

QUESTION 25

The Object of Charity

We next have to consider the object of charity. On this topic there are two things that have to be considered: first, the things that are to be loved out of charity (question 25) and, second, the ordering of the things to be loved (question 26).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is God alone to be loved out of charity, or one's neighbor as well? (2) Is charity to be loved out of charity? (3) Are non-rational creatures to be loved out of charity? (4) Can one love himself out of charity? (5) Can one love his own body out of charity? (6) Are sinners to be loved out of charity? (7) Do sinners love themselves? (8) Are one's enemies to be loved out of charity? (9) Should enemies be shown signs of friendship? (10) Are the angels to be loved out of charity? (11) Are the demons to be loved out of charity? (12) How should one enumerate the things to be loved out of charity?

Article 1

Does the love of charity stop with God, or does it extend to our neighbor?

It seems that the love of charity stops with God and does not extend to our neighbor:

Objection 1: Just as we must love God, so too we must fear Him—this according to Deuteronomy 10:12 (“And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you except that you fear Him and love Him?”). But the fear by which a man is feared and which is called *human* fear is different from the fear by which God is feared and which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 2), is called either *servile* fear or *filial* fear. Therefore, the love that belongs to charity, by which God is loved, is likewise different from the love by which our neighbor is loved.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that to be loved is to be honored. But the honor that is owed to God, which is the honor of *latría*, is different from the honor that is owed to a creature, which is the honor of *dulia*. Therefore, the love by which God is loved is likewise different from the love by which our neighbor is loved.

Objection 3: As is said in a Gloss on Matthew 1:2, hope generates charity. But hope is had in God in such a way that those hoping in men are reprehended—this according to Jeremiah 17:5 (“Cursed be the man who places his trust in man”). Therefore, charity is owed to God in such a way that it does not extend to our neighbor.

But contrary to this: 1 John 4:21 says, “This commandment we have from God, that he who loves God should also love his brother.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 6; q. 19, a. 3; *ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 3), habits are diversified only by that which changes the species of the act, since all the acts of a single species belong to the same habit. But given that the species of an act is taken from its object in accord with the object's formal character (*secundum formalem rationem ipsius*), an act that is directed toward an object's [formal] character and an act that is directed toward the object under such a character (*sub tali ratione*) must be the same in species—in the way that an act of seeing by which light is seen is the same in species as an act of seeing by which a color is seen in accord with the character *light* (*secundum luminis rationem*).

Now the [formal] character that belongs to loving one's neighbor is God, since we ought to love in our neighbor the fact that he exists in God. Hence, it is clear that an act by which God is loved (*diligitur*) is the same in species as an act by which our neighbor is loved. And it is because of this that the habit of charity extends not only to love (*dilectio*) of God, but also to love of neighbor.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which our neighbor can be feared, just as there are likewise two ways in which our neighbor can be loved.

In one way, it is because of *what is proper to himself*—as, for instance, when someone fears a

tyrant because of his cruelty, or when he loves (*amat*) someone out of a desire to acquire something from him. And this sort of human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same holds in the case of love.

In the second way, a man is feared and loved because of *what there is of God existing in him*—as when a secular power (a) is feared because of the divine ministry which he has of punishing evildoers and (b) is loved for the sake of justice. And this sort of fear of a man is not distinct from the fear of God, and neither is this sort of love (*amor*) distinct from the love of God.

Reply to objection 2: Love (*amor*) has to do with the good in general (*respicit bonum in communi*), whereas honor has to do with the proper good of the one who is honored, since it is bestowed on someone as a testimony to his own proper virtue. And so love is not diversified in species by the different quantities of goodness had by diverse things, as long as those things are all referred back to a unified general good, whereas honor is diversified according to the proper goods of individuals.

Hence, we love all our neighbors by the same love of charity, insofar as they are referred back to one common good, i.e., God, whereas we bestow different honors on different individuals in accord with the proper virtue of each one. And, similarly, we show to God the singular honor of *latría*, because of His singular virtue.

Reply to objection 3: The ones being blamed are those who hope in man as the principal source of salvation, not those who hope in man as helping them ministerially under God. Similarly, if someone loved (*diligere*) his neighbor as the principal end, this would be reprehensible, but not if someone loved his neighbor for the sake of God—which belongs to charity.

Article 2

Is charity to be loved out of charity?

