QUESTION 67

The Duration of the Virtues after this Life

Next we have to consider the duration of the virtues after this life (*de duratione virtutum post hanc vitam*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Do the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Do the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Does faith remain? (4) Does hope remain? (5) Does anything of faith or hope remain? (6) Does charity remain?

Article 1

Do the moral virtues remain after this life?

It seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life:

Objection 1: As Matthew 22:30 says, men in the state of future glory will be like the angels. But as *Ethics* 10 says, it is ridiculous to posit moral virtues in the angels. Therefore, neither is it the case that there will be moral virtues in men after this life.

Objection 2: The moral virtues perfect a man in his active life. But the active life does not remain after this life; for in *Moralia* 6, Gregory says, "The works of the active life pass away with the body." Therefore, the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 3, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. But the non-rational parts of the soul are corrupted when the body is corrupted, because they are acts of corporeal organs. Therefore, it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 1:15 says, "Justice is perpetual and immortal."

I respond: As Augustine reports in *De Trinitate* 14, Cicero claimed that after this life the four cardinal virtues do not exist, but that in that other life men will be beatified solely by the cognition of that nature in which nothing is better or more lovable—or, as Augustine puts it in the same place, "that nature which created all natures." However, afterwards Augustine himself determines that these four virtues do exist in the future life, but in a different mode.

To see this clearly, notice that in these virtues there is something *formal* and something *material*. What is *material* in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part of the soul toward passions and operations in accord with a certain mode. But since this mode is determined by reason, it follows that what is *formal* in all the virtues is the very order of reason.

So, then, one should reply that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life as regards what is *material* in them. For in the future life sensory desires and the pleasures of food and sex will have no place, and neither will fear and audacity with respect to the dangers of death, or, again, the distribution and sharing of those things that are useful in the present life.

However, as regards what is *formal*, these virtues will remain absolutely perfect in the blessed in heaven, since each individual's reason will be perfectly upright with respect to those things that pertain to him in that state, and each individual's appetite will be completely moved in accord with the order of reason in the matters that pertain to that state. Hence, in the same place Augustine says, "Prudence will exist there without any danger of error, fortitude without the irksomeness of tolerating evils, and temperance without resistance from disordered desires—so that it will belong to prudence not to prefer any good to God or to equate any good with God, and it will belong to fortitude to cling to Him with utter firmness, and it will belong to temperance to take delight without any harmful effect." On the other hand, as regards justice, it is even clearer what act it will have in that state, viz., to be subject to God, since even in this life it belongs to justice to be subject to a superior.

Reply to objection 1: In the cited passage the Philosopher is talking about the moral virtues with respect to what is *material* in them, viz., in the case of justice, exchanges and distributions; in the case of fortitude, terrors and dangers; and in the case of temperance, disordered sensory desires.

Reply to objection 2: The reply to the second objection is similar. For what belongs to the active life is related *materially* to the virtues.

Reply to objection 3: There are two states after this life: (a) before the resurrection, when souls will be separated from their bodies, and (b) after the resurrection, when souls will once again be united with their bodies.

Thus, in the state of resurrection, there will be non-rational powers in the bodily organs, just as there now are. Hence, fortitude will be able to exist in the irascible power and temperance in the concupiscible power, since both powers will be perfectly disposed toward obeying reason.

On the other hand, in the pre-resurrection state the non-rational parts will not exist in actuality in the soul; instead, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 77, a. 8), they will exist only as roots in the soul's essence (*solum radicaliter in essentia ipsius*). Hence, the two virtues in question will likewise exist in actuality only in their root, viz., in reason and the will, in which, as has been explained (q. 63, a. 1), there are certain seeds of these virtues. By contrast, justice, which exists in the will, will remain even in actuality. This is why it is specifically said of justice that it is "perpetual and immortal"—both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible, and also because of the similarity of its act, as was just explained above.

Article 2

Do the intellectual virtues remain after this life?

