

QUESTION 143

The Parts of Temperance in General

Next we have to consider the parts of temperance: first, the parts themselves in general (question 143); second, each of the parts specifically (questions 144-169).

The Only Article

Are the parts of temperance appropriately enumerated?

It seems that in *Rhetorica* Tully inappropriately enumerated the parts of temperance, which he claimed to be continence (*continentia*), clemency (*clementia*), and modesty (*modestia*):

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 7 continence is divided off from *virtue*. But *temperance* is contained under *virtue*. Therefore, continence is not a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Clemency mitigates hatred or anger. But as has been explained (q. 141, a. 4), temperance has to do not with passions of this sort, but instead with the pleasures associated with the sense of touch. Therefore, clemency is not a part of temperance.

Objection 3: Modesty consists in exterior acts; hence, in Philippians 4:5 the Apostle says, “Let your modesty be known to all men.” But as was established above (q. 58, a. 8), exterior acts are the subject matter of justice. Therefore, modesty is more a part of justice than a part of temperance.

Objection 4: In *Super Somnium Scipionis* Macrobius posits many more parts of temperance. For he claims that what follows upon temperance are modesty, a sense of shame (*verecundia*), abstinence (*abstinentia*), chastity (*castitas*), moral integrity (*honestas*), moderation (*moderatio*), frugality (*parcitas*), sobriety (*sobrietas*), and a sense of propriety (*pudicitia*). Again, Andronicus claims that the relatives of temperance are self-restraint (*austeritas*), continence, humility (*humilitas*), simplicity (*simplicitas*), decorousness (*ornatus*), orderliness (*bona ordinatio*), and self-sufficiency (*per se sufficientia*). Therefore, it seems that Tully enumerated the parts of temperance in an insufficient manner.

I respond: As was explained above (questions 48 and 128), a cardinal virtue can have three types of parts, viz., *integral* parts, *subjective* parts, and *potential* parts.

The *integral* parts of a virtue are conditions that have to come together for the virtue. And on this score there are two integral parts of temperance, viz., (a) *a sense of shame* (*verecundia*), whereby one flees from the unseemliness (*turpitude*) that is contrary to temperance, and (b) *moral uprightness* (*honestas*), whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For as is clear from what has been said (q. 141, a. 2 and q. 142, a. 4), among the virtues temperance more than the others claims for itself a certain beauty (*decor*), whereas the vices belonging to intemperance have the most unseemliness (*turpitude*).

The *subjective* parts of a virtue are its species. But the species of virtue have to be diversified by the diversity of their object or subject matter. Now temperance has to do with the pleasures associated with the sense of touch, which are divided into two genera. For some of them are ordered toward nutrition. And, among these, there is *abstinence* with respect to food and *sobriety* (*sobrietas*), properly speaking, with respect to drink. On the other hand, some of them are ordered toward the generative power. And among these, with respect to principal pleasure of coitus itself there is *chastity* (*castitas*), whereas with respect to the surrounding pleasures that occur, for instance, in kisses, caresses, and embraces, there is *a sense of propriety* (*pudicitia*).

Now the *potential* parts of a principal virtue are secondary virtues that observe in other subject matters—not involving as much difficulty—the same mode that the principal virtue observes in its own principal subject matter. Now temperance involves moderating the pleasures associated with the sense of touch, which are the most difficult to moderate. Hence, if any virtue effects some sort of moderation in a subject matter and brings the appetite under control as it tends toward something, then that virtue can be counted as a part of temperance in the sense of being a virtue adjoined to temperance. Now there are

three ways in which this can happen: (a) *in the interior movements of the mind*, (b) *in the exterior movements and acts of the body*, and (c) *in exterior things*.

(a) Now besides the movement of sentient desire, which temperance moderates and brings under control, there are three movements found in the soul that tend toward something. The first is a movement of the will that is co-moved by the force of a passion (*motus voluntatis commotae ex impetus passionis*), and it is *continence (continentia)* that controls this movement in such a way that even though the man feels immoderate passions, the will is nonetheless not conquered. The second interior movement tending toward something is the movement of hope and of audacity, which follows upon hope, and it is *humility (humilitas)* that moderates this movement or brings it under control. The third movement is the movement of anger tending toward vindication, and this movement is kept under control by *mildness (mansuetudo)*, i.e., *clemency (clementia)*.

(b) As for bodily movements and acts, it is modesty (*modestia*) that moderates them and keeps them under control. Andronicus divides modesty into three parts: The first involves discerning what should be done and what should be left alone, and what should be done in what order and then persisting firmly in this; and on this score he posits *orderliness (bona ordinatio)*. The second is that a man should observe decency in what he does, and on this score Andronicus posits *decorousness (ornatus)*. The third has to do with conversations, or any other interactions, with friends, and on this score he posits *self-restraint (austeritas)*.

(c) As for exterior things, there are two ways in which moderation should be applied. The first is that superfluous things not be required, and on this score Macrobius posits *frugality (parcitas)* and Andronicus posits *self-sufficiency*. The second is that a man not require too many exquisite things, and on this score Macrobius posits *moderation (moderatio)* and Andronicus posits *simplicity (simplicitas)*.

Reply to objection 1: As will be explained below (q. 155, a. 1), continence, to be sure, differs from a virtue as the incomplete differs from the complete (*sicut imperfectum a perfecto*), and in this sense it is divided off from virtue. However, it agrees with temperance both (a) in *subject matter*, since it has to do with the pleasures associated with touch, and (b) in *mode*, since it consists in a keeping control. And so it is appropriately counted as part of temperance.

Reply to objection 2: Clemency (*clementia*), or mildness (*mansuetudo*), is posited as a part of temperance not because of an agreement in *subject matter*, but instead, as has been explained, because it agrees with temperance in the *mode* of controlling and moderating.

Reply to objection 3: As regards exterior acts, justice pays attention to what is owed to another. By contrast, modesty is concerned not with this, but only with a certain sort of moderation. And this is why it is counted as a part of temperance and not as a part of justice.

Reply to objection 4: Tully includes under *modesty* all the things that pertain to the moderation of bodily movements and of exterior things, along with the moderation of *hope*, which we have claimed pertains to *humility*.