all things that are doable. Therefore, it seems that, by the knowledge infused into Him by the Holy Spirit, Christ had cognition of all things.

I respond: As was previously explained (q. 9, a. 1), it was fitting for Christ's soul to be perfected in all things by having all its potentiality actualized (*per hoc quod omnis eius potentialitas sit reducta ad actum*). However, one has to take into account that in the human soul, as in any creature, there are two sorts of passive potentiality to consider: (a) the one in relation to a *natural agent*, and (b) the other in relation to *the First Agent*, who is able to bring any creature to a higher actuality which a natural agent does not bring it to (*qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale*). And this latter sort of potentiality has customarily been called a *potentiality of obedience* [or *obediential potentiality*] in a creature (*et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creatura*).

Now both of these potentialities in Christ's soul were actualized by the divinely infused knowledge under discussion here. And so, through this sort of knowledge, Christ's soul, first of all, had cognition of all the things that can be known by a man through the power of the light of his active intellect, including

whatever things pertain to human scientific knowledge. Second, through this sort of knowledge Christ had cognition of all those things that are made known to men through divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or to the gift of prophecy or to any of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. For Christ's soul had a more abundant and more complete cognition of all these things than others do.

However, Christ did not have cognition of the very essence of God through this sort of knowledge; instead, He had this cognition only through the first sort of knowledge that was discussed above (q. 10).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the intellective's soul *natural* action, which takes place through its relation to a natural agent, viz., the active intellect.

Reply to objection 2: In the state of the present life, when the human soul is tied to the body in such a way that it cannot have an act of understanding without a phantasm, it cannot have an understanding of separated substances. However, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 89, a. 2), after the state of the present life, the separated soul will in some way be able, in its own right (*per seipsam*), to have cognition of separated substances. And this is clear mainly in the case of the souls of the blessed in heaven.

Now before His passion, Christ was not only a wayfarer, but also a comprehender [of the divine essence]. Hence, His soul was able to have cognition of the separated substances in the manner in which a separated soul has cognition of them.

Reply to objection 3: The perfection of the intellective soul does not involve the cognition of singulars as regards its *theoretical* cognition (*secundum cognitionem speculativum*), but its perfection does involve the cognition of singulars as regards its *practical* cognition (*secundum cognitionem practicum*), which, as *Ethics* 6 explains, is not brought to perfection without the cognition of the singulars that are involved in its operation (*in quibus est operatio*). Hence, as Tully explains in his *Rhetorica*, prudence requires "memory of past things, cognition of present things, and foresight with respect to future things." Therefore, since Christ had the fullness of prudence because of the gift of counsel, it follows that He had cognition of all past, present, and future singular things.

Article 2

Was Christ's soul able to have understanding through His infused knowledge without turning itself toward phantasms?

It seems that Christ's soul was not able to have understanding through His infused knowledge without turning itself toward phantasms (*anima Christi non potuerit intelligere secundum hanc scientiam nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata*):

Objection 1: As *De Anima* 3 explains, phantasms are related to the intellective soul as colors are related to sight. But Christ's visual power was not able to proceed into act without turning itself toward colors. Therefore, His intellective soul was likewise not able to understand anything without turning itself toward phantasms.

Objection 2: Christ's soul is of the same nature with our souls. Otherwise, He would not be of the same species with us—against which the Apostle says in Philippians 2:7, "He was made in the likeness of men." But our soul cannot have understanding without turning itself toward phantasms. Therefore, likewise, neither can Christ's soul.

Objection 3: The senses are given to man to be of service to the intellect. Therefore, if Christ's soul were able to have understanding without turning itself toward phantasms, which are received through the senses, it would follow that it was useless for the sensory powers to exist in Christ's soul—which is absurd. It seems, therefore, that Christ's soul was not able to have understanding without turning itself toward phantasms.

But contrary to this: Christ's soul had cognition of certain things that cannot be cognized through phantasms, viz., separated substances. Therefore, it was able to have understanding without turning itself toward phantasms.

I respond: As will become more clear below (q. 15, a. 10), in His pre-passion state Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender [of the divine essence]. And He had the condition of a wayfarer mainly on the part of His body, to the extent that it was possible, whereas He had the condition of a comprehender mostly on the part of His intellective soul.