It seems that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 13:8-9 the Apostle says, "Knowledge (*scientia*) will be destroyed," and the reason is that "we know in part." But just as the cognition that belongs to scientific knowledge is "in part," i.e., imperfect, so too with the cognition that belongs to the other intellectual virtues for as long as this life endures. Therefore, all the intellectual virtues will cease to exist after this life.

Objection 2: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that since scientific knowledge is a habit, it is a quality that is difficult to change; for it is not easily lost, except perhaps because of some vehement change or illness. But there is no change in the human body as great as that which occurs through death. Therefore, scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.

Objection 3: The intellectual virtues perfect the intellect for performing its proper act well. But it seems that the act of the intellect does not exist after this life, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the soul does not understand anything without a phantasm; but phantasms do not remain after this life, since they exist only in corporeal organs. Therefore, the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.

But contrary to this: The cognition of universal and necessary things is more firm than the cognition of particular and contingent things. But the cognition of particular contingent things remains in a man after this life, more specifically, the cognition of those things that someone has done or undergone—this according to Luke 16:25 ("Remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus received bad things"). Therefore, *a fortiori*, the cognition of universal and necessary things remains, and this belongs to scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues.

I respond: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 6), there are some who have claimed that (a) intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect (*in intellectu possibili*) except during the time when it is actually engaged in intellective understanding, and that (b) when actual thinking ceases, there is conservation of species only in the sentient powers, viz., in the powers of imagination and memory, which are acts of corporeal organs. Powers of this sort are corrupted when the body is corrupted. And so on this opinion scientific knowledge will not in any way remain after this life when the body is corrupted—and neither will any other intellectual virtue remain.

However, this opinion is contrary to the view of Aristotle, who in *De Anima* 3 says, "The passive intellect is actualized when it becomes each thing in knowing it, whereas it is in potentiality with respect to actually engaging in thinking." The opinion in question is likewise contrary to reason, since intelligible species are received unchangeably in the passive intellect, in accord with the mode of the recipient. Hence, the passive intellect is called "the place for species" (*locus specierum*), because it conserves the intelligible species. By contrast, the phantasms, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, a. 7), are such that it is in turning toward them that a man has intellective understanding in this life by applying the intelligible species to them, are corrupted when the body is corrupted.

Hence, with respect to the phantasms, which are, as it were, what is *material* in the intellectual virtues, the intellectual virtues are destroyed when the body is destroyed, whereas with respect the intelligible species, which exist in the passive intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. But in the case of the intellectual virtues, the species behave as what is *formal*.

Hence, the intellectual virtues remain after this life with respect to what is *formal* in them, but not with respect to what is *material* in them—just like the moral virtues, in the way explained above (a. 1).

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle's words should be understood as having to do with what is material in scientific knowledge and with the mode of understanding, since the phantasms do not remain when the body is destroyed, and there will be no use of scientific knowledge by turning to the phantasms.

Reply to objection 2: Illness corrupts the habit of scientific knowledge with respect to what is material in it, viz., the phantasms, but not with respect to the intelligible species, which exist in the passive intellect.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 89, a. 1), after death the separated soul has a different mode of intellective understanding than it has by turning to phantasms. And on this score scientific knowledge remains, though not with the same mode of operating—just as has been explained (a. 1) concerning the moral virtues.

Article 3

Does faith remain after this life?

It seems that faith remains after this life:

Objection 1: Faith (*fides*) is more noble than scientific knowledge (*scientia*). But as has been explained, scientific knowledge remains after this life. Therefore, so does faith.

Objection 2: 1 Corinthians 3:11 says, "No one can lay a different foundation from the one that has been laid, which is Christ Jesus"—i.e., faith in Christ Jesus. But when the foundation has been removed, what is built upon it does not remain. Therefore, if faith does not remain after this life, no other virtue remains.

