

QUESTION 113

The Effects of Grace

Next we have to consider the effects of grace: first, the justification of a sinner, which is an effect of operating grace (question 113) and, second, merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace (question 114).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) What is the justification of a sinner? (2) Does it require an inpouring of grace? (3) Does it require any movement of free choice? (4) Does it require a movement of faith? (5) Does it require a movement of free choice against sin? (6) Should the forgiveness of sin be counted among the requirements already mentioned? (7) Is there a temporal ordering in the justification of a sinner, or does it occur all at once? (8) What is the natural ordering of the things that come together for justification? (9) Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work? (10) Is the justification of a sinner a miracle?

Article 1

Is the justification of a sinner the forgiveness of sins?

It seems that the justification of a sinner (*iustificatio impii*) is not the forgiveness of sins:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), sin is opposed not only to justice but to all virtues. But 'justification' signifies a certain movement toward justice. Therefore, not every instance of the forgiveness of sin is a justification, since every movement is from one contrary to another.

Objection 2: As is explained in *De Anima* 2, each thing ought to be denominated from what is most important in it. But the forgiveness of sins is effected primarily (a) by faith—this according to Acts 15:9 ("... purifying their hearts by faith")—and (b) by charity—this according to Proverbs 10:12 ("Charity covers all sins"). Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should be denominated from faith or charity rather than from justice.

Objection 3: The forgiveness of sins seems to be the same thing as a calling (*vocatio*), since it is someone distant who is called, and one is distant from God through sin. But being called is prior to justification—this according to Romans 8:30 ("Those whom He called He also justified"). Therefore, justification is not the forgiveness of sins.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Romans 8:30 ("Those whom He called He also justified") says, "By the forgiveness of their sins." Therefore, justification is the forgiveness of sins.

I respond: An act of justifying (*justificatio*), taken passively, implies a movement toward justice, just as an act of heating (*calefactio*) implies a movement toward heat. And since justice by its nature implies a certain rectitude of order, 'justice' can be taken in two ways:

In one way, 'justice' implies a correct ordering within a man's *action itself*. And as *Ethics* 5 makes clear, this is the sense in which justice is posited as a virtue, whether it be *particular justice*, which orders a man's act with respect to its rectitude in relation to another individual man, or *legal justice*, which orders a man's act with respect to its rectitude in relation to the common good of the many.

In the second way, 'justice' implies a certain rectitude of order within a man's *interior disposition itself*, viz., insofar as the man's highest part is subject to God and insofar as the lower powers of his soul are subject to the highest power, viz., reason. And this is the disposition that in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher likewise calls "justice metaphorically speaking."

Now there are two ways in which this sort of justice can be effected in a man:

In one way, in the manner of a simple generation, which goes *from a privation to a form*. And justification in this sense could belong to a man who was not in sin, as long as he received justice of this sort from God in the way that Adam is said to have received original justice.

In the second way, this sort of justice can be effected in a man in accord with the sort of movement

that goes *from one contrary to another*. In this sense, ‘justification’ implies a certain change from a state of injustice to a state of justice of the sort just mentioned. And it is in this sense that we are talking here about the justification of a sinner—in accord with what the Apostle says in Romans 4:5 (“To him who does not works, yet believes in Him who justifies a sinner,” etc.). And since a movement is denominated from its *terminus ad quem* rather than from its *terminus a quo*, it follows that a change of this sort, by which someone is changed from a state of injustice through the forgiveness of his sins, is given its name from its *terminus ad quem* and is called ‘the justification of a sinner’.

Reply to objection 1: Every sin, insofar as it involves a certain disorder on the part of a mind not subject to God, can be called a injustice that is contrary to the sort of justice explained above—this according to 1 John 3 (“Everyone who commits a sin likewise commits an iniquity, and his sin is an iniquity”). Accordingly, the removal of any sin is called a justification.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Faith’ and ‘charity’ express a specific ordering of the human mind to God with respect to intellect or with respect to affection. By contrast, ‘justice’ implies in a more generic way a *total* rectitude of order. And so a change of the sort in question is denominated from justice rather than from charity or faith.

Reply to objection 3: The ‘calling’ refers back to God’s assistance in moving and exciting the mind interiorly toward giving up sin. This motion on God’s part is a cause of the forgiveness of sin and not itself the forgiveness of sin.

Article 2

Is an inpouring of grace required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner?

It seems that an inpouring of grace (*infusio gratiae*) is not required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Someone can be removed from one contrary without being led all the way to the other contrary, as long as the contraries admit of something in the middle (*si contraria sint mediata*). But the state of sin and the state of grace are contraries that admit of something in the middle; for between them lies the state of innocence, in which a man has neither grace nor sin. Therefore, it is possible for someone’s guilt to be remitted without his being led all the way to grace.

Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin (*remissio culpae*) consists in God’s reckoning—this according to Psalm 31:2 (“Blessed the man to whom the Lord has not imputed his sin”). But as was established above (q. 110, a. 1), the inpouring of grace posits something within us as well. Therefore, the inpouring of grace is not required for the forgiveness of sin.

