

QUESTION 78

The Specific Powers of the Soul

Next we have to consider the specific powers of the soul. It is relevant to the theologian's inquiry to ask specifically only about the intellective and appetitive powers, in which the virtues are found. But because knowledge of these powers in some way depends on the others, our inquiry concerning the specific powers of the soul will have three parts. For we have to consider, first, those powers that are preparatory for intellective understanding (question 78); second, the intellective powers (question 79); and, third, the appetitive powers (questions 80-83).

On the first topic there are four questions: first, concerning the genera of the powers of the soul; second, concerning the species of the vegetative part of the soul; third, concerning the exterior sensory powers; and fourth, concerning the interior sensory powers.

Article 1

Are there five kinds of power that belong to the soul?

It seems that there are not five kinds of power that belong to the soul, viz., (a) the vegetative, (b) the sentient, (c) the appetitive, (d) the power to effect movement with respect to place, and (e) the intellective:

Objection 1: The powers of the soul are called the soul's 'parts'. But there are only three parts of the soul commonly enumerated by everyone, viz., the vegetative soul, the sentient soul, and the rational soul. Therefore, there are only three kinds of power that belong to the soul, and not five.

Objection 2: The powers of the soul are the principles of the vital works (*principia operum vitae*). But there are four senses in which something is said to be alive (*vivere*). For in *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, "There are many senses of 'to be alive' (*multipliciter ipso vivere dicto*), so that something is said to be alive even if just one of the following is present: intellective understanding; sensing; movement and standing still with respect to place; and movement with respect to nourishment, decrease, and increase." Therefore, given that the appetitive is left out, there are just four genera of the powers of the soul.

Objection 3: What is common to all the powers ought not to be designated as a special kind of soul. But appetite (*appetere*) belongs to each of the powers of the soul. For the sense of sight desires a fitting visible object, and thus Ecclesiasticus 40:22 says, "The eye will desire favor and beauty (*gratiam et speciem*) but, more than these, green sown fields (*virides sationes*)." And by the same line of reasoning, each of the other powers desires an object fitting for itself. Therefore, the appetitive should not be posited as a special type of power belonging to the soul.

Objection 4: As is explained in *De Anima 3*, in animals the principle that effects movement is either the sensory power, the intellect, or the appetite. Therefore, the principle that effects movement should not be posited as a special kind of soul beyond the ones mentioned above.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, "We claim that the powers are the vegetative, the sentient, the appetitive, the power to effect movement with respect to place, and the intellective."

I respond: There are five *kinds of power* that belong to the soul, and they are enumerated above. Three are called *souls (animae)*, whereas four are called *ways of being alive (modi vivendi)*.

The reason for this difference is that the different *souls* are distinguished by the fact that there are diverse ways in which the soul's operation exceeds the operation of corporeal nature; for the whole of the corporeal nature is subject to the soul (*tota natura corporalis subiacet animae*) and is related to it as its

matter and instrument.

Thus, there is a certain operation of the soul that exceeds corporeal nature to the extent that it is not even exercised by means of a corporeal organ (*per organum corporale*); and this is the operation of the *rational soul*.

Again, there is another operation of the soul, lower than this one, which is, to be sure, effected by means of a corporeal organ, but not by means of any corporeal quality (*fit per organum corporale non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem*); and this is the operation of the *sentient soul*. For even though *hot* and *cold* and *moist* and *dry* and other corporeal qualities of this sort are required for the operation of the sensory power, they are nonetheless not required in such a way that the sentient soul's operation proceeds by the mediation of the power of such qualities; instead, they are required only for appropriately disposing the organ.

Again, the lowest operation of the soul is that which is effected by means of a corporeal organ and by the power of a corporeal quality. Yet this operation exceeds the operation of corporeal nature because the motions of bodies are from an exterior principle, whereas operations of the sort in question are from an intrinsic principle—something that is common to all the operations of the soul, since anything with a soul (*omne animatum*) moves itself in some way. And this is the operation of the *vegetative soul*; for, as *De Anima 2* explains, digestion and what follows upon digestion are effected instrumentally by the action of heat.