Objection 3: The cognition belonging to faith and the cognition belonging to glory differ as the imperfect and the perfect. But an imperfect cognition can exist along with a perfect cognition. For instance, in an angel evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) can exist along with morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*); and a man can have, with respect to the same conclusion, scientific knowledge through a demonstrative syllogism along with opinion through a dialectical syllogism. Therefore, after this life faith can exist along with the cognition belonging to glory.

But contrary to this: In 2 Corinthians 5:6-7 the Apostle says, "As long as we are in the body, we wander from the Lord, since we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who exist in the state of glory do not wander from the Lord, but instead are present to Him. Therefore, faith does not remain after this life in the state of glory.

I respond: Opposition is the *per se* and proper cause of one thing's being excluded from another,

viz., insofar as the opposition of an affirmation and a negation is included in all opposites.

Now in some cases there is an opposition *with respect to contrary forms*, e.g., *white* and *black* among the colors. On the other hand, in some cases the opposition is *with respect to the perfect and the imperfect*; hence, in the case of alterations *more* and *less* are taken as contraries—e.g., as *Physics* 5 points out, when what is less hot becomes more hot. And since the perfect and the imperfect are opposed to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to exist together in the same respect.

However, notice that an imperfection sometimes belongs to the *nature* of a thing and pertains to its species; for instance, a lack of reason belongs to the nature of the species of a horse or an ox. And since a thing that remains numerically one and the same cannot be transferred from one species to another, it follows that if this sort of imperfection is removed, then the species of the thing is destroyed; for instance, a thing would no longer be an ox or a horse if it were rational. By contrast, sometimes an imperfection does not belong to the nature of the species, but occurs to an individual *in some other respect* (*sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud*); for instance, a lack of reason sometimes occurs in a man to the extent that his use of reason is obstructed because of sleep or drunkenness or something of the sort. And it is clear that when this sort of imperfection is removed, the entity's substance still remains.

Now it is clear that an imperfection of cognition belongs to the nature of faith. For imperfection is posited in the definition of faith given in Hebrews 11:1: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that are not apparent." And Augustine says, "What is faith? To believe what you do not see." Now the fact that a cognition is lacking in evidentness or vision (*sit sine apparatione vel visione*) pertains to an imperfection of cognition. And so an imperfection of cognition belongs to the nature of faith. Hence, it is clear that faith cannot be a perfect cognition while remaining numerically the same cognition.

However, we should consider further whether or not faith can exist together with a perfect cognition. For nothing prevents a certain sort of imperfect cognition from sometimes existing along with a perfect cognition. Therefore, notice that there are three possible ways for a cognition to be imperfect: (a) on the part of the *object* of the cognition; (b) on the part of the *medium*; and (c) on the part of the *subject*.

It is on the part of the *object* of cognition that morning knowledge and evening knowledge differ as the perfect and the imperfect in the angels. For morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*) is of things insofar as they have *esse* in the Word, whereas evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) is of things insofar as they have *esse* in their own proper natures, which is imperfect in relation to the first sort of *esse*.

As for the *medium*, a cognition that is of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium and a cognition that is of a conclusion through a probabilistic medium differ as the perfect and the imperfect.

And as for the *subject*, opinion, faith, and scientific knowledge differ as the perfect and imperfect. For it belongs to the nature of an opinion that one thing is accepted with a fear of the opposite, so that an opinion does not have firm adherence (*non habet firmam inhaesionem*). By contrast, it belongs to the nature of scientific knowledge that it has firm adherence along with intellective vision, since it has a certitude that comes from the understanding of the principles. And faith falls in between them, since it goes beyond opinion in having firm adherence, whereas it falls short of scientific knowledge in not having vision.

Now it is clear that the perfect and the imperfect cannot exist together with respect to the same thing (*secundum idem*); however, things that differ as perfect and imperfect with respect to some same thing can exist together in some other same thing (*ea quae differunt secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse in aliquo alio eodem*).