Now it is the condition of the soul of a comprehender that it is in no way subject to the body or dependent upon it; instead, the soul completely dominates the body. Hence, after the resurrection, glory will likewise redound from the soul into the body. By contrast, the soul of a man who is a wayfarer needs to turn itself toward phantasms because it is tied to the body and is in some sense subject to it and dependent upon it.

And so beatified souls, both before and after the resurrection, are able to have understanding without turning toward phantasms. And it is necessary to say the same thing about Christ's soul, which fully possessed the capabilities of a comprehender.

Reply to objection 1: The likeness that the Philosopher posits does not apply in every respect. For it is clear that the end of the visual power is to have cognition of colors, whereas the end of the intellective power is not to have cognition of phantasms, but to have cognition of the intelligible species that it takes from the phantasms and apprehends in the phantasms, in accord with the state of the present life. Therefore, the likeness is with respect to what each of the two powers *looks to* and not with respect to what the condition of each power *is terminated in*.

Now nothing prevents a thing, given its diverse states, from tending toward its end by diverse paths, whereas the proper end of a thing is always unified. And so even though the visual power does not have cognition of anything that lacks color, the intellect is, according to its state, able to have cognition without a phantasm, though not without an intelligible species.

Reply to objection 2: Even though Christ's soul was of the same nature as our souls, it nonetheless had a status that our own soul has only in hope and not in reality, viz., the state of a comprehender.

Reply to objection 3: Even though Christ's soul was able to have understanding without turning itself toward phantasms, it was nonetheless likewise able to have understanding by turning itself toward phantasms. And so it was not useless for the sensory powers to exist in Christ's soul, especially since the sensory powers are given to man not only for intellective knowledge, but also for the necessities of animal life.

Article 3

Did Christ's soul have infused knowledge by way of comparison?

It seems that Christ's soul did not have infused knowledge by way of comparison (*anima Christi non habuit hanc scientiam per modum collationis*):

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "We do not say that there is either counsel or choice in Christ." But these things are denied of Christ only because they imply comparison and discursive reasoning. Therefore, it seems that in Christ there was no comparative or discursive knowledge.

Objection 2: A man needs comparison and discursive reasoning in order to investigate what he is ignorant of. But as was explained above (a. 1), Christ had cognition of all things. Therefore, there was no comparative or discursive knowledge in Him.

Objection 3: The knowledge belonging to Christ's soul was in the manner of the comprehenders

[of God's essence], who are like the angels (Matthew 22:30). But as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, in the angels there is no discursive, i.e., comparative, knowledge. Therefore, there was no discursive, i.e., comparative, knowledge in Christ's soul, either.

But contrary to this: As was established above (q. 5, a. 4), Christ had a rational soul. But the proper operation of a rational soul is to compare one thing to another and to proceed discursively from one thing to another. Therefore, there was discursive, i.e., comparative, knowledge in Christ's soul.

I respond: There are two ways in which knowledge can be discursive or comparative:

In one way, with respect to *the acquisition* of the knowledge, as happens in us when we proceed to have a cognition of one thing through another, e.g., effects through causes, or vice versa. And the knowledge that belonged to Christ's soul was not comparative or discursive in this sense, since the sort of knowledge that we are now talking about was divinely infused into Him and not acquired through reason's investigation.

In the second way, knowledge can be called discursive or comparative with respect to *the use of the knowledge*, in the way that knowers sometimes conclude to effects from causes, not in order to learn something for the first time, but because they want to make use of the knowledge that they already have. And it is in this sense that the knowledge belonging to Christ's soul was able to be comparative and discursive. For He was able to conclude to one thing from another as He pleased. For instance, in Matthew 17:24-25, after our Lord had asked Peter, "From whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute, from their sons or from strangers?" when Peter responded, "From strangers," our Lord concluded, "Therefore, the sons are exempt."

Reply to objection 1: What is excluded in the case of Christ is counsel *accompanied by doubt* and, as a result, choice, which includes such counsel in its definition. However, the *use* of counsel is not ruled out in the case of Christ.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of discursive reasoning and comparing when they are ordered toward *acquiring* knowledge.

Reply to objection 3: The blessed in heaven are like the angels as regards the gifts of grace, but there remains a difference that has to do with their natures. And so it is connatural for the souls of the blessed, but not for the angels, to make use of comparison and discursive reasoning.