It seems not to be the case that charity is to be loved out of charity:

Objection 1: As is clear from Matthew 22:37-39, what is to be loved out of charity is inferred from the two precepts of charity. But charity is not contained under either of these precepts, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is based upon a sharing in beatitude. But charity cannot participate in beatitude. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a sort of friendship. But no one can have a friendship with charity or with any accident, since things of this sort cannot reciprocate love—which, as is explained in *Ethics* 8, is part of the nature of friendship. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, “He who loves his neighbor must, as a consequence, likewise love love itself (*etiam ipsam dilectionem diligit*).” But one’s neighbor is loved out of charity. Therefore, as a consequence, charity is likewise loved out of charity.

I respond: Charity is a certain sort of love (*amor*).

But by the nature of *the power* of which it is an act, love is such that it can be reflected back upon itself. For since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever is contained under the notion *good* can fall under an act of willing; and since an act of willing is itself something good (*ipsum velle est quoddam bonum*), one can will to will—just as, likewise, the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, since this, too, is something true.

However, it is also the case that, by reason of *its own species*, love is such that it is reflected back upon itself, since it is a spontaneous movement on the part of the lover toward what is loved. Hence, by the very fact that someone loves, he loves that he loves.

Still, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity (*caritas*) is not simple love (*amor*) but instead has the character of friendship (*amicitia*). Now there are two ways in which something is loved by friendship:

In one way, something is loved *as the friend* with whom we have the friendship and for whom we will good things.

In the second way, something is loved *as a good that we will for our friend*. And it is in this way, and not in the first way, that charity is loved out of charity. For charity is a good that we wish for everyone whom we love out of charity. And the same line of reasoning holds for beatitude and for the other virtues.

Reply to objection 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we have friendship. But our love for them includes loving charity, because we love our neighbor and God insofar as we love it for ourselves and our neighbor to love God, i.e., to have charity.

Reply to objection 2: Charity is the very sharing of the spiritual life through which one arrives at beatitude. And so it is desired as a good for everyone whom we love out of charity.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through insofar as what is loved through friendship are those with whom we have friendship.

Article 3

Are even non-rational creatures to be loved out of charity?

It seems that even non-rational creatures (*creaturae irrationales*) are to be loved out of charity:

Objection 1: It is through charity that we are especially conformed to God. But God loves non-rational creatures out of charity; for as Wisdom 11:25 says, He loves “all things that exist,” and whatever He loves, He loves by His very self, and He is charity.

Objection 2: Charity is mainly directed toward God and extends to other things insofar as they pertain to God. But just as the rational creature pertains to God insofar as he has the likeness of an *image* (*similitudo imaginis*), so too the non-rational creature has the likeness of a *trace* (*similitudo vestigii*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 93). Therefore, charity extends even to non-rational creatures.

Objection 3: Just as God is the object of charity, so He is also the object of faith. But faith extends to non-rational creatures insofar as we believe that heaven and earth are created by God, and that the fish and the birds are produced from the waters, and that plants and walking animals are produced from the earth. Therefore, charity likewise extends to non-rational creatures.

But contrary to this: The love of charity (*dilectio caritatis*) extends only to God and our neighbor. But by the name ‘neighbor’ one cannot mean a non-rational creature, since non-rational animals do not share in the life of reason with man (*non communicant cum homine in vita rationali*). Therefore, charity does not extend to non-rational creatures.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), charity is a certain sort of friendship, and what is loved through friendship is, in the first sense, the friend with whom the friendship is had and, in the second sense, the goods that are wished for one’s friend.

Thus, no non-rational creature can be loved in the first sense out of charity—and this for three reasons.

Two of these reasons have to do with *friendship in general*, which cannot be had with non-rational creatures:

First, because friendship is had with someone for whom we will the good. But I cannot properly will the good for a non-rational creature, because only a rational creature, who is in charge of using the good that he has through free choice, and not a non-rational creature, properly possesses his own good

(*est eius proprie habere bonum*). That is why, in *Physics 2*, the Philosopher says, “It is only by a similitude that we say that something happens well or badly for entities of this sort.”

Second, because every friendship is based upon some sharing of life; for, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 8*, nothing is so proper to friendship as sharing one another’s lives. But non-rational creatures cannot share in human life, which has to do with reason (*quae est secundum rationem*). Hence, no friendship can be had with non-rational creatures—except, perhaps, metaphorically (*nisi forte secundum metaphoram*).

