

QUESTION 59

An Angel's Will

We next have to consider what pertains to an angel's will. We will first consider the will itself (question 59) and then the movement of the will, which is love (*amor*) or affection (*dilectio*) (question 60).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do angels have a will? (2) Is an angel's will his very nature or, again, his very intellect? (3) Do angels have free choice? (4) Do angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite?

Article 1

Do angels have a will?

It seems that angels do not have a will (*in angelis non sit voluntas*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3, "The will exists in the reason." But in the angels there is no reason (*ratio*); instead, there is something higher than reason. Therefore, in the angels there is no will; instead, there is something higher than the will.

Objection 2: As is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, the will is a type of desire (*appetitus*). But desire belongs to what is imperfect, since a desire is for something that is not yet had. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels—especially the beatified angels—it seems that they do not have a will.

Objection 3: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the will is a moved mover, since it is moved by a desirable thing *qua* understood. But angels are not moveable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore, angels do not have a will.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says that the image of the Trinity is found in the mind with respect to memory, intelligence, and will. But the image of God is found in the angelic mind and not just in the human mind, since the angelic mind is likewise capable of seeing God. Therefore, angels have a will.

I respond: One must posit a will in the angels. To make this clear, notice that since all things proceed from God's will, they are all in their own way inclined toward the good through appetite (*appetitus*), though in different ways.

For certain things, e.g., plants and inanimate bodies, are inclined toward the good only through a natural disposition and without any cognition. This sort of inclination toward the good is called a *natural appetite*.

Other things are inclined toward the good with some sort of cognition, not in the sense that they understand the very concept of the good (*ratio boni*), but in the sense that they know some particular good—as, for instance, the senses, which know the sweet and the white and other things of this sort. The inclination that follows upon this type of cognition is called a *sentient appetite*.

Finally, certain things are inclined toward the good with a cognition by which they know the very concept of the good, and this is proper to an intellect. These things are inclined toward the good in the most perfect way—not, as it were, directed toward the good only by another, as are things that lack cognition, and not directed toward a merely particular good, as are things that have only sentient cognition, but inclined, as it were, toward the universal good itself. And this sort of inclination is called a *will*.

Hence, since angels through their intellect have cognition of the universal concept of the good (*cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni*), it is clear that they have a will.

Reply to objection 1: Reason (*ratio*) transcends the sensory power (*sensus*) in a way different from that in which intellective understanding (*intellectus*) transcends reason. For reason transcends the sensory power because of a diversity in the *objects of cognition* (*secundum diversitatem cognitorum*), since the sensory power has to do with particulars, whereas reason has to do with universals. And so an appetite that tends toward the universal good, which corresponds to reason, is different from an appetite that tends toward a particular good, which corresponds to the sensory power. By contrast, intellective understanding and reason differ in their *mode of cognition* (*quantum ad modum cognoscendi*). For intellective understanding has cognition by simply looking (*simplici intuitu*), whereas reason has cognition by going discursively (*discurrendo*) from one thing to another. Still, by means of discursive reasoning, reason arrives at a cognition of what intellective understanding has cognition of without discursive reasoning, viz., the universal. Therefore, the very same object is proposed to the appetitive power by both reason and intellective understanding. Hence, in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the *name* of the appetitive part of the soul is taken from the seeking out (*appetendo*) of what is not yet possessed, the appetitive part nonetheless extends not only to this sort of thing, but also to many other things. In the same way, the name ‘rock’ (*lapis*) is taken from the hurting of the foot (*laesio pedis*), and yet this is not the only thing that belongs to a rock. Similarly, the irascible power is named from anger, and yet there are in the irascible power passions other than anger, e.g., hope, audacity, and others of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: The will is called a moved mover in the sense that willing, along with intellective understanding, is a certain sort of movement. Nothing prevents a movement in this sense from existing in angels, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, this sort of movement is the act of what is perfect.

Article 2

Does an angel’s will differ from his intellect or his nature?

It seems that an angel’s will does not differ from his intellect or his nature (*non differat voluntas ab intellectu et natura*):

Objection 1: An angel is more simple than a natural body. But through its form a natural body is inclined toward its end, which is its good. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel is inclined toward his end through his form. But ‘angel’s form’ refers either (a) to the very nature in which he subsists, or else (b) to an intelligible species that exists in his intellect. Therefore, an angel is inclined toward the good both through his nature and through his intelligible species. But this inclination toward the good pertains to the will. Therefore, an angel’s will is not distinct from his nature or his intellect.

Objection 2: The intellect’s object is the true, whereas the will’s object is the good. But the good and the true differ only conceptually and not in reality. Therefore, the will and the intellect do not differ from one another in reality.

