

QUESTION 18

The Subject of Hope

We next have to consider the subject of hope. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does the virtue of hope exist in the will as its subject? (2) Does hope exist in the blessed in heaven (*in beatis*)? (3) Does hope exist in the damned? (4) Does hope have certitude as it exists in those who are in this life (*in viatoribus*)?

Article 1

Does hope exist in the will as its subject?

It seems that hope does not exist in the will as its subject:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is an arduous good. But what is arduous is the object of the irascible power and not of the will. Therefore, hope exists in the irascible power and not in the will.

Objection 2: In a case in which one thing is sufficient, it is pointless to posit a second thing. But charity, which is the most perfect among the virtues, is sufficient for perfecting the power of the will. Therefore, hope does not exist in the will.

Objection 3: It is impossible for a single power to have two acts at the same time (*una potentia non potest simul esse in duobus actis*); for instance, the intellect is unable to have intellectual understanding of many things at the same time. But an act of hope can exist together with an act of charity. Therefore, since an act of charity obviously belongs to the will, an act of hope does not belong to the will. Therefore, hope does not exist in the will.

But contrary to this: The soul has a capacity for God only with respect to its mind (*non nisi secundum mentem*), which, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate*, contains the memory (*memoria*), the intelligence (*intelligentia*), and the will (*voluntas*). But hope is a theological virtue that has God as its object. Therefore, since hope exists in neither the memory nor the intelligence, which belong to the cognitive power, it follows that it exists in the will as its subject.

I respond: As is clear from what was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 87, a. 2), habits are known from their acts. But an act of hope is a movement of the appetitive part of the soul, since its object is a good.

Now since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 82, a. 5), there are two appetites in a man, viz., (a) the *sentient appetite*, which is divided into the *irascible appetite* and the *concupiscible appetite*, and (b) the *intellective appetite*, which is called the will, it follows that, as was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 82, a. 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 22, a. 3), movements similar to those that exist in the lower appetite along with a passion exist in the higher appetite without any passion.

Now an act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sentient appetite, since the good that is an object of this virtue is not any sensible good, but is instead the divine good. And so hope exists in the higher appetite, which is called the will, as its subject, and not in the lower appetite, which the irascible part of the soul belongs to.

Reply to objection 1: The object of the irascible power is something arduous and *sensible*. By contrast, the object of the virtue of hope is something arduous and *intelligible*—or, better, something that exists beyond understanding (*supra intellectum existens*).

Reply to objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with respect to one act, viz., the act of elective love (*diligere*). But another virtue is required to perfect the will with respect to its other act, viz. the act of hope (*sperare*).

Reply to objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, a. 8), the movement of hope and the movement of charity have an ordering with respect to one another. Hence, nothing prevents both of them from existing together in a single power.

In the same way, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 58, a. 2 and q. 85, a. 4), the intellect is

able to have simultaneous intellectual understanding of many things that are ordered with respect to one another.

Article 2

Does hope exist in the blessed in heaven?

It seems that hope exists in the blessed in heaven (*spes sit in beatis*):

Objection 1: Christ was a perfect ‘comprehender’ [of the divine essence] (*comprehensor*) from the beginning of His conception. But He had hope, since, as a Gloss explains it, in Psalm 30:1 it is by His person that it is said, “In you, O Lord, have I hoped.” Therefore, hope can exist in the blessed in heaven.

Objection 2: Just as the attainment of beatitude is an arduous good, so is its continuation. But before men attain beatitude, they have the hope of attaining beatitude. Therefore, after they have attained beatitude, they can hope for the continuation of beatitude.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 3), through the virtue of hope one can hope for beatitude not only for himself but also for others. But the blessed who are in heaven hope for beatitude for others; otherwise, they would not pray for them. Therefore, hope can exist in the blessed in heaven.

Objection 4: It is not just the glory of the soul, but also the glory of the body that belongs to beatitude. But as is clear from Apocalypse 6:9 and from *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, the souls of the saints who are in heaven still look forward to the glory of the body. Therefore, hope can exist in the blessed in heaven.