The third [main] reason is *proper to charity*. For charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, which a non-rational creature is not capable of. Hence, the friendship of charity cannot be had with a non-rational creature.

Still, non-rational creatures can be loved out of charity as goods which we will for others, viz., insofar as out of charity we will them to be conserved for the honor of God and for their usefulness to men. And this is likewise the sense in which God loves them out of charity.

Reply to objection 1: The response to the first objection is clear from this.

Reply to objection 2: The similitude of a *vestige* does not cause the capacity for eternal life in the way that the similitude of an *image* does. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: Faith can extend to all things that are in any way true. But the friendship of charity extends only to those things that are apt to have eternal life. And so the arguments are not parallel.

Article 4

Does a man love himself out of charity?

It seems that a man does not love himself out of charity:

Objection 1: In a certain homily Gregory says, “Charity cannot be had between fewer than two individuals.” Therefore, no one has charity with respect to himself.

Objection 2: As is clear from *Ethics 8*, friendship by its nature implies reciprocal love and equality, which are not possible for a man with respect to himself. But as has been explained, charity is a certain sort of friendship. Therefore, it cannot be the case that someone has charity with respect to himself.

Objection 3: What belongs to charity cannot be blameworthy, since, as 1 Corinthians 13:4 says, charity does not do wrong. But to love oneself is blameworthy, since 2 Timothy 3:1-2 says, “In the last days dangerous times will come, and men will be lovers of self.” Therefore, a man cannot love himself out of charity.

But contrary to this: Leviticus 19:18 says, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” But we love our friend out of charity. Therefore, we should also love ourselves out of charity.

I respond: Since, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a certain sort of friendship, there are two possible ways in which we can talk about charity:

(a) in one way, *under the common notion of friendship*. And on this score we should say that, properly speaking, what is had with respect to oneself is not friendship, but something greater than friendship. For friendship implies a certain type of *union*—for instance, Dionysius says, “Love is a unitive virtue”—whereas what each individual has with respect to himself is *unity*, which is stronger than union. Hence, just as unity is a principle of union, so the love by which one loves himself is the form and root of friendship, since we have friendship with respect to others by the fact that we relate to them as we relate to ourselves. For *Ethics 9* says, “The friendly regard (*amicabilia*) directed toward the other comes from the friendly regard that is directed toward oneself.” In the same way, with respect to principles one

does not have knowledge (*scientia*) but instead has something greater, viz., understanding (*intellectus*).

(b) In a second way, we can speak of charity *as regards its proper notion*, viz., insofar as it is the friendship of a man mainly with respect to God and, consequently, with respect to the things that belong to God. Among those things is included the man himself who has charity. And so among the other things that he loves out of charity as belonging to God, he loves even himself out of charity.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory is talking about charity under the common notion of friendship.

Reply to objection 2: On this same interpretation, the second argument goes through.

Reply to objection 3: Those who love themselves are blamed insofar as they love themselves with respect to their sentient nature, which they conform to. But this is not to love oneself truly with respect to one's rational nature, i.e., in such a way that one loves those goods that contribute to the perfection of reason. And it is in this latter sense that loving oneself belongs mainly to charity.

Article 5

Should a man love his own body out of charity?

It seems that a man should not love his own body out of charity:

Objection 1: We do not love what we do not will to share a common life with. But men who have charity flee from association with the body—this according to Romans 7:24 (“Who will free me from the body of this death?”) and according to Philippians 1:23 (“... having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ”). Therefore, our body is not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: The friendship of charity is based upon a sharing in the enjoyment of God. But our body cannot participate in this enjoyment. Therefore, our body is not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: Since charity is a certain sort of friendship, it is directed toward those who can reciprocate our love. But our body cannot love us out of charity. Therefore, it is not to be loved out of charity.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine claims that four things are to be loved out of charity, and included among them is one's own body.

I respond: There are two ways in which our body can be thought of: (a) with respect to *its nature* and (b) with respect to the *corruption of sin and punishment*.

Now the nature of our body comes not from any created evil principle, as the Manicheans imagine, but from God. Hence, we can use it in the service of God—this according to Romans 6:13 (“Present your members to God as instruments of justice”). And so out of the love of charity, by which we love God, we should likewise love our own body.

On the other hand, we should not love the infection of sin and the corruption of punishment in our body, but should instead strive for their removal.