Objection 3: No one is simultaneously the subject of two contraries. But certain sins are contraries, e.g., prodigality and stinginess (*prodigalitas et illiberalitas*). Therefore, someone who is the subject of the sin of prodigality is not simultaneously the subject of the sin of stinginess. Therefore, when one sins by the vice of prodigality, he is freed from the sin of stinginess. And in this sense a certain sin is forgiven without grace.

But contrary to this: Romans 3:24 says, “... justified graciously (*gratis*) by His grace.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a. 6 and q. 87, a. 3), by sinning a man offends God. But no one’s offense is forgiven unless the mind of the one who has been offended is at peace with the offender. So our sin is said to be forgiven insofar as God is at peace with us. This peace consists in the love by which God loves us (*consistit in dilectione qua Deus nos diligit*). But God’s love, on the part of the divine act, is eternal and immutable, whereas, on the part of the effect that it imprints upon us, it is sometimes interrupted, viz., insofar as we sometimes abandon it and sometimes get it back again. But the effect of God’s love in us, which is removed through sin, is grace, by which a man is

made worthy of the eternal life from which mortal sin excludes us. And so the forgiveness of sin is unthinkable without the presence of an inpouring of grace.

Reply to objection 1: More is required for an offender's sin to be forgiven than that some non-offender is simply speaking not hated. For among men it can happen that one man neither loves nor hates another; but if he offends him, then his being forgiven for the offense cannot occur without special benevolence.

Now God's benevolence with respect to a man is said to be restored through the gift of grace. And so even though, before man sinned, he could have existed both without grace and without sin, nonetheless, after his sin, he is no longer able to exist without sin unless he has grace.

Reply to objection 2: Just as God's love does not, as was explained above (q. 110, a. 1), consist only in the act of God's will, but also implies a certain effect of grace, so, too, the fact that God does not impute to a man his sin implies a certain effect in the one whose sin is not imputed. For the fact that a sin is not imputed by God proceeds from God's love.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, "If ceasing to sin were the same as not having sin, then it would be sufficient for Scripture to issue this warning: 'Son, you have sinned; do not add to this any more'. But this is not sufficient; rather, it adds, 'Also pray that your past sins might be forgiven you.'" For as has been explained (q. 87, a. 6), the actual sin passes away, but the guilt remains (*transit peccatum actu et remanet reatu*). And so when someone passes from the sin of one vice to this sin of a contrary vice, he does, to be sure, cease to have the *act* of the past sin, but he does not cease to have the *guilt*, and so he simultaneously has the guilt of both sins. For the sins are not contrary to one another as far as the turning away from God is concerned, and it is on this score that a sin carries guilt.

Article 3

Is a movement of free choice required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of free choice is not required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: We see that through the sacrament of Baptism children, and sometimes even adults, are justified without a movement of free choice. For instance, in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says that when a certain friend of his was afflicted with a fever, "he lay senseless for a long time in a deadly sweat, and when hope was lost, he was baptized unknowingly and re-created"—where re-creation comes about through justifying grace. But God has not fettered His power to the sacraments (*potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis*). Therefore, He is likewise able to justify a man without the sacraments in the absence of any movement of free choice.

Objection 2: When a man is sleeping, he does not have the use of reason, and without the use of reason there cannot be a movement of free choice. But according to 3 Kings 3:5ff. and 2 Paralipomenon 1:7ff., it was in his sleep that Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the gift of justifying grace is sometimes given to a man by God without any movement of free choice.

Objection 3: It is through the same cause that grace is both brought into being and conserved; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, "A man should turn himself to God in such a way that he is always being made just by God." But grace is conserved in a man without a movement of free choice. Therefore, it can be poured into him from the beginning without a movement of free choice.

But contrary to this: John 6:45 says, "Everyone who has heard from the Father and learned comes to me." But learning does not take place without a movement of free choice, since the learner gives his consent to the teacher. Therefore, no one comes to God through justifying grace without a movement of free choice.

I respond: The justification of a sinner occurs when God moves a man to justice; for according to Romans 4:5, it is “He who justifies a sinner.” Now God moves each thing in accord with its own mode; for instance, we see among natural things that heavy and lightweight things are moved by Him in different ways because of their diverse natures. Hence, He likewise moves men in accord with the condition of human nature. Now a man by his proper nature has the power of free choice (*homo secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii*). And so in someone who has the use of free choice, God’s moving him to justice does not occur without a movement of free choice. Rather, God infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way that, along with this, He simultaneously moves free choice to accept the gift of grace in the case of those who have a capacity for this movement.

Reply to objection 1: Young children (*pueri*) do not have the capacity for free choice, and so they are moved by God to justice solely through the informing of their soul. However, this does not occur without the sacrament. For just as original sin, in opposition to which they are justified (*a quo iustificantur*), comes to them not by their own will but from a carnal origin, so, too, grace flows into them from Christ through a spiritual regeneration.