But contrary to this: In Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, “Why would someone hope for what he sees?” But the blessed in heaven enjoy the vision of God. Therefore, there is no room in them for hope.

I respond: When that which gives the species to a thing is taken away, then the species is destroyed and the thing cannot remain as the same thing; for instance, when the form of a natural body is removed, the body does not remain the same in species.

Now as was explained above (q. 17, aa. 5-6), hope receives its species from its principal object, just as the other virtues do. But, as has been explained (q. 17, a. 2), its principal object is eternal beatitude insofar as it can be had by God’s help. Therefore, since an arduous and possible good does not fall under the notion of hope except insofar as it is future, it follows that when beatitude is present and no longer future, the virtue of hope cannot exist there. And so hope, like faith, is put aside in heaven, and neither of them can exist in the blessed in heaven.

Reply to objection 1: Even though Christ was a comprehender [of the divine essence] and was, as a result, one of the blessed as regards the enjoyment of God, He was nonetheless at the same time a wayfarer (*viator*) as regards His [human] nature’s passibility, which He was still subject to (*quam adhuc gerebat*). And so He was able to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality—yet not in such a way that He had the virtue of hope, which looks to the enjoyment of God and not to the glory of the body as its principal object.

Reply to objection 2: The beatitude of the saints is called ‘eternal life’ because by the fact that they enjoy God, the saints are in a certain sense made participants in God’s eternity, which surpasses all of time. And so the continuity of beatitude is not divided into present, past, and future (*continuatio beatitudinis non diversificatur per praesens, praeteritum et futurum*). Therefore, the blessed in heaven do not have hope with respect to the continuation of beatitude; rather, they have the reality itself, since there is no notion of what is future in this case.

Reply to objection 3: As long as the virtue of hope endures, it is by the same hope that one hopes for beatitude for himself and for others. But when the hope by which they had hoped for beatitude for themselves is put aside in the blessed in heaven, then they hope for beatitude for others—and yet not by

the virtue of hope, but rather out of the love of charity. In the same way, one who has charity with respect to God loves his neighbor by that same charity, and yet someone can love his neighbor by some other sort of love without having the virtue of charity.

Reply to objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue that has God as its object, the principal object of hope is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Again, even if the glory of the body has the character of something arduous in relation to human nature, it nonetheless does not have the character of something arduous for someone who has the glory of the soul—both because (a) the glory of the body is something very small (*minimum quiddam*) in comparison with the glory of the soul, and also because (b) one who has the glory of the soul already has a sufficient cause of the glory of the body.

Article 3

Does hope exist in the damned?

It seems that hope exists in the damned (*in damnatis sit spes*):

Objection 1: The devil is both damned and the prince of the damned—this according to Matthew 25:41 (“Depart you cursed into the everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels”). But the devil has hope—this according to Job 40:28 (“Behold, his hope shall fail him”). Therefore, it seems that the damned have hope.

Objection 2: Just as faith can be either informed or unformed, so, too, with hope. But unformed faith can exist in the demons and the damned—this according to James 2:19 (“The demons believe, and they tremble”). Therefore, it seems that unformed hope can likewise exist in the damned.

Objection 3: No man is able after death to accrue merit or demerit that he did not have in this life—this according to Ecclesiastes 11:3 (“If the tree falls to the south, or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there shall it be”). But many who will be damned will have had hope in this life without ever despairing. Therefore, in the future life they will likewise have hope.

But contrary to this: Hope is a cause of joy—this according to Romans 12:12 (“... rejoicing in hope”). But the damned exist in sorrow and grief and not in joy—this according to Isaiah 65:14 (“My servants will give praise for joyfulness of heart, and you will cry for sorrow of heart, and you will howl for grief of spirit”). Therefore, hope does not exist in the damned.

I respond: Just as it belongs to the nature of beatitude that the will comes to rest in it, so it belongs to the nature of punishment that what is inflicted by way of punishment is repugnant to the will.