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle did not flee from association with the body as regards the body's nature; in fact, in this regard he did not want to be deprived of it—this according to 2 Corinthians 5:4 (“We wish not to be unclothed, but to be overclothed”). But he did wish to lack the infection of excessive desire (*volebat carere infectione concupiscentiae*), which remains in the body, and its corruption, which prevents the soul from being able to see God. This is why he explicitly says “... from the body of this death.”

Reply to objection 2: Even though our body cannot enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, nonetheless, through the works that we do with our body we can attain the perfect enjoyment of God. Hence, a certain sort of beatitude redounds upon the body from the soul's enjoyment, viz., “the strength (*vigor*) of health and incorruption,” as Augustine puts it in his letter to Dioscorus. And so since the body in some sense participates in beatitude, it can be loved with the love of charity.

Reply to objection 3: Reciprocal love has a place in the friendship that is with respect to another, but not in the friendship that one has with respect to himself, as regards either the soul or the body.

Article 6

Are sinners to be loved out of charity?

It seems that sinners are not to be loved out of charity:

Objection 1: Psalm 118:113 says, “I have hated the wicked.” But David had charity. Therefore, sinners are more to be hated out of charity than loved out of charity.

Objection 2: As Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost, “The proof of love is in the exhibiting of the deed.” But the just do not exhibit deeds of love to sinners, but instead they seem to exhibit deeds of hatred—this according to Psalm 100:8 (“In the morning I put to death all the sinners of the land”). And in Exodus 22:18 the Lord commanded, “Do not allow the evildoers to live.” Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: It belongs to friendship that we will and desire good things for our friends. But out of charity the saints desire evil things for sinners—this according to Psalm 9:18 (“Let the wicked be turned to Hell”). Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 4: It is proper to friends to rejoice over the same things and to will the same things. But charity does not make one will what sinners will; nor does it make one rejoice over what sinners rejoice over. Rather, it brings about just the opposite of this. Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 5: As *Ethics* 8 says, it is proper to friends to share their lives. But one should not share his life with sinners—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:17 (“Withdraw from their presence”). Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “When it is said, ‘Love your neighbor’, it is clear that every man is to be counted as a neighbor.” But sinners do not cease to be men, since sin does not destroy their nature. Therefore, sinners are to be loved out of charity.

I respond: There are two things to think about in the case of sinners, viz., (a) their *nature* and (b) their *sin*.

As regards their *nature*, which they have from God, they are capable of beatitude and, as was explained above (q. 23, aa. 1 and 5), charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude. And so, as regards their nature, they are to be loved out of charity.

By contrast, their *sin* is opposed to God and is an obstacle to beatitude. Hence, with respect to their sin, by which they are opposed to God, every sinner is to be hated—even, as Luke 14:26 has it, one’s father and mother and relatives. For in the case of sinners we ought to hate the fact that they are sinners and love the fact that they are men capable of beatitude. And this is what it is to truly love them out of charity because of God.

Reply to objection 1: The prophet hated the wicked insofar as they are wicked, hating their iniquity, i.e., their evil. And this is the perfect hatred of which he says, “I have hated them with a perfect hatred.” Now hating someone’s evil is of a piece with loving his good. Hence, this perfect hatred likewise belongs to charity.

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, the benefits of friendship are not to be withheld from friends who are sinners as long as there is hope of their being cured; instead, they are to be assisted in recovering their virtue more than in recovering their money if they have lost it, inasmuch as virtue is more closely related to friendship than money is.

However, when they fall into very great wickedness and become incurable, then the familiarity of

friendship should not be accorded them. And that is why sinners of this sort, from whom harm to others is more to be expected than a mending of their ways, are ordered to be put to death according to both divine law and human law. Yet a judge does this not out of hatred of them, but out of the love of charity by which the public good is preferred to an individual person's life. Still, death imposed by a judge benefits the sinner—whether he is converted, in which case his sin is expiated, or not converted, in which case his sinning is terminated, since through his death the power to sin further is removed from him.

Reply to objection 3: There are three possible ways to understand imprecations of this sort that are found in Sacred Scripture:

(a) as *predictions* rather than desires, so that the meaning is, "Let the sinners depart for Hell," i.e., they will depart for Hell.

(b) as *desires*, but in such a way that the desire of the one who wishes it is referred back not to the punishment of the men, but to *the justice of the punisher*—this according to Psalm 57:11 ("The just man will rejoice when he sees the vindication"). For as Wisdom 1:13 says, God Himself, who does the punishing, likewise "does not rejoice in the destruction of the wicked," but rejoices instead in His justice, since "the Lord is just and has loved justice" (Psalm 10:8).