By contrast, the *kinds of powers* belonging to the soul are distinguished by their objects. As was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), the higher a power is, the more universal the object it is related to. But the object of the soul's operation can be thought of in a three-step ordering:

For the object of some of the soul's operations is just the body that is united to the soul. And this kind of power belonging to the soul is the *vegetative*, since the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united.

Again, there is another kind of power belonging to the soul that has a more universal object, viz., all bodies that can be sensed (*omne corpus sensibile*), and not just the body united to the soul.

And there is yet another kind of power belonging to the soul that has a still more universal object, viz., not just all the bodies that can be sensed but every being in general (*universaliter omne ens*).

From this it is clear that these last two kinds of power belonging to the soul have an operation not only with respect to the conjoined being, but also with respect to extrinsic beings. But since something that operates must in some way be conjoined to the object with respect to which it operates, it is necessary for an extrinsic being that is the object of an operation of the soul to be related to the soul in two ways:

First, it must be related to the soul in such a way that it is apt to be conjoined to the soul and to exist in the soul through a likeness of itself (*per suam similitudinem*); and in this regard there are two kinds of power, viz., the *sentient power* with respect to the less general object (*respectu obiecti minus communis*), i.e., the sensible body, and the *intellective power* with respect to the most general object of all, i.e., being in general (*ens universale*).

Second, the soul is itself inclined toward and tends toward the exterior being. And in accord with this relation there are two kinds of power belonging to the soul, viz., the *appetitive power*, according to which the soul is related to an extrinsic being as to an end, which is the first thing in intention, and the *power of effecting movement with respect to place*, insofar as the soul is related to the exterior being as to a terminus of operation and motion; for every animal effects movement in order to obtain something that is desired and intended.

Lastly, the *ways of being alive* are distinguished in a manner that corresponds to the grades of living things. For some living things, viz., *plants*, are such that only the vegetative is present in them. Some are such that, in addition to the vegetative, the sentient is also present, but not movement with

respect to place; these are the *immobile animals* such as small shellfish (*conchilia*). Still other living things are such that they have, in addition, movement with respect to place; these are the *perfect animals*, which require many things for their life and so need movement in order to be able to find the necessities that are situated at some distance from them. Finally, there are some living beings, viz., *men*, in whom the intellective is combined with the others. However, as *De Anima 2* explains, the appetitive does not constitute a separate grade of living thing, since appetite exists in everything in which sentience exists.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The first two objections are answered by what has been said.

Reply to objection 3: A *natural appetite* is an inclination which an entity has by its nature toward something; hence, it is by a natural appetite that every power desires what is fitting for it. However, an *animal's appetite* follows upon an apprehended form. And for an appetite of this sort a special power of the soul is required; the power of apprehension (*apprehensio*) is not by itself sufficient. For a thing is desired insofar as it exists in its own nature. But it does not exist with its own nature in the apprehensive power; instead, it exists there by means of a likeness.

Hence, it is clear that it is only for its own act that the sense of sight naturally desires the visible thing; that is, it desires to see it. By contrast, an animal, through its appetitive power, desires the thing seen not only in order to see it, but also for its other uses. And if the soul needed the things perceived by the sensory powers only for the sake of the actions of those powers—i.e., only in order that it might sense those things—then it would not be necessary to posit the appetitive as a special genus among the powers of the soul. For in that case the natural appetite of the powers would be sufficient.

Reply to objection 4: Even though the appetitive and sensory powers are principles for effecting movement in perfect animals, it is nonetheless not the case that the appetitive and sensory powers as such are sufficient to effect movement without some other power being added to them. For immobile animals have appetitive and sensory powers, and yet they do not have the power to effect movement. Moreover, this power to effect movement exists not only in the appetitive and sensory powers insofar as they command movement, but also in the parts of the body themselves, in order that they might readily obey the appetitive power of the soul that moves them. An indication of this is that when the members of the body lose their natural disposition, they do not obey the appetitive power with respect to movement.