Article 4

Was the infused knowledge in Christ lesser than in the angels?

It seems that the infused knowledge in Christ was lesser than in the angels (*in Christo huiusmodi scientia fuerit minor quam in angelis*):

Objection 1: Perfection is proportioned to the thing that is perfectible. But according to the order of nature, the human soul falls below the angelic nature. Therefore, since the knowledge we are now talking about was infused into Christ's soul in order to perfect it, it seems that this knowledge fell short of the knowledge by which an angelic nature is perfected.

Objection 2: The knowledge that belonged to Christ's soul was in some sense comparative and discursive—something that cannot be said of the knowledge belonging to the angels. Therefore, the knowledge that belonged to Christ's soul was inferior to the knowledge belonging to the angels.

Objection 3: The more immaterial a type of knowledge is, the greater it is. But the knowledge belonging to the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge belonging to Christ's soul is, since Christ's soul is the act of a body and turns toward phantasms—something that cannot be said of the angels. Therefore, the knowledge belonging to the angels is greater than the knowledge belonging to Christ's soul.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 2:9 the Apostle says, "But we see Jesus, who for a while was

made a little less than the angels, crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death.” From this it is clear that it is only because He suffered death—and thus not because of His knowledge—that Christ is said to be less than the angels.

I respond: The knowledge infused into Christ can be thought of in two ways: (a) what it had from the *cause that infused it (a causa influente)*, and (b) what it had from the *subject that received it (ex subjecto recipiente)*.

As regards the first point, the knowledge infused into Christ’s soul was more excellent than the knowledge belonging to the angels, both with respect to the number of things known and with respect to the certitude of the knowledge, since the spiritual light infused into Christ’s soul is more excellent than the light belonging to the angelic nature.

As regards the second point, the knowledge infused into Christ’s soul is lesser than the knowledge belonging to the angels (*est infra scientiam angelicam*), specifically with respect to the mode of cognition that is natural to the human soul, which is through turning to phantasms and through comparing and discursive reasoning.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 5

Was there habitual knowledge in Christ?

It seems that there was no habitual knowledge in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit habitualis scientia*):

Objection 1: It has been explained (a. 1 and q. 9, a. 1) that the greatest perfection was fitting for Christ’s soul. But the perfection of knowledge that is activated [at the present moment] is greater than the perfection of knowledge that preexists in a habit (*maior est perfectio scientiae existentis in actu quam preexistentis in habitu*). Therefore, it seems to have been fitting for Him to know all things actively (*in actu*). Therefore, He did not have habitual knowledge.

Objection 2: Since a habit is ordered toward its own activation, habitual knowledge that is never activated (*quae numquam in actum reducitur*) seems to be useless. But since, as has already been explained (a. 1), Christ knew all things, He would not have been able to think of all things actively by having a cognition of one thing after another, since it is impossible get through infinitely many things by enumerating them. Therefore, any habitual knowledge in Him would have been useless—which is absurd. Therefore, He had active knowledge—and not habitual knowledge—of all the things that He knew.

Objection 3: Habitual knowledge is a certain perfection of the knower. But a perfection is more noble than what is perfectible. Therefore, if there was a created habit of knowledge in Christ’s soul, then it would follow that something created is more noble than Christ’s soul. Therefore, there was no habitual knowledge in Christ’s soul.

But contrary to this: The knowledge belonging to Christ that is now under discussion was univocal with our knowledge, just as His soul was of one species with our soul. But our [scientific] knowledge is in the genus of *habit*. Therefore, Christ’s knowledge was habitual.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 4), the mode of the knowledge infused into Christ’s soul was appropriate to the receiving subject, since what is received in a subject is received in the mode of the receiver. Now the connatural mode of the human soul is that sometimes there is understanding in actuality, and sometimes there is understanding in potentiality (*quandoque sit intellectus actu, quandoque in potentia*). But in the middle between pure potentiality and completed actuality is the habit.

Now the middle and the endpoints belong to same genus. And so it is clear that the mode connatural to the human soul is to receive [scientific] knowledge in the manner of a habit. And so one

should reply that the knowledge infused into Christ's soul was habitual knowledge, since He was able to use it whenever He wanted to.