(c) as *desires* that are referred back to the *removal of the sin* and not to the punishment itself—viz., so that the desire is that the sins should be destroyed and the men remain.

Reply to objection 4: We love sinners out of charity not in order that we might will what they themselves will or in order that we might rejoice over what they themselves rejoice over, but in order that we might bring it about that they will what we will and rejoice over what we rejoice over. Hence, Jeremiah 15:19 says, "They will be turned to you (*convertentur ad te*), and you will not be turned to them."

Reply to objection 5: Living together with sinners is indeed to be avoided by the weak because of the danger that threatens them of being subverted by the sinners. However, for the perfect, whose corruption is not a matter of concern, it is praiseworthy to have commerce with sinners, so that they might convert them. For as Matthew 9:11-13 relates, our Lord ate and drank with sinners in this way.

Still, the company of sinners is to be avoided by everyone as far as association in their sin is concerned. And this is why 2 Corinthians 6:17 says, "Withdraw from their midst and do not touch the unclean," viz., by consenting to their sin.

Article 7

Do sinners love themselves?

It seems that sinners love themselves:

Objection 1: The source (*principium*) of sin is found especially in sinners. But love of self is the source of sin; for in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "It builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore, sinners especially love themselves.

Objection 2: Sin does not destroy one's nature. But it belongs to each thing by its nature to love itself; hence, even non-rational creatures naturally seek their own good, viz., the conservation of their being and other such things. Therefore, sinners love themselves.

Objection 3: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is lovable to all things. But many sinners think of themselves as good. Therefore, many sinners love themselves.

But contrary to this: Psalm 10:6 says, "Whoever loves iniquity hates his own soul."

I respond: In one sense, loving oneself is common to everyone; in a second sense, it is proper to those who are good; and in a third sense, it is proper to those who are bad.

For it is common to everyone that he loves what he takes himself to be. However, there are two

ways in which a man is said to be something:

In one way, according to his *substance and nature*. And on this score all men take it to be a general good that they are what they are, viz., composites of soul and body. And on this score all men, both good and bad, also love themselves insofar as they love the conservation of themselves.

In the second way, a man is said to be something in accord with *what is preeminent in him (secundum principalitatem)*, in the way that the ruler of a city is said to be the city, so that what the ruler does, the city is said to do. Now in this sense not everyone thinks himself to be what he in fact is. For the principal thing in a man is his rational mind, whereas what is secondary in him is his sentient and corporeal nature. As is clear from 2 Corinthians 4:16, the Apostle calls the first of these the ‘interior man’ and the second the ‘exterior man’. Now good men think that what is preeminent in them is the rational nature or interior man, and hence they think themselves to be what they in fact are. By contrast, bad men think that what is predominant in them is the sentient and corporeal nature, viz., the exterior man. Hence, not having a correct understanding of themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but instead love what they take themselves to be. Good men, on the other hand, having a correct understanding of themselves, truly love themselves.

The Philosopher proves this in *Ethics* 9 by reference to five things that are proper to friendship. For, first of all, each friend wills that his friend exist and live; second, he wills goods for him; third, he does good things to him; fourth, he finds it pleasant to live with him; fifth, he is in agreement with him, taking pleasure in the same things and being pained by the same things.

Accordingly, good men love themselves with respect to the interior man, since they will the interior man to be preserved in his integrity; and it is pleasant for them to enter into their own heart, since they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of good things in the past, and the hope of future goods—and pleasure is caused by all of these. Similarly, good men do not suffer dissension of the will within themselves, since their whole soul tends in a single direction (*tendit in unum*).

By contrast, bad men do not will that the integrity of the interior man should be preserved. Nor do they desire the spiritual goods of the interior man or act for this end. Nor is it pleasant for them to live with themselves by entering into their own heart, since they find there bad things—present, past, and future—which they abhor. Nor, because of their tormenting conscience, do they agree with themselves—this according to Psalm 49:21 (“I will reprove you and stand firm against your face”). And by these same things it can be proved that bad men love themselves with respect to the corruption of the exterior man. But this is not the way in which good men love themselves.

Reply to objection 1: As is explained in the same place, the love of self which is the source of sin is the sort of love which is proper to bad men and which ends up in contempt for God. For bad men desire exterior goods in such a way that they disdain spiritual goods.

