

## QUESTION 103

### *Dulia*

Next we have to consider the parts of respectfulness (*de partibus observantiae*): first, *dulia*, which gives honor and other things pertaining to honor to persons who are superiors (question 103); and, second, obedience (*obedientia*), through which their commands are obeyed (question 104).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is honor (*honor*) something spiritual or something corporeal? (2) Is honor owed to superiors alone? (3) Is *dulia*, which shows honor and veneration to superiors, a special virtue distinct from *latria*? (4) Are there distinct species of *dulia*?

### Article 1

#### Does honor imply something corporeal?

It seems that honor does not imply anything corporeal (*honor non importet aliquid coporale*):

**Objection 1:** As can be gathered from what the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, to honor is to show reverence as a testimony to virtue. But showing reverence is something spiritual, since, as was established above (q. 81, a. 2), revering is an act of fear. Therefore, honor is something spiritual.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 4, honor is a reward for virtue. But a reward for virtue, which consists mainly in spiritual things, is not anything corporeal, since the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore, honor does not consist in corporeal things.

**Objection 3:** Honor is distinct from praise, as well as from glory. But praise and glory consist in exterior things. Therefore, honor consists in interior and spiritual things.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on 1 Timothy 5:17 (“Let priests who rule well be deemed worthy of double honor”), Jerome says, “‘Honor’ here stands either for alms or for favors (*pro eleemosyna vel pro munere*).” But both of these involve corporeal things. Therefore, honor consists in corporeal things.

**I respond:** Honor implies a sort of witnessing to someone’s excellence or superiority (*excellencia*), and, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1 and 8, this is why men who wish to be honored look for testimony to their own excellence. Now the testimony is rendered either in the eyes of God or in the eyes of men (*vel coram Deo vel coram hominibus*):

In the sight of God, who sees into hearts, the testimony of conscience is sufficient. And so honor with respect to God (*quoad Deum*) can consist in just an interior movement of the heart, viz., when someone recognizes either God’s excellence or the excellence that another man has in the eyes of God.

On the other hand, with respect to men (*quoad homines*), one cannot confer honor except through exterior signs, either (a) with *words*, as when one proclaims aloud the excellence of someone, or (b) with *deeds*, as by bowing or saluting or other gestures of this sort, or, again, (c) with *exterior things*, as by the offering of honoraria or gifts or by the erection of statues, or by other things of this sort. And on this score honor consists in exterior and corporeal signs.

**Reply to objection 1:** Reverence is not the same thing as honor. However, on the one side, reverence is a *moving principle* of honoring someone, since it is out of the reverence which one has for an individual that he honors him, whereas, on the other side, reverence is an *end* of honor, since someone is honored in order that he might be held in reverence by others.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher explains in the same place, honor is not a sufficient reward for virtue, but there can be nothing greater than honor among human and corporeal things, since the corporeal things are themselves signs that point to outstanding virtue.

Now the good and the beautiful deserve to be manifested—this according to Matthew 5:15 (“Neither do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel basket, but instead they place it upon a lamp stand, that it may give light to all in the house”). And it is to this extent that honor is called the reward of virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which *praise (laus)* is distinct from *honor (honor)*:

In one way, because praise consists in verbal signs alone, whereas honor consists in exterior signs of any sort. And, on this score, praise is included within honor.

In a second way, because by showing honor we render testimony to the excellence of someone's goodness *absolutely speaking*, whereas through praise we testify to someone's goodness *in relation to an end*, in the way that we praise someone who does good work toward some end. Again, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, honor is directed toward the *best* things, which are not *ordered toward* an end but already *exist in* the end.

Now *glory (gloria)* is an *effect* of honor and of praise. For from the fact that we testify to someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the minds of many people. And this is what the name 'glory' implies, since 'glory' means, as it were, renown (*claria*). Hence, a certain Gloss by Ambrose on Romans 1 says, "Glory is clear knowledge with praise."

## Article 2

### Is honor owed properly speaking to superiors?

It seems that honor is not owed properly speaking to superiors (*honor non proprie debeat superioribus*):

**Objection 1:** An angel is superior to every human pilgrim—this according to Matthew 11:11 ("He who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist"). But as is clear from Apocalypse 22:8-9, the angel stopped John when John wanted to honor him. Therefore, honor is not owed to superiors.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), honor is owed to someone as a testimony to his virtue. But it sometimes happens that one's superiors are not virtuous. Therefore, honor is not owed to them—just as honor is likewise not owed to the demons, even though they are superior to us in the order of nature.