So, then, cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *object* cannot in any way have the same object (*nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto*); however, they can share the same medium

and the same subject (*possunt convenire in eodem medio et in eodem subiecto*). For nothing prevents one man from having a cognition of two objects at one and the same time through one and the same medium, where one of the two objects is perfect and the other imperfect, e.g., *sickness* and *health*, or *good* and *evil*.

Again, it is impossible for cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *medium* to share the same medium. But nothing prevents them from sharing the same object and the same subject, since one man can have cognitions of the same conclusion through a probabilistic medium and through a demonstrative medium.

Again, it is likewise impossible for cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *subject* to exist together in the same subject. But faith by its nature has an imperfection that is on the part of the subject, viz., that the one who has faith does not see what he believes in, whereas beatitude by its nature has perfection on the part of the subject, so that, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 8), one who is blessed in heaven sees that by which he is beatified. Hence, it is clear that it is impossible for faith to remain along with beatitude in the same subject.

Reply to objection 1: Faith is more noble than scientific knowledge on the part of the *object*, since its object is the First Truth. But scientific knowledge has a more perfect mode of cognition that is not incompatible with the perfection of beatitude, viz., vision, in the way that the mode of faith *is* incompatible with it.

Reply to objection 2: Faith is the foundation as regards what it contains of cognition. And so when that cognition is perfected, the foundation will be more perfect.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Does hope remain after death in the state of glory?

It seems that hope remains after death in the state of glory:

Objection 1: Hope perfects the human appetite in a more noble way than the moral virtues do. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, the moral virtues remain after this life. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so does hope.

Objection 2: Fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life, both a filial fear in the blessed in heaven, which remains forever, and a fear of punishment in the damned. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, hope is able to remain.

Objection 3: Just as hope is of a future good, so, too, is desire. But in the blessed in heaven there is a desire for a future good, both (a) with respect to the glory of the body, which the souls of the blessed desire, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 24, and (b) with respect to the soul's glory—this according to Ecclesiasticus 24:29 ("They who eat me will still hunger, and they who drink me will still thirst") and 1 Peter 1:12 ("... at whom the angels desire to look"). Therefore, it seems possible for hope to exist in the blessed after this life.

But contrary to this: In Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, "Who sees what he hopes for?" But the blessed in heaven see that which is the object of hope, viz., God. Therefore, they do not hope.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), that which by its nature implies the imperfection of its subject cannot exist along with the subject when the opposed perfection has been brought to completion. For instance, it is clear that a movement by its nature implies the imperfection of its subject, since a movement is the act of something that exists in potentiality insofar as it exists in potentiality, so that when that potentiality is actualized (*quando illa potentia reducitur ad actum*), the movement then ceases. For a thing is not still becoming white after it has already been made white.

Now as is clear from what we said above about the passion of hope (q. 40, aa. 1 and 2), hope implies a certain movement toward that which is not had. And so once what is hoped for, viz., the enjoyment of God, is had, hope will no longer be able to exist.

Reply to objection 1: Hope is more noble than the moral virtues as regards its object, viz., God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of beatitude in the way that the act of hope is—except perhaps by reason of their subject matter, with respect to which the moral virtues do not remain. For it is not the case that a moral virtue perfects the appetite only with respect to what is not yet had; instead, it also perfects the appetite with respect to what is had at present.

Reply to objection 2: As will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 19, a. 2), there are two types of fear, *servile fear* and *filial fear*:

Servile fear is the fear of punishment and cannot exist in the state of glory, since no possibility of punishment remains.

Filial fear, on the other hand, has two acts, viz., (a) to revere God (*revereri Deum*), and filial fear remains with respect to this act, and (b) to fear separation from Him, and filial fear does not remain with respect to this act. For to be separated from God has the character of an evil, whereas nothing evil will be feared in the state of glory—this according to Proverbs 1:33 ("Abundance will be enjoyed, and the fear of evils will be removed"). But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 1), fear is opposed to hope by the opposition between *good* and *evil*, and so the fear that remains in the state of glory is not opposed to hope.