Article 2

Are the parts of the vegetative soul appropriately enumerated as the nutritive, the augmentative and the generative?

It seems that the parts of the vegetative soul are not appropriately enumerated as the nutritive, the augmentative and the generative:

Objection 1: Powers (*vires*) of this sort are called 'natural'. But the powers (*potentiae*) of the soul go beyond natural powers (*supra vires naturales*). Therefore, powers (*vires*) of this sort should not be posited as powers of the soul (*potentiae animae*).

Objection 2: What is common to both living and non-living things should not be counted as a power of the soul. But generation is common to all generable and corruptible things, both living and non-living. Therefore, the generative power should not be posited as a power of the soul.

Objection 3: The soul is more powerful than a corporeal nature is. But it is by the very same active power that a corporeal nature communicates both the species and appropriate size (*speciem et debitam quantitatem*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, the same holds for the soul. Therefore, the augmentative

power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.

Objection 4: Each thing is conserved in *esse* by that through which it has *esse*. But it is the generative power through which an entity acquires the *esse* of a living thing. Therefore, a living thing is conserved through that same power. But as *De Anima 2* explains, it is the nutritive power that is ordered toward the conservation of a living thing, since it is a power that is able preserve its subject. Therefore, the nutritive power should not be distinguished from the generative power.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says that the works of this soul are “to generate and to make use of nourishment,” and again, “to effect growth” (*augmentum facere*).

I respond: There are three powers of the vegetative part [of the soul]. For as has been explained (a. 1), the vegetative part has as its object the very body that is alive through the soul, and there are three operations of the soul that are necessary for such a body.

One operation is that through which it acquires *esse*, and this is what the *generative* power is ordered toward. The second is that through which the living body acquires its appropriate size, and this is what the *augmentative* power is ordered toward. The third operation is that through which the body of a living thing is preserved both in *esse* and in its appropriate size, and this is what the *nutritive* power is ordered toward.

However, there is a certain difference among these powers that has to be noted. For the nutritive and augmentative powers have their effect in the thing in which they exist, since it is the very body that is united to the soul that grows and is conserved through the augmentative and nutritive powers that exist in that same soul. By contrast, the generative power has its effect not in the same body but in another body, since nothing generates its very own self. And so the generative power in a certain sense approaches the dignity of the sentient soul, which has an operation with respect to exterior things—even though the sentient soul has this sort of operation in a more excellent and universal way—since, as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, the highest manifestation of a lower nature attains to the lowest manifestation of a higher nature.

And so, as *De Anima 2* says, among these three powers it is the generative that is closer to the boundary [with the sentient] and more important and more perfect; for it is an already perfected entity that “has the role of making another entity like itself.” Moreover, the augmentative and nutritive powers serve the generative power, while the nutritive power serves the augmentative.

Reply to objection 1: Powers of the sort in question are called ‘natural’ both (a) because they have an effect that is similar to that of nature, which likewise communicates *esse*, size, and conservation (though these powers do it in a higher way), and also (b) because these powers exercise their actions by the instrumentality of the active and passive powers that are the principles of natural actions.

Reply to objection 2: Among inanimate things, generation is totally from the outside (*ab extrinseco*). By contrast, the generation of living things has a higher mode, through something that belongs to the living being itself, viz., its seed (*semen*), in which there resides a principle that gives form to the body. And so in a living thing there has to be a power through which this sort of seed is prepared; and this is the generative power.

Reply to objection 3: Since the generation of living things is by means of seed, the animal that is generated must be small in size at the beginning. Because of this, it has to have a power of the soul through which it is brought to its appropriate size. By contrast, an inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent, and so it receives both its species and quantity simultaneously in accord with the condition of the matter.

Reply to objection 4: As has already been explained (a. 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is brought to completion by the mediation of heat, the role of which is to consume moisture. And so in order to restore the moisture that is lost, the vegetative principle needs to have a nutritive

power through which food is converted into the substance of the body. This is likewise necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.

Article 3

Are the five exterior sensory powers appropriately distinguished?