Now what one is ignorant of is such that it cannot either bring the will to rest or be repugnant to it. This is why Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* that in their initial state the angels could not have been either perfectly happy before being confirmed in the good (*ante confirmationem*) nor perfectly unhappy before their fall, since they did not have foreknowledge of how things would turn out for them (*cum non essent praescii sui eventus*). For what is required for true and perfect beatitude is that one should be certain of the perpetuity of his beatitude; otherwise, his will would not come to rest. Similarly, since the perpetuity of damnation belongs to the punishment of the damned, it would not truly have the character of punishment unless it were repugnant to the will—which it could not be if the damned were ignorant of the perpetuity of their damnation. And so it belongs to the state of unhappiness had by the damned that they themselves know that there is no possible way for them to escape damnation and arrive at beatitude; hence, Job 5:22 says, “He does not believe that he can turn back from the darkness to the light.”

Hence, it is clear that the damned cannot apprehend beatitude as a *possible* good, just as the blessed in heaven cannot apprehend beatitude as a *future* good. And so hope can exist neither in the blessed in

heaven nor in the damned. Rather, hope can exist in the wayfarers (*in viatoribus*), whether they are in this life or in purgatory, since in both cases they apprehend beatitude as something both *future* and *possible*.

Reply to objection 1: As Gregory says in *Moralia* 33, the words of Job 40:28 are being said of the devil with respect to his members, whose hope will be nullified.

Alternatively, if the words are understood to apply to the devil himself, they can be referred to the hope by which he hopes that he will win victory over the saints—this according to what came before [in Job 40:18] (“He has confidence that the Jordan will run into his mouth”). But this is not the sort of hope of which we are speaking here.

Reply to objection 2: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Faith has to do with bad things and good things, with past and present and future things, with one’s own things and those of others. By contrast, hope has to do only with good future things that pertain to oneself.” And so it is possible for there to be unformed faith in the damned rather than hope, since divine goods are not something future and possible for them, but are instead removed from them (*eis absentia*).

Reply to objection 3: The lack of hope in the damned does not alter their demerit, just as the absence of hope in the blessed does not increase their merit. Rather, in both cases the lack of hope occurs because of a change in their status.

Article 4

Does the hope of those who are in this life have certitude?

It seems that the hope of those who are in this life does not have certitude (*spes viatorum non habet certitudinem*):

Objection 1: Hope exists in the will as in a subject. But certitude belongs to the intellect and not to the will. Therefore, hope does not have certitude.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1), hope proceeds from grace and merits. But, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 112, a. 5), in this life we cannot know with certitude that we have grace. Therefore, the hope of someone in this life does not have certitude.

Objection 3: Certitude cannot have to do with anything that is able to fail. But many individuals in this life who have hope fail to acquire beatitude. Therefore, the hope of those who are in this life does not have certitude.

But contrary to this: As the Master says in *Sentences* 3, dist. 26, “Hope is the certain expectation (*certa expectatio*) of future beatitude.” This can be based on what is said in 2 Timothy 1:12 (“I know Him whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to preserve what I have committed to Him”).

I respond: There are two ways in which certitude is found in a thing, viz., (a) *essentially* (*essentialiter*) and (b) *by participation* (*participative*). Certitude is found essentially in a cognitive power and by participation in everything that is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power.

The latter is the sense in which it is said that nature operates with certitude (*natura certitudinaliter operatur*), insofar as nature is moved by God’s intellect, which moves each thing toward its end with certitude. Likewise, it is in this same sense that the moral virtues are said to operate with more certitude (*certius*) than an art or craft does, insofar as the moral virtues are moved by reason to their acts in the manner of nature. And it is likewise in this sense that hope tends with certitude toward its end, participating, as it were, in the certitude had by faith (*participans certitudinem a fide*), which exists in a cognitive power.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Hope depends principally not on grace that is already had, but rather on

God's omnipotence and mercy, through which even someone who does not have grace is able to acquire it, so that he might in this way arrive at eternal life. But whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and of His mercy.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that some individuals who have hope fail to attain beatitude stems from a defect of free choice, which puts up an obstacle of sin, and not from a defect in God's omnipotence or mercy, on which hope depends. Hence, this fact does not undermine the certitude of hope.