Objection 3: Powers are not differentiated by a distinction between the common and the proper; for instance, the power of vision is directed both toward color [in general] and toward whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be related as the common and the proper, since the true is a certain good, viz., the good of the intellect. Therefore, the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

But contrary to this: An angel’s will is directed only toward good things, whereas his intellect is directed toward both good and bad things, since it has cognition of both. Therefore, an angel’s will is

distinct from his intellect.

I respond: An angel's will is a certain power (*virtus*) or potentiality (*potentia*) that is neither his very nature nor his intellect.

The claim that an angel's will is not his nature is obvious from the fact that a thing's nature or essence is included within the thing itself, and so anything that extends to what exists outside a thing is not that thing's essence. Hence, in the case of natural bodies we see that the inclination toward their own *esse* is not something added to the essence, but derives (a) from the thing's matter, which desires the *esse* before it has it, and (b) from its form, which keeps the thing in existence once it exists. By contrast, an inclination for what is extrinsic derives from something added to the essence. For instance, a body's inclination to a given place derives from its heaviness or lightness, while its inclination to effect what is similar to itself derives from its active qualities. Now a will is naturally inclined toward the good. Hence, the only case in which the essence and the will are the same is where the good is totally contained within the essence of the one who is willing—i.e., in the case of God, who wills nothing outside Himself except for the sake of His own goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, since the infinite good lies outside the essence of every created thing. Hence, an angel's will—or any other creature's will—cannot be the same as his essence.

Similarly, an angel's will—or a man's will—cannot be the same as his intellect. For cognition occurs in virtue of the fact that the object of cognition exists within the one having the cognition (*cognitum est in cognoscente*), and so the intellect extends to what exists outside itself insofar as what exists outside the intellect is by its essence capable of existing in some sense within the intellect. By contrast, the will extends itself to what exists outside itself insofar as it in some way tends toward an exterior thing by a certain inclination. But the power by which a creature has within itself something that exists outside itself is distinct from the power by which it tends toward an exterior thing. And so in any creature the intellect must be distinct from the will.

However, this is not so with God, who has both universal being and universal good within Himself. So both His will and His intellect are His essence.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, a natural body is inclined toward its own *esse* through its substantial form, whereas it is inclined toward what is exterior to itself through something added to itself.

Reply to objection 2: Powers are differentiated not by a material distinction among their objects, but rather by a formal distinction, which involves the concept (*ratio*) of the power's object. And so the difference between the concepts *true* and *good* is sufficient for a distinction between the intellect and the will.

Reply to objection 3: The true and the good are convertible in reality, and this is why the good is understood by the intellect under the concept *true*, and why the true is desired by the will under the concept *good*. And yet, as has been explained, the diversity of the concepts is sufficient to differentiate the powers.

Article 3

Do angels have free choice?

It seems that angels do not have free choice (*liberum arbitrii*):

Objection 1: The act of free choice is to choose (*eligere*). But the act of choosing cannot exist in angels, because the act of choosing is a desire for something which has been deliberated about

beforehand and, as *Ethics* 3 says, deliberation is a certain sort of inquiry. But angels do not come to have cognition through inquiry, since inquiry involves discursive reasoning. Therefore, it seems that angels do not have free choice.

Objection 2: Free choice is open to both parts of a contradiction (*habet se ad utrumlibet*). But there is nothing in an angel's intellect that is open to both parts of a contradiction, since, as has been explained (q. 58, a. 5), an angel's intellect cannot be mistaken with respect to its natural intelligible objects. Therefore, an angel's appetite cannot have free choice.

Objection 3: Things that are natural in angels belong to them in greater or lesser degrees, since the intellectual nature in higher angels is more perfect than in lower angels. But free choice does not admit of greater and lesser degrees. Therefore, angels do not have free choice.

But contrary to this: Free choice belongs to the dignity of man. But angels have more dignity than men do. Therefore, since free choice exists in men, *a fortiori* it exists in angels.

I respond: Some things do not act from free choice, but instead act insofar as they are acted upon and moved by others, in the way that an arrow is moved to its target by an archer. On the other hand, some things, e.g., non-rational animals, act by a sort of choice, but not by free choice; for instance, a sheep flees from a wolf in virtue of a certain sort of judgment by which it takes the wolf to be harmful to itself. However, this judgment is not free for the sheep, but is instead instilled in it by nature.