Reply to objection 2: Even if natural love is not totally removed from bad men, it is nonetheless perverted in them in the way already explained.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as bad men take themselves to be good, they have some participation in love of self. Still, this is only apparent love of self and not genuine love of self. Still, even this sort of love is not possible in those who are extremely bad.

Article 8

Is it necessary for one’s enemies to be loved out of charity?

It seems not to be necessary for one’s enemies to be loved out of charity:

Objection 1: In *Enchiridion* 73 Augustine says, “So great a degree of goodness,” viz., to love one’s enemies, “does not belong to such a great multitude as we believe are heard when, in prayer, they

say, ‘Forgive us our trespasses’.” But no one’s sin is forgiven without charity, since, as Proverbs 10:12 says, “Charity covers all sins.” Therefore, it is not necessary for one’s enemies to be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: Charity does not destroy one’s nature. But every entity, even non-rational ones, naturally hate their contrary, in the way that the sheep hates the wolf and that water hates fire. Therefore, charity does not bring it about that one’s enemies are loved.

Objection 3: Charity does not do wrong. But it seems perverse that one should love his enemies, just as it seems perverse that one should hate his friends. Hence, in 2 Kings 19:6 Joab reproaches David saying, “You love those who hate you and hate those who love you.” Therefore, charity does not bring it about that one’s enemies are loved.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 5:44 our Lord says, “Love your enemies.”

I respond: There are three possible ways to think of love of one’s enemies:

First, that one’s enemies are loved *insofar as they are enemies*. This is perverse and contrary to charity, since it is to love what is bad in the other person.

In the second way, love of one’s enemies can be understood as directed toward *the nature*, but *in general*. And love of one’s enemies in this sense necessarily belongs to charity (*est de necessitate caritatis*), so that, namely, one who loves God and neighbor does not exclude his enemies from the general love of one’s neighbor (*ab illa generalitate dilectionis proximi*).

In the third way, love of one’s enemies can be thought of *specifically* (*in speciali*), in the sense that one is moved by a movement of love specifically toward an enemy (*in speciali ... ad inimicum*). And this does not belong to charity with absolute necessity (*non est de necessitate caritatis absolute*), since to be moved with a movement of love specifically toward any given man individually likewise does not belong to charity with necessity; for this would be impossible. Yet it does indeed belong to charity with necessity as regards one’s being mentally prepared (*secundum praeparationem animi*)—so that, namely, a man has a mind ready to love a particular enemy if the necessity arises.

However, it belongs to the *perfection* of charity that a man should, in addition, actually accomplish loving his enemy for the sake of God outside of a time of necessity. For since one’s neighbor is loved out of charity for the sake of God, to the extent that someone loves God more, he will also show more love to his neighbor without any enmity hindering him—just as, if someone loves a man more, he will love that man’s children even if they are unfriendly to him. And this is what Augustine is talking about.

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is thus clear.

Reply to objection 2: Each entity naturally hates what is contrary to itself insofar as it is contrary, and enemies are contrary to us insofar as they are enemies. Hence, we ought to hate this in them, since it ought to displease us that they are our enemies. But they are not contrary to us insofar as they are men and capable of beatitude. And on this score we ought to love them.

Reply to objection 3: It is blameworthy to love our enemies insofar as they are enemies. And, as has been explained, charity does not do this.

Article 9

Does it necessarily belong to charity that a man should show the signs or effects of love to his enemy?

It seems that it necessarily belongs to charity that a man should show the signs or effects of love to his enemy:

Objection 1: 1 John 3:18 says, “Let us love not in word or in speech, but in deed and in truth.” But one loves in deed by showing to the one loved the signs and effects of love. Therefore, it necessarily belongs to charity that one show signs and effects of this sort to one’s enemies.

Objection 2: In Matthew 5:44 says “Love your enemies” along with “Do good to those who hate you.” But loving one’s enemies necessarily belongs to charity. Therefore, so does doing good to one’s enemies.

Objection 3: By charity one loves not only God, but also his neighbor. But in a homily for Pentecost Gregory says, “The love of God cannot be idle, since it does great things if it exists. If it ceases to operate, it is not love.” Therefore, charity that is had with respect to one’s neighbor cannot exist without the effects of its operation. But it necessarily belongs to charity that every neighbor is loved, even one’s enemy. Therefore, it necessarily belongs to charity that we should extend the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Matthew 5:44 (“Do good to those who hate you”) says, “To do good to one’s enemies is the summit of charity. But what belongs to the *perfection* of charity does not belong to it *with necessity*. Therefore, showing the signs and effects of love to one’s enemies does not belong to charity with necessity.