Now in the damned there can be fear of punishment more than there can be hope of glory in the blessed. For in the damned there will be a succession of punishments, and so the character of the future, which is an object of fear, remains in that state, whereas the glory of the saints exists without succession insofar as it is a certain participation in eternity, in which there is no past or future, but only the present. Yet even in the case of the damned fear does not exist properly speaking. For as was explained above (q. 40, a. 2), fear never exists without some hope for escape, which will not at all exist in the damned. Hence, neither will fear exist—except perhaps in the common way of speaking, according to which *any* expectation of a future evil is called 'fear'.

Reply to objection 3: As regards the *soul's state of glory*, there cannot be any desire in the blessed, insofar as desire looks to the future—and this for the reason already explained. However, hunger and thirst are said to exist in that state because weariness is removed (*per remotionem fastidii*), and for the same reason desire is said to exist in the angels.

As regards the *glory of the body*, in the souls of the saints there can, to be sure, be a desire for it, but not hope properly speaking, either (a) insofar as hope is a theological virtue, since the object of hope is God and not any created good, or (b) insofar as hope is taken in general. For as was explained above (q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is something arduous, whereas a good for which we now have an inevitable cause is not related to us as something arduous (*in ratione ardui*). Hence, it is not proper to say that someone who has silver money *hopes* that he will have something that it is immediately within his power to eat. Similarly, those who have the glory of the soul are properly said only to *desire* the glory of the body and not to *hope* for it.

Article 5

Does anything of faith or hope remain in the state of glory?

It seems that something of faith or hope remains in the state of glory:

Objection 1: When what is proper has been removed, what is common remains—as is explained in the *Liber de Causis*: "When *rational* is removed, *living* remains, and when *living* is removed, *being*

remains." But in faith there is something that it shares in common with beatitude, viz., cognition itself, while there is something proper to itself, viz., darkness (*aenigma*), since faith is a cognition of mystery (*cognitio aenigmatica*). Therefore, when the darkness of faith is removed, the cognition itself that belongs to faith remains.

Objection 2: Faith is a certain sort of spiritual light that belongs to the soul—this according to Ephesians 1:17-18 ("... the eyes of your heart enlightened in the knowledge of God"). But this light is imperfect in relation to the light of glory, of which Psalm 35:10 says, "In your light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light arrives; for instance, a candle is not extinguished when the sun's brightness arrives. Therefore, it seems that the light of faith itself remains along with the light of glory.

Objection 3: The substance of a habit is not removed by the fact that its subject matter is removed. For instance, a man is able to retain the *habit* of generosity even when he has lost his money; it is the *act* that he cannot have. Now the object of faith is the First Truth but not as seen (*veritas prima non visa*). Therefore, when this is removed by the fact that the First Truth is seen, the habit itself of faith is still able to remain.

But contrary to this: Faith is a simple habit. But what is simple either is removed as a whole or remains as a whole. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), faith does not remain as a whole but is instead removed, it seems that it is taken away as a whole.

I respond: Some have claimed that hope is totally removed, but that faith is partly removed, viz., with respect to the darkness, and partly remains, viz., with respect to the substance of the cognition.

If this is interpreted to mean that what remains is the same *in genus* but not the same *in number*, then it is absolutely true, since faith agrees with the heavenly vision in genus, i.e., the genus *cognition*. By contrast, hope does not agree with beatitude in genus, since hope is related to the enjoyment of beatitude in the way that a movement is related to rest at its terminus.