Only that which has intellective understanding (*intellectus*) can act in virtue of a free judgment, since it has cognition of the universal concept of the good (*cognoscit universalem rationem boni*) and on this basis can judge that this thing or that thing is good. Hence, wherever there is intellective understanding, there is free choice. And so it is clear that angels have free choice in an even more excellent way than men do, just as they have intellective understanding in a more excellent way as well.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking here about choice as it exists in man. But just as a man's judgment about speculative matters (*speculativa*) differs from an angel's in that the latter occurs without inquiry, whereas the former occurs through inquiry, so it is with practical matters (*operabilia*). Hence, angels have choice in virtue of their direct reception of truth and in the absence of the deliberative inquiry of counsel.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), cognition occurs in virtue of the fact that the object of cognition exists in the one having the cognition. Now a thing is imperfect when what is apt by nature to exist in it does not exist in it. Hence, an angel would not be perfect in his nature if his intellect were not determinate with respect to every truth that he can have cognition of by nature.

By contrast, an act of an appetitive power occurs in virtue of the fact that the affections are inclined toward an exterior thing. Now the perfection of a thing does not depend on every entity toward which it is inclined, but depends only on what is higher. And so it is not an imperfection on the part of an angel if he does not have a determinate will with respect to those things that are lower than himself. However, it would be an imperfection on his part if he had an indeterminate will with respect to what is higher than himself.

Reply to objection 3: Free choice exists in a more noble way in the higher angels than it does in the lower angels, just as the judgment of the intellect exists in a more noble way in the higher angels. Yet it is true that freedom itself, to the extent that it is thought of as involving a certain absence of coercion, does not admit of greater and lesser degrees. For privations and negations are not intensified or remitted *per se*, but are intensified or remitted only through their causes or in light of an adjoined affirmation.

Article 4

Do angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite?

It seems that angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite (*in angelis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that in the demons “there is irrational fury and insane concupiscence.” But demons have the same nature as angels, since their sin did not alter their nature. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

Objection 2: Love and joy exist in the concupiscible appetite, whereas anger, hope, and fear exist in the irascible appetite. But all of these are attributed to good and bad angels in Sacred Scripture. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

Objection 3: Certain virtues are said to exist in the irascible and concupiscible appetites; for instance, charity and temperance seem to exist in the concupiscible appetite, whereas hope and fortitude exist in the irascible appetite. But these virtues exist in angels. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the irascible and concupiscible appetites exist in the sentient part of the soul. But angels do not have a sentient part. Therefore, they do not have an irascible appetite or a concupiscible appetite.

I respond: Only a sentient appetite, and not an intellective appetite, is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible. The reason for this is that since powers are differentiated only by the formal concept of their objects and not by a material distinction among their objects, it follows that if a given object corresponds to a power under some common concept, then there will not be a distinction of powers corresponding to the diversity of the proper concepts contained by that common concept. For instance, if the proper object of the visual power is color under the concept *color*, then there will not be two distinct visual powers corresponding to the difference between *black* and *white*. However, if *white* as *white* were the proper object of some power, then the power that sees white would be distinct from the power that sees black.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 16, a. 1) that the object of the intellective appetite (or will) is the good under the common concept of the good, and there cannot be any desire that is not a desire for the good. Hence, in the intellective part [of our soul] the appetite is not divided in a way that corresponds to the distinction among particular goods—unlike the sentient appetite, which is divided in virtue of the fact that its objects are certain particular goods and not the good under the common concept of the good. Hence, since angels have only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible, but instead remains undivided and is called the will.

Reply to objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are predicated of the demons metaphorically, in just the way that anger is sometimes attributed to God, because of a likeness in the effects.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as love and joy are passions, they exist in the concupiscible appetite, but insofar as ‘love’ and ‘joy’ name simple acts of will, these acts exist in the intellective part. For instance, to love is to will the good for someone, and to rejoice is for the will to rest in some good that is now possessed. And, more generally, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 9, none of these names is used for a passion in the case of the angels.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as charity is a virtue, it exists in the will and not in the concupiscible appetite. For the object of the concupiscible appetite is a good that is pleasurable to the senses. But the divine good, which is the object of charity, is not a good of this sort.

For the same reason, one should claim that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite. For the

object of the irascible appetite is some arduous sensible good. But this is not what the hope which is a virtue has to do with; instead, it has to do with an arduous divine good.

Now insofar as temperance is a human virtue, it has to do with desires for sensible pleasures, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Similarly, fortitude has to do with acts of daring and fear, which exist in the irascible power. And so temperance, insofar as it is a human virtue, exists in the concupiscible power, and fortitude exists in the irascible power. But temperance and fortitude do not exist in the angels in this way. For in the angels there are no passions of sense desire or of fear and daring, which are the passions that have to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. Rather, temperance is said to exist in the angels to the extent that they employ their will with moderation in keeping with the rule of God's will. And fortitude is said to exist in them to the extent that they carry out God's will steadfastly. But all of this is done through their will and not through an irascible or concupiscible appetite.