I respond: The effects and signs of charity proceed from an interior act of love (*ex interiori dilectione*) and are proportioned to it. And as was explained above (a. 8), an interior act of love for one’s enemy in general falls under the necessity of a precept absolutely speaking, whereas an interior act of love specifically for one’s enemy falls under the necessity of a precept not absolutely speaking, but rather as regards one’s being mentally prepared for it. The same thing, then, should be said about showing an effect or sign of love exteriorly.

For there are certain works and signs of love (*beneficia et signa dilectionis*) which are shown to our neighbors in general—for instance, when one prays for all the faithful or for the whole people, or when one bestows a favor on the whole community. And it falls under the necessity of precept to show such acts or signs of love to one’s enemies, since if they were not shown to one’s enemies, this would smack of the ill-will of vindictiveness—contrary to what is said in Leviticus 19:18 (“Do not seek revenge; and do not hold in memory the injuries wrought by your fellow citizens”).

By contrast, there are other works or signs of love that one shows to particular persons. And showing such acts or signs of love to one’s enemies is not necessary for salvation except with respect to being mentally prepared to come to their assistance in time of necessity—this according to Proverbs 25:21 (“If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink”) But for someone to show good works of this sort to his enemies outside of a time of necessity belongs to the *perfection* of charity, through which one is not only wary of being conquered by evil, which belongs to *necessity*, but also wills to conquer evil with good, which belongs to *perfection*—that is, as long as he is not only wary of being dragged down into hatred because of the injury inflicted on him, but also intends by his own good works to draw his enemy toward loving him.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from this.

Article 10

Do we have to love the angels out of charity?

It seems that we do not have to love the angels out of charity:

Objection 1: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, Augustine says, “The love of charity is twofold, viz., love of God and love of neighbor.” But love of the angels is not contained under love of God, since the angels are created substances. Nor does love of the angels seem to be contained under love of neighbor, since they do not share the same species with us. Therefore, it is not the case that the angels are to be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: Brute animals have more in common with us than do the angels, since we and the brute animals are in the same proximate genus. But as was explained above (a. 3), we do not have charity with respect to the brute animals. Therefore, neither do we have charity with respect to the angels.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 8 explains, nothing is more proper to friends than to share their lives (*convivere*). But angels do not share their lives with us, and we cannot even see them. Therefore, we are unable to have the friendship of charity with respect to them.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “Now if anyone to whom we are bound to offer a favor of mercy or who is bound to offer a favor of mercy to us is correctly called our neighbor, then it is clear that the holy angels, from whom we receive many favors of mercy, are also included under the precept by which we are commanded to love our neighbor.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 23. a. 1), the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, participation in which men share with the angels. For Matthew 22:30 says, “In the resurrection men will be like the angels in heaven.” And so it is clear that the friendship of charity extends to the angels as well.

Reply to objection 1: Someone is called a ‘neighbor’ not only because of sharing a species but also because of sharing in the blessings that pertain to eternal beatitude. For it is upon this sort of sharing that the friendship of charity is based.

Reply to objection 2: Brute animals agree with us in a proximate genus by reason of their sentient nature. But we participate in eternal beatitude not by reason of our sentient nature, but by reason of our rational mind, which we share in common with the angels.

Reply to objection 3: Angels do not share their life with us by exterior intercourse, which belongs to us in accord with our sentient nature. However, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), we share our life with the angels by our minds—imperfectly, to be sure, in this life, but perfectly in heaven.

Article 11

Do we have to love the demons out of charity?

It seems that we have to love the demons out of charity:

Objection 1: The angels are neighbors to us insofar as we share our lives with them in our rational mind. But the demons also share their lives with us in this way, since, as is explained in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, their natural gifts remain undiminished—viz., their being (*esse*), their life (*vivere*), and their understanding (*intelligere*). Therefore, we have to love the demons out of charity.

Objection 2: The demons differ from the blessed angels by the difference *sin*, in the same way that men who are sinners differ from just men. But just men love men who are sinners out of charity. Therefore, they likewise have to love the demons out of charity.