**Objection 3:** In Romans 12:10 the Apostle says, "Outdo one another in showing honor." And 1 Peter 2:17 says, "Honor everyone." But this would be such that it should not be done if honor were owed to superiors alone. Therefore, honor is not owed properly speaking to superiors.

**Objection 4:** In Tobit 1:16 we read that Tobias had ten talents [of silver] of that by which he had been honored by the king. Again, in Esther 6:11 we read that Assuerus honored Mordechai and had it acclaimed in his presence, "Worthy of this honor is the one whom the king has wished to honor." Therefore, honor is also shown to subjects (*inferioribus*). And so it does not seem that honor is owed properly speaking to superiors.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that honor is owed to "the best."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), honor is nothing other than a certain sort of profession of the excellence or superiority (*excellencia*) of someone's goodness. Now someone's excellence or superiority can be thought of not only by way of comparison to the one doing the honoring, viz., whether latter is more excellent than, or superior to, the one who is being honored, but also in its own right (*secundum se*), or in comparison to certain other individuals. Accordingly, it is always the case that honor is owed to someone because of some excellence or superiority (*propter aliquam excellentiam vel superioritatem*). But it need not be the case that the one who is being honored is more excellent than the one honoring him; instead, he may be more excellent than certain other individuals, or even more excellent in some respects, though not absolutely speaking, than the one who is honoring him.

**Reply to objection 1:** The angel stopped John from not just any sort of honoring, but from the honoring of adoration which belongs to *latría* and which is owed to God.

An alternative reply is that the angel prohibited even *dulia*, in order to highlight the dignity which John himself had and by which he had, through Christ, been made equal to the angels in accord with “the hope of the glory of the children of God” (Romans 5:2). And so the angel did not want to be adored as a superior by John.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the prelates are bad men, then they are honored not because of the excellence of their own virtue, but because of the excellence of their office, insofar as they are ministers of God. And the whole community over which they preside is also honored in them.

The demons, on the other hand, are irrevocably bad and are to be treated as enemies rather than honored.

**Reply to objection 3:** In each individual there is something on the basis of which someone can think of him as his superior—this according to Philippians 2:3 (“In humility, think of one another as superior”). Accordingly, everyone ought to take the lead in honoring the others.

**Reply to objection 4:** Private persons are sometimes honored by kings not because they are superior to the kings according to the ordering of offices, but because of some sort of excellence or superiority in their virtues. It is on this score that Tobias and Mordechai were honored by their kings.

### Article 3

#### Is *dulia* a specific virtue distinct from *latria*?

It seems that *dulia* is not a specific virtue distinct from *latria*:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Psalm 7:1 (“O Lord, my God, in you have I put my trust”) says, “O Lord of all through your power, to whom *dulia* is owed; O God through creation, to whom *latria* is owed.” But the virtue that is ordered toward God as the Lord is not distinct from the virtue that is ordered to God as God. Therefore, *dulia* is not a virtue distinct from *latria*.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, being loved is similar to being honored. But it is the same virtue of charity by which God is loved and by which one’s neighbor is loved. Therefore, *dulia*, by which one’s neighbor is honored, is not a virtue distinct from *latria*, by which God is honored.

**Objection 3:** The movement by which someone is moved toward an image is the same as the movement by which he is moved toward the thing whose image it is. But a man is honored through *dulia* to the extent that he is an image of God (*inquantum est ad Dei imaginem*); for Wisdom 2:22-23 says of the impious that “they have not taken into account the honor of holy souls; for God created man incorruptible, and He made him to the image of His own likeness.” Therefore, *dulia* is not a virtue distinct from *latria*, by which God is honored.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says, “The service (*servitus*) owed to men, in accord with which the Apostle commanded servants to be subject to their masters and which in Greek is called *dulia*, is distinct from *latria*, which is the service that has to do with worshiping God.”

**I respond:** In accord with what was said above (q. 101, a. 3), where the type of debt is different, the virtue that repays that debt has to be different (*ubi est alia ratio debiti, ibi necesse quod sit alia virtus quae debitum reddat*). But service (*servitus*) of different types is owed to God and to man, since being a lord or master belongs to God in one way and to a man in a different way. For God has the full and principal Lordship with respect to the whole of creation and with respect to each creature, which is totally subject to His power, whereas a man participates in a certain likeness of God’s Lordship, in accord with which he has a particular power over some man or over some creature.

And so *dulia*, which gives due service to a human being who has lordship, is a different virtue from *latria*, which gives due service to God’s Lordship.