Reply to objection 1: There were two sorts of cognition in Christ's soul, and each was maximally perfect in its own way:

One sort, which exceeds human nature, is that knowledge by which Christ's soul saw God's essence and other things in that essence. And this was its most perfect knowledge absolutely speaking. And this cognition was not habitual but activated with respect to all the things that it had cognition of in this way.

The other sort of cognition existed in Christ in a mode proportioned to human nature, so that, more specifically, He had a cognition of things through the species that were divinely infused. This is the sort of cognition that we are presently talking about. And this sort of cognition was not the most perfect absolutely speaking, but the most perfect in the genus of human cognition. Thus, it did not always have to be activated

Reply to objection 2: A habit is activated (*reducitur in actum*) at the command of the will, since a habit is that by which an individual acts when he wills to. Now the will is related to infinitely many things in an indeterminate way. And yet even though the will does not actually tend toward each of these infinitely many things, this is not useless as long as it tends in actuality toward what is fitting for the time and place.

And so, likewise, even though not everything that is subject to a habit is actualized, the habit is not useless as long as what is actualized corresponds to a fitting end that belongs to the will in accord with the demands of particular activities and times.

Reply to objection 3: *Good* and *being* are said in two ways:

In one way, *absolutely speaking*. And on this score what is called good and a being is a substance that subsists in its own *esse* and in its own goodness.

In the second way, a thing is called good and a being *in a certain respect* (*secundum quid*). And on this score it is called an *accidental being* (*ens accidens*), not because it itself has *esse* and goodness, but because its subject is a being and is good (*quia eo subjectum est ens et bonum*).

So, then, habitual knowledge is better or more dignified than Christ's soul *in a certain respect* rather than *absolutely speaking*, because all the goodness of habitual knowledge accrues to the goodness of its subject.

Article 6

Was there more than one habit of knowledge in Christ's soul?

It seems that there was only a single habit of knowledge in Christ's soul (*in anima Christi non fuerit nisi unus habitus scientiae*):

Objection 1: The more perfect knowledge is, the more unified it is; hence, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 55, a. 3), the higher angels have cognition through forms that are more universal. But Christ's knowledge was the most perfect of all. Therefore, it was maximally unified. Therefore, it was not divided up by many habits (*non ergo fuit distincta per plures habitus*).

Objection 2: Our faith is derived from Christ's knowledge; thus Hebrews 12:2 says, "... looking upon Jesus, the author and consummator of faith." But as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 2-2, q. 4, a. 6), there is a single habit of faith for all the things to be believed. Therefore, *a fortiori*, in Christ there is a single habit of faith.

Objection 3: Types of knowledge are distinguished by the diverse sorts of knowable things. But Christ's soul knew all things in accord with one type, viz., the divinely infused light. Therefore, in Christ there was just a single habit of knowledge.

But contrary to this: Zachariah 3:9 says, "On this stone"—i.e., Christ—"there are seven eyes."

But 'eye' means knowledge. Therefore, it seems that in Christ there were several habits of knowledge.

I respond: As has been explained (aa. 4-5), the knowledge infused into Christ's soul has a mode connatural to the human soul. Now it is connatural to the human soul to receive species with less universality than the angels receive, so that the human soul has cognition of different specific natures through different intelligible species. But, as a result, it happens that in us there are different habits of knowledge because there are different genera of knowable things. More specifically, those things that are traced back to a single genus are known by the same habit of knowledge. As *Posterior Analytics* 1 puts it, "A single science belongs to a single genus of subject." And this is why the knowledge infused into Christ's soul was divided into different habits.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 4), Christ's soul is the most perfect of all and exceeds the knowledge that belongs to the angels with respect to *what is thought of* in it on the part of God, who infuses it.

However, it falls short of angelic knowledge with respect to the *mode of the receiver*. And the mode of [a human soul] involves the knowledge in question being divided into many habits in the sense that it exists through species that are more particular.

Reply to objection 2: Our faith is founded on the First Truth. And so Christ is the author of our faith because of His knowledge as God, which is unified absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: The divinely infused light is the *general* reason for understanding those things that are divinely revealed, just as the light of the intellect is the general reason for understanding those things that are known naturally. And so it was necessary to posit in Christ's soul species of singular things in order for it to know each one by a proper cognition (cf. a. 1, ad 3). Accordingly, as has been explained, there had to be diverse habits of knowledge in Christ's soul.