Objection 3: As is clear from the passage from Augustine adduced above (a. 9), those by whom we are given favors ought to be loved by us out of charity as neighbors. But as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 11, the demons are useful to us in many ways, since “by tempting us they fashion crowns for us.” Therefore, the demons are to be loved out of charity.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 28:18 says, “Your covenant with death shall be abolished, and your pact with hell shall not stand.” But the perfection of a covenant and a pact comes through charity. Therefore, it is not the case that we have to have charity with respect to the demons, who are the inhabitants of Hell and the overseers of death.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 6), in the case of sinners we have to love their nature out of charity and hate their sin out of charity. Now the name ‘demon’ signifies a nature deformed by sin. And

so the demons are not to be loved out of charity.

However, if this meaning is not given to the name, and the question is instead referred to those spirits who are called demons, whether they are to be loved out of charity, then one should reply, in accord with what was said above (a. 2), that there are two ways in which something is loved out of charity:

In one way, as someone with whom friendship is had. And on this score we cannot have the friendship of charity with those spirits. For it belongs to the nature of friendship that we will the good for our friends. But we cannot will out of charity the good of eternal life, which charity has to do with, for those spirits who have been damned for eternity by God. For this would be incompatible with charity for God, through which we give our approval to His justice.

In the second way, something is loved as that which we will to endure as the other's good. As was explained above (a. 3), this is the way in which we love non-rational animals out of charity insofar as we will them to endure for the glory of God and for their usefulness to men. And it is in this way, too, that we can love the demons out of charity, viz., insofar as we will those spirits to be conserved with their natural gifts for the glory of God.

Reply to objection 1: It is not impossible for the mind of the angels to have eternal beatitude, in the way that this is impossible for the mind of the demons. And so the friendship of charity, which is based upon the sharing of eternal life rather than upon the sharing of a nature, is had with the angels but not with the demons.

Reply to objection 2: Men who are sinners in this life have the possibility of attaining eternal beatitude. This possibility is not had by those men who are damned in Hell; on this score, the line of reasoning is the same for these men as it is for the demons.

Reply to objection 3: The usefulness that accrues to us from the demons derives not from their own intention but from the ordering of divine providence. And so we are not induced by this usefulness to have friendship with them; instead, we are induced to be friends of God, who turns their perverse intention to our advantage.

Article 12

Are the things to be loved by us out of charity correctly enumerated as these four: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves?

It seems that the things to be loved by us out of charity are not correctly enumerated as these four: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves:

Objection 1: As Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, "Anyone who does not love God does not love himself, either." Therefore, the love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore, it is not the case that the love of oneself is one thing and the love of God another thing.

Objection 2: A part ought not to be divided over against its whole. But our body is a certain part of ourselves. Therefore, our body ought not to be divided, as another lovable thing, from ourselves.

Objection 3: Just as we have a body, so, too, does our neighbor. Therefore, just as the love by which one loves his neighbor is distinct from the love by which he loves himself, so, too, the love by which one loves his neighbor's body is distinct from the love by which he loves his own body. Therefore, the four things to be loved out of charity are not appropriately distinguished.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, "There are four things to be loved: one which is above us," viz., God; "another which we ourselves are; a third which is next to us," viz., our neighbor; "and a fourth which is below us," viz., our own body.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing

of beatitude. In this sharing, there is one thing that is thought of as the source who pours forth beatitude, viz., God; there is a second thing that directly participates in beatitude, viz., the man or the angel; and there is a third thing into which beatitude streams through a certain sort of overflow, viz., the human body.

That which pours fourth beatitude is for that reason lovable, since He is the cause of beatitude. That which participates in beatitude can be lovable for two reasons, either because he is identical with ourselves or because he is joined to us in participating in beatitude—and on this score there are two things lovable out of charity, viz., insofar as a man loves both himself and his neighbor.

Reply to objection 1: The different relations of the lover to different lovable things makes for the diverse character of lovability. Accordingly, since the relation that a man who loves has to God is different from the relation that he has to himself, two lovable things are posited; for the love of the one is a cause of the love of the other. This is why when the one is removed, the other is removed.

Reply to objection 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind, which can be capable of beatitude, whereas the body does not directly attain to beatitude, but instead attains to it only through a sort of overflow. And so in accord with his rational mind, which is the principal thing in man, a man loves himself out of charity in a way different from the way in which he loves his own body.

Reply to objection 3: A man loves his neighbor both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body by reason of a certain fellowship in beatitude. And so in the case of one's neighbor the love has a single character. Hence, our neighbor's body is not posited as a special lovable thing.