It seems that the five exterior sensory powers (*sensus*) are not appropriately distinguished:

Objection 1: The senses have cognition of accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, since powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the sensory powers are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.

Objection 2: Shape and size and the other accidents that are called ‘common sensibles’ are not ‘*per accidens* sensibles’, but are instead divided off against the latter in *De Anima* 2. But it is a diversity of *per se* objects that diversifies powers. Therefore, since shape and size differ more from color than sound does, it seems that, *a fortiori*, there should be another sentient power that has cognition of shape and size rather than of color and sound.

Objection 3: A single sense has cognition of a single pair of contraries (*unus sensus est unius contrarietatis*); for instance, the sense of sight has cognition of white and black. But the sense of touch has cognition of several pairs of contraries, viz., hot and cold, moist and dry, etc. Therefore, the sense of touch is not a single sensory power, but a number of them. Therefore, there are more than five sensory powers.

Objection 4: Species are not divided off against their genus. But the sense of taste is a sort of sense of touch. Therefore, it should not be posited as another sense over and beyond the sense of touch.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that “there is no other sensory power beyond these five.”

I respond: Some want to take the explanation for the distinctions among, and number of, the exterior sensory powers from the organs in which one or another of the elements dominates—either water or air or something of that sort. Others take the explanation from the medium, either the conjoined medium or the extrinsic medium, be it air or water or something else of that sort. Still others take it from the diverse natures of the sensible qualities, depending on whether the quality in question belongs to a simple body or whether instead it follows upon complexity.

However, none of these views is satisfactory. For the powers do not exist for the sake of the organs; rather, the organs exist for the sake of the powers. Hence it is not because there are diverse organs that there are diverse powers. Rather, nature instituted diversity in the organs in order that they might correspond to a diversity of powers. Similarly, nature provided the diverse media for the diverse sensory powers, insofar as this was appropriate for the acts of the powers. And it is the intellect—and not the sensory powers—that has cognition of the natures of the sensible qualities.

Therefore, the explanation for the number of, and distinctions among, the exterior sensory powers has to be taken from what is proper and *per se* to the sensory powers themselves. Now a sensory power is a passive power that is susceptible to being affected by an exterior sensible thing. Therefore, the exterior things that effect the changes are what a sensory power perceives *per se*, and the sensory powers are distinguished from one another in a way that corresponds to the diversity of such things.

Now there are two kinds of change, *natural change* (*immutatio naturalis*) and *spiritual change* (*immutatio spiritualis*). A change is *natural* insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received with its natural *esse* in the thing changed, e.g., heat in a thing that is heated. The change is

spiritual insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received with spiritual *esse* in the thing changed, e.g., the form of a color in the pupil, which does not thereby become colored. And for the operation of a sensory power what is required is a spiritual change, through which an *intention* of the sensible form (*intentio formae sensibilis*) comes to exist in the organ of the sensory power. Otherwise, if a natural change were by itself sufficient for sensing, then every natural body would have sensation whenever it was altered.

Now in certain sensory powers, e.g., the *sense of sight*, there is only a spiritual change, whereas in the other sensory powers the spiritual change is accompanied by a natural change either on the part of the object alone or on the part of the organ as well.

On the part of the object, the natural change is with respect to place in the case of sound, which is the object of the *sense of hearing*. For sound is caused by vibration and movement in the air. And as for alteration, in the case of odor, which is the object of the *sense of smell*, a body has to be altered in some way through heat in order to give off an odor.

On the part of the organ, a natural change is involved in the *sense of touch* and the *sense of taste*; for instance, when a hand touches something hot, it itself becomes hot; and the tongue is moistened by the moistness of various tastes. By contrast, the organ of the sense of smell and the organ of the sense of hearing do not undergo any natural change in sensing, except incidentally.