Further, *dulia* is a certain species of respectfulness (*observantia*). For it is through respectfulness that we honor persons who are superior in office, whereas through *dulia*, taken properly, servants venerate their lords or masters. For *dulia* in Greek means service (*servitus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as [the virtue of] religion is called piety par excellence (*pietas per excellentiam*), since God is a father par excellence, so, too, *latria* is called *dulia* par excellence, since God is a Lord in the most excellent way. However, a creature does not participate in the power to create [*ex nihilo*], and it is by reason of this power that *latria* is owed to God.

And this is why the Gloss distinguishes them, attributing *latria* to God because of creation, which is not shared with any creature, but attributing *dulia* to God because of His Lordship, which is shared with creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason for loving one's neighbor is God, since what we love through charity in our neighbor is just God, and this is why it is the same [virtue of] charity by which God and neighbor are loved. Still, there are other types of friendship, different from charity, corresponding to the other ways in which men are loved.

Similarly, since there are different ways of serving God and man or of honoring them both, *latria* and *dulia* are not the same virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** A movement toward an image insofar as it is an image is referred to the thing of which it is an image, but not every movement toward an image is toward it insofar as it is an image. And so sometimes a movement toward an image differs in species from a movement toward the thing.

So, then, one should reply that the honor or subjection that belongs to *dulia* has to do, absolutely speaking, with some office held by a man. For even though, in accord with that office, the man is made to the image or likeness of God, it is nonetheless not always the case that when one man shows reverence to another, he refers by this act to God.

An alternative reply is that a movement toward the image is toward the thing, but it is not the case that a movement toward the thing has to be a movement toward the image. And so reverence that is shown to something, insofar as it is directed toward an image, redounds in some way toward God, whereas there is a different sort of reverence which is shown to God Himself and which does not in any way involve an image of Him.

#### Article 4

##### Does *dulia* have diverse species?

It seems that *dulia* has diverse species:

**Objection 1:** Honor is shown to one's neighbor through *dulia*. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, different neighbors, e.g., a king, a father, and a teacher, are honored for different reasons. Therefore, since diverse characters in the object diversify the species of a virtue, it seems that *dulia* is divided into virtues that differ in species.

**Objection 2:** The middle differs in species from the endpoints, in the way that *gray* differs from *white* and *black*. But *hyperdulia* seems to be in the middle between *latria* and *dulia*, since it is shown to creatures who have a special closeness to God, e.g., the Blessed Virgin insofar as she is the Mother of God. Therefore, it seems that *dulia* has different species, viz., one being *dulia* simply speaking and the other being *hyperdulia*.

**Objection 3:** Just as in a rational creature one finds the image of God (*imago Dei*) by reason of which the creature is honored, so too in a non-rational creature one finds a trace of God (*vestigium Dei*). But different types of likeness are implied by the names 'image' and 'trace'. Therefore, there must

accordingly be diverse species of *dulia* as well, especially since honor is exhibited to certain non-rational creatures, e.g., the wood of the Holy Cross and other things of this sort.

**But contrary to this:** *Dulia* is divided off from *latria*. But *latria* is not divided into diverse species. Therefore, neither is *dulia*.

**I respond:** *Dulia* can be taken in two ways:

In one way, *in general (communiter)*, and in this sense it shows reverence to any man by reason of any sort of excellence. So taken, it includes within itself piety (*pietas*) and respectfulness (*observantia*) and any virtue of this sort that shows reverence to a man. Accordingly, it will have parts that are diverse in species.

In the second way, it can be taken *strictly (stricte)*, so that it is in accord with *dulia* that a servant (*servus*) shows reverence to his lord or master; for, as has been explained (a. 3), *dulia* bespeaks service (*servitus*). And on this score it is not divided into diverse species; instead, it is one of the species of respectfulness (*observantia*). Tully posits this species because the way in which a servant reveres his master is different from the way in which a soldier reveres his general or in which a disciple reveres his teacher, and so on for other relationships of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the case of *dulia* taken *in general*.

**Reply to objection 2:** *Hyperdulia* is the most important species of *dulia* taken *in general*. For the most reverence is owed to a man because of the closeness he has to God.

**Reply to objection 3:** No subjection or honor is owed by a man to a non-rational creature considered in its own right. To the contrary, every such creature is naturally subject to man.

Now as Damascene points out in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 4, when the Cross of Christ is honored, this is done by the same honor as that by which Christ Himself is honored, just as the king's purple is honored by the same honor as that by which the king himself is honored.