However, if the claim is interpreted to mean that numerically the same cognition which constitutes faith remains in heaven, then it is altogether impossible. For it is not the case that if the difference of a given species is removed, the substance of the genus remains numerically the same; for instance, if the difference that constitutes whiteness is removed, then it is not the case that numerically the same substance of color remains, as if numerically the same color were sometimes white and sometimes black. For the genus is not related to the difference in the way that matter is related to form, so that the substance of the genus might remain when the difference is removed in the way that the numerically the same substance of matter remains when the form is removed. For the genus and difference are not *parts* of the species; otherwise, they would not be predicated of the species. Rather, just as the species signifies the whole, i.e., the whole composed of matter and form among material things, so, too, the difference signifies the whole, and so does the genus. However, the genus denominates the whole from something that is like the matter (*ab eo quod est sicut materia*), whereas the difference denominates the whole from something that is like the form (*ab eo quod est sicut forma*), and the species denominates the whole from both. For instance, in a man the sentient nature is related as matter (*materialiter*) to the intellective nature, so that *animal* is predicated because the whole has a sentient nature, *rational* is predicated because the whole has an intellective nature, and *man* is predicated because the whole has both natures. And so the same whole is signified by those three notions, but not *from* the same thing. Hence, it is clear that since the difference designates only what the genus designates (*differentia non sit nisi designativa generis*), if the difference is removed, then the same substance of the genus cannot remain. For it is not the case that the same animality exists if some other type of soul constitutes the animal.

Hence, it cannot be the case that numerically the same cognition, which was previously dark, later becomes a clear vision. And so it is clear that nothing of faith that is the same in number or in species remains in heaven; instead, only something that is the same in genus remains.

Reply to objection 1: As is clear from what has been said, when *rational* is removed, the *living* that remains is the same in genus and not the same in number.

Reply to objection 2: The imperfection of the candle's light is not opposed to the perfection of the sun's light, since it does not have to do with the same subject. By contrast, the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another, and they have to do with the same subject. Hence, they cannot exist together, just as the brightness of the air cannot exist along with its darkness.

Reply to objection 3: Someone who loses his money does not lose the possibility of having money, and so it is appropriate for the habit of generosity to remain. By contrast, in the state of glory the object of faith, which is something not seen, is removed not only in actuality but also with respect to its possibility—and this because of the permanence of beatitude.

Article 6

Does charity remain after this life in the state of glory?

It seems that charity does not remain after this life in the state of glory:

Objection 1: As 1 Corinthians 13:10 says, "When what is perfect comes, what is in part [read: what is imperfect] shall be done away with." But the charity that belongs to this life (*caritas viae*) is imperfect. Therefore, it shall be done away with when the perfection of glory comes.

Objection 2: Habits and acts are distinguished by their objects. But the object of love is a good that is apprehended. Therefore, since the apprehension that belongs to the present life is different from the apprehension that belongs to the future life, it seems not to be the case that the same charity remains in both the present life and the future life.

Objection 3: Things that share the same nature are such that the imperfect can arrive at an equality of perfection through continuous growth. But the charity that belongs to this life (*caritas viae*), no matter how much it grows, can never arrive at an equality with the charity that belongs to heaven (*caritas patriae*). Therefore, it seems that the charity of this life does not remain in heaven.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 13:8 the Apostle says, "Charity never passes away."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), when the imperfection of a given thing does not belong to the nature of its species, then nothing prevents numerically the same thing that was previously imperfect from afterwards becoming perfect, in the way that a man is perfected through growth and in the way that an instance of whiteness is perfected through intensification.

Now charity is love (*amor*), and there is no imperfection that belongs to it by its nature; for love can be either of something had or of something not had, and it can be of something seen or of something not seen. Hence, charity is not done way with by the perfection of glory, and so numerically the same charity remains.

Reply to objection 1: The imperfection of charity is related to it *per accidens*, since imperfection does not belong to the nature of love. But when what is *per accidens* is removed, the substance of the thing remains. Hence, when the imperfection of charity is done away with, charity itself is not done away with.

Reply to objection 2: Charity does not have the cognition itself as its object, since in that case it would not be the same in this life and in heaven. Instead, it has for its object the very thing that the cognition is of, and this remains the same, viz., God Himself.

Reply to objection 3: The charity that belongs to this life cannot through growth arrive at equality with the charity that belongs to heaven—and this because of a difference that lies on the side of the cause; for as *Ethics* 9 says, vision is, as it were, a cause of love. And the more perfect the cognition of God is, the more perfectly He is loved.