Now since the sense of sight does not involve a natural change in either the organ or the object, it is maximally spiritual, and it is the most perfect and the most general of all the sensory powers. And after the sense of sight comes the sense of hearing, and then the sense of smell, both of which involve a natural change on the part of the object; for as *Physics* 8 proves, local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration. On the other hand, the sense of touch and the sense of taste are the most material; the distinction between them will be explained in a moment (*ad* 3 and *ad* 4 below). The reason why the first three senses are not effected through a conjoined medium is so that no natural change will touch the organ, as occurs with these last two sensory powers.

Reply to objection 1: Not all accidents have the power to effect change (*vim immutativam*) in their own right; rather, only qualities of the third species are such that alteration occurs because of them. And so only qualities of this sort are the objects of the sensory powers; for as *Physics* 7 explains, “A sensory power is altered in the same way that inanimate bodies are.”

Reply to objection 2: Size and shape and other such accidents, which are called *common sensibles*, lie between *per accidens sensibles* and *proper sensibles*, where the latter are the objects of the sensory powers.

For the proper sensibles effect change in the sensory powers directly and primarily (*primo et per se*), since they are the qualities that effect alterations.

By contrast, the common sensibles are all traced back to quantity. In the case of size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity, whereas shape is a quality that involves quantity, since the nature of a shape consists in its being the boundary of a magnitude (*terminatio magnitudinis*). On the other hand, motion and rest are sensed insofar as the subject is related in one or more ways to (a) the magnitude of an object or of its spatial distance (in the case of augmentation or local motion), or to (b) sensible qualities (in the case of alteration). And so to sense motion and rest is in a certain way to sense one thing and many things.

Now a quantity is the proximate subject of a quality that effects alteration; for instance, a surface is the proximate subject of a color. And so the common sensibles do not effect change primarily and directly in a sensory power. Rather, they effect such change by means of a sensible quality; for instance, a surface effects change in a sensory power by means of its color.

And yet the common sensibles are not *per accidens sensibles*, since common sensibles make for variations in the way that a sensory power is affected. For instance, a sensory power is affected in

different ways by a large surface and by a small surface, since the whiteness itself is also called large or small and so is divided in accord with its proper subject.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher seems to say in *De Anima 2*, the sense of touch is one in genus but divided into many species of sensory power; and this is why it has diverse pairs of contraries as objects. However, these species are not separated from one another by organ, but are instead spread throughout the whole body, and so the distinction among them is not obvious. On the other hand, the sense of taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, is joined together with the sense of touch in the tongue, but not throughout the whole body, and so it is easily distinguished from the sense of touch.

However, one could reply that all these pairs of contraries are such that (a) each belongs to a single proximate genus and (b) all of them together belong to a common genus that is the object of the sense of touch according to its common nature. But this common genus is unnamed, in the same way that the proximate genus of *hot* and *cold* is unnamed.

Reply to objection 4: According to what the Philosopher says, the sense of taste is that species of the sense of touch which exists just in the tongue, and it is distinct not from the sense of touch in general but from those species of the sense of touch that are spread throughout the body.

On the other hand, if the sense of touch is just a single sensory power because of the single common nature of its object, one will have to say that the sense of taste is distinguished from the sense of touch by reason of different sorts of changes. For as far as its organ is concerned, and given the quality which is its proper object, the sense of touch is affected by a natural change and not just a spiritual change. The organ of the sense of taste, however, is not necessarily affected with a natural change by the quality that is its proper object, in such a way, namely, that the tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter; instead, it is affected by the preparatory quality on which taste is based, viz., moistness, which is an object of the sense of touch.

Article 4

Are the interior sensory powers appropriately distinguished?

It seems that the interior sensory powers are not appropriately distinguished:

Objection 1: What is common is not divided off [on the same level] over against what is proper (*commune non dividitur contra proprium*). Therefore, the common sensory power (*sensus communis*) should not be enumerated among the interior sentient powers, over against the proper exterior sensory powers.

Objection 2: One should not posit an interior apprehensive power for any object that a proper and exterior sensory power is sufficient for. But the proper exterior sensory powers are sufficient for judging sensible things, since each sensory power judges with respect to its own proper object. These sensory powers seem likewise sufficient for perceiving their own acts; for instance, since the action of a sensory power in some sense lies between the power and the object, it seems that the sense of sight is much more capable of perceiving its own act of seeing, as something closer to itself, than of seeing color—and so on for the other sensory powers. Therefore, it was unnecessary to posit an interior power, called the ‘common sensory power’, for this purpose.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher, the power of imagining (*vis phantastica*) and the power of remembering (*vis memorativa*) are passions of the primary sentient power. But a passion is not divided off over against its subject. Therefore, memory (*memoria*) and imagination (*phantasia*) should not be posited as powers distinct from the sensory power.

Objection 4: The intellect is less dependent on the sensory power than is any power of the sentient part of the soul. But the intellect does not have cognition of anything unless it receives it from the sensory power; for as *Posterior Analytics* 1 says, “Whoever lacks one of the sensory powers lacks one sort of knowledge.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, one should not posit a power of the sentient part, called the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), to perceive intentions that are not perceived by the sensory power.

Objection 5: Acts of the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*), i.e., comparing and composing and dividing, and acts of the power of reminiscing (*vis reminiscitiva*), i.e., using a sort of syllogism to conduct an inquiry, are no less distant from the acts of the estimative power and of the power of remembering than acts of the estimative power are from an act of imagining (*ab actu phantasiae*). Therefore, either the cogitative power and power of reminiscing should be posited as powers distinct from the estimative power and the power of remembering, or else the estimative power and the power of remembering should not be posited as powers over and beyond the power of imagining.

Objection 6: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine posits three types of vision: (a) *corporeal vision*, which is effected through the sensory power; (b) *spiritual vision*, which is effected through the power of imagining or fantasizing (*per imaginationem sive phantasiam*); and (c) *intellectual vision*, which is effected through the intellect. Therefore, there is no interior power other than the power of imagining that lies between the sensory powers and the intellect.

But contrary to this: In his *Liber de Anima* Avicenna posits five interior sentient powers, viz., “the common sensory power (*sensus communis*), the imaging power (*phantasia*), the imaginative power (*potentia imaginativa*), the estimative power (*potentia aestimativa*), and the power of remembering (*potentia memorativa*).”

I respond: Since nature is not lacking in what is necessary, there must be as many actions of the sentient part of the soul as are sufficient for the life of a perfect animal. And if these actions cannot all be traced back to a single principle, then they require diverse powers, since a power of the soul is nothing other than a proximate principle for the soul’s operation.

Note, then, that the life of a perfect animal requires that the animal apprehend a thing not only in the presence of the sensible object, but also in its absence. Otherwise, since an animal’s movement and action follow upon apprehension, the animal would not move in order to find out about a thing that is absent—just the opposite of what appears to be true, especially in the case of perfect animals, which move purposefully (*moventur motu processivo*), since they are moving toward something absent that has been apprehended. Therefore, through its sentient soul the animal must not only receive the species of sensible things when it is presently being affected by those things, but must also retain and conserve the species. But among corporeal things, to receive and to retain are traced back to diverse principles; for instance, moist things are good at receiving but bad at retaining, and the opposite holds for dry things. Hence, since the sentient power is the act of a corporeal organ, a power that receives sensible species must be different from a power that conserves them.

Again, note that if an animal moved solely because of sensibly pleasurable or painful things, one would have to posit in the animal only an apprehension of forms that the sensory power perceives and with respect to which it takes delight or feels revulsion. But an animal has to seek out or flee from certain things not only because they are pleasant or unpleasant to sense, but also because of other kinds of suitability and utility, or harm—as, for instance, when a sheep, seeing a wolf coming, flees not because of the ugliness of the wolf’s color or shape, but because of the danger to the sheep’s nature; or as when a bird collects straw not because the straw delights its senses, but because this is useful for building a nest. Therefore, an animal has to perceive intentions of this sort which the exterior sensory powers do not perceive. And for this sort of perception there has to be some distinct principle, since perception of sensible forms comes from changes effected by the sensible thing, whereas the perception of the

intentions just alluded to does not.

So, then, the *proper sensory powers* and the *common sensory power* are ordered toward the reception of sensible forms. (The distinction between them will be explained below.)

On the other hand, the *imaging power* or *power of imagining* (*phantasia vel imaginatio*)—they are the same—is ordered toward the retention or conservation of forms. For the imaging (or imagining) power is, as it were, a sort of treasury of forms that have been received through the sensory power.

Now the *estimative power* (*vis aestimativa*) is ordered toward apprehending intentions that are not received through the sensory power, whereas the *power of remembering* (*vis memorativa*), which is a treasury of intentions of this sort, is ordered toward conserving them. An indication of this is that, in animals, the source of remembering comes from some intention of this sort, e.g., that something is harmful or agreeable. And the very nature of the past, which the power of remembering attends to, is intertwined with intentions of this sort.

Now note that as far as sensible forms are concerned, there is no difference between man and the other animals, since they are affected in similar ways by sensible exterior things. However, there is a difference with respect to the intentions we have just been talking about. For the other animals perceive intentions of this sort only by a sort of natural instinct, whereas man also perceives them through a certain comparison (*per quamdam collationem*). And so what in animals is called the *natural estimative power*, in man is called the *cogitative power*, which arrives at intentions of this sort through a certain comparison. Hence, it is also called *particular reason*, and physicians assign it a determinate organ, viz., the middle part of the head; for it compares intentions of individuals in the way in which *intellective reason* compares intentions of universals.

As for the power of remembering, man has not only *memory* (*memoria*), like the other animals, in the immediate recording of past things, but also *reminiscence* (*reminiscentia*) in inquiring quasi-syllogistically into the memory of the past by means of individual intentions.

Now Avicenna posits a fifth power, between the estimative power and the power of imagining, which composes and divides the imagined forms—as is clear, for instance, when from the imagined form of gold and imagined form of a mountain we compose a single form of a golden mountain, which we never actually see. But this operation is not apparent in animals other than man, in whom the power of imagining is sufficient for this. In his book *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* Averroes likewise attributes this action to the power of imagining.

And so it is necessary to posit just four interior powers of the sentient part of the soul, viz., the common sensory power (*sensus communis*), the power of imagining (*vis imaginativa*), the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), and the power of remembering (*vis memorativa*).

Reply to objection 1: The interior sensory power is called ‘common’ not through predication, like a genus, but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

Reply to objection 2: A proper sensory power judges a proper sensible by distinguishing it from other things that fall under the same sensory power, e.g., distinguishing white from black or green. But neither the sense of sight nor the sense of taste can distinguish white from sweet, since whatever makes a distinction between two things must have cognition of both of them. Hence, the judgment regarding this distinction must belong to the common sensory power, which is such that (a) all the apprehensions of the senses are referred to it as to a common terminus, and such that (b) it also perceives the intentions of the sensory powers, as when someone sees that he is seeing. For the latter cannot be done through a proper sensory power, which has cognition only of the sensible form by which it is changed. The act of seeing is perfected in such a change, and from this change there follows another change in the common sensory power, which perceives the act of seeing.

Reply to objection 3: Just as one power arises from the soul by the mediation of another power in the way explained above (q. 77, a. 7), so too the soul is the subject of one power by the mediation of

another. It is in this sense that the power of imagining and the power of remembering are called passions of the primary sentient power (*passiones primi sensitivi*).

Reply to objection 4: Even though the intellect's operation arises from the sensory power, nonetheless, in the entity apprehended through the sensory power the intellect knows many things that the sensory power is unable to perceive. The same holds for the estimative power, though on a lower level.

Reply to objection 5: The cogitative power and power of remembering have an eminence in man not because they are proper to the sentient part of the soul, but—by a sort of overflow—because of their affinity for and nearness to universal reason. And so they are not different powers from the ones in other animals, but the same powers, and yet more perfect.

Reply to objection 6: Augustine is calling 'spiritual vision' the vision which is effected by the likenesses of bodies in the absence of the bodies. From this it is clear that spiritual vision is common to all interior apprehensions.