The same line of reasoning holds for those who are insane or mentally incapacitated and who have never had the use of free choice. On the other hand, if someone at one time had the use of free choice and afterwards lost it either through infirmity or sleep, he would not receive justifying grace through Baptism administered exteriorly—or through any other sacrament—unless he had previously intended to have the sacrament (*nisi prius habuerit sacramentum in proposito*), and this could not occur without the use of free choice. It is in this sense that the man that Augustine is talking about was re-created; for he accepted his Baptism both beforehand and afterwards.

Reply to objection 2: Solomon did not merit or receive wisdom in his sleep. Rather, in his sleep it was declared to him that, because of his previous desire, wisdom would be poured into him by God; hence, in Wisdom 7 it says in his person, “I desired it, and understanding (*sensus*) was given to me.”

An alternative reply is that the sleep in question was not natural sleep, but a sleep of prophecy—this in accord with Numbers 12:6 (“If there is a prophet of the Lord among you, I will speak to him through his sleep or in a vision”). In such a case the one in question has the use of free choice.

Notice, however, that the line of reasoning is not the same for the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace. For the gift of justifying grace orders a man principally toward the good, which is the object of the will, and so a man is moved toward it by a movement of the will, i.e., by a movement of free choice. By contrast, wisdom perfects the intellect, which precedes the will, and so the intellect can be illuminated by the gift of wisdom without a complete movement of free choice. In the same way, we see that certain things are revealed to men in their sleep—this according to Job 33:15-16: “When deep sleep falls upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He opens the ears of men, and teaching, instructs them in what they are to learn.”

Reply to objection 3: When justifying grace is poured into the soul, there is a certain transmutation of the soul, and so a proper movement of the human soul is required in order for the soul to be moved in accord with its own mode. By contrast, the conservation of grace occurs without a transmutation, and so it does not require any movement on the part of the soul; rather, it requires only a continuation of God’s influence.

Article 4

Is a movement of faith required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of faith is not required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Just as a man is justified through faith, so he is likewise justified through other things as well—for instance,

(a) through *fear*, about which Ecclesiasticus 1:27 says, “The fear of the Lord drives out sin, for he who is without fear cannot be justified,” and

(b) through *charity*—this according to Luke 7:47 (“Many sins have been forgiven her, because she has loved much”), and

(c) through *humility*—this according to James 4:6 (“God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble”), and

(d) through *mercy*—this according to Proverbs 15:27 (“Through mercy and faith sins are washed away”).

Therefore, it is not the case that a movement of faith is required for justification more than movements of the virtues just mentioned.

Objection 2: An act of faith is required for justification only insofar as it is through faith that a man has cognition of God. But there are also other ways in which a man can have cognition of God, viz., through natural cognition and through the gift of wisdom. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of faith is required for the justification of a sinner.

Objection 3: The articles of the Faith are diverse. Therefore, if an act of faith were required for the justification of a sinner, then, it seems, when a man was first justified, he would have to think of all the articles of the Faith. But this seems absurd, since such thinking would require a long period of time. Therefore, it seems that an act of faith is not required for justification.

But contrary to this: Romans 5:1 says, “Therefore, having been justified by faith, let us have peace with God.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), a movement of free choice is required for the justification of a sinner in the sense that a man’s mind is moved by God. But God moves a man’s soul by turning it toward Himself—as it says in Psalm 84:7 (according to the alternative version): “You will turn us, O God, and bring us to life.” And so what is required for the justification of a sinner is a movement of the mind by which it is turned toward God.

But the initial turning toward God (*prima conversio in Deum*) is effected through faith—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“He who comes to God must have faith that He exists”). And so a movement of faith is required for the justification of a sinner.

Reply to objection 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is informed by charity, and so a movement of charity also occurs in the justification of a sinner along with the movement of faith.

Now free choice is moved toward God in order to submit itself to Him, and so an act of filial fear and an act of humility likewise occur, since it is possible for one and the same act of free choice to belong to diverse virtues, insofar as the one commands and the other is commanded, i.e., insofar as the act can be ordered to diverse ends.

Now an act of mercy works against sin either (a) in the manner of satisfaction, and in this sense it *follows upon* justification; or (b) in the manner of *preparation*, insofar as the merciful receive mercy, and in that sense it can also precede justification; or (c) it can also concur *simultaneously* in justification along with the other virtues mentioned above, insofar as mercy is included in the love of neighbor.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the case that through natural cognition a man is turned toward God insofar as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence, that sort of cognition is not sufficient for justification. Moreover, as is clear from what was said above (q. 68, a. 2), the gift of wisdom presupposes the cognition that belongs to faith (*praesupponit cognitionem fidei*).

Reply to objection 3: As the Apostle says in Romans 4:5, “But to him who believes in the one who justifies a sinner, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God.” From this it is clear that in the justification of a sinner an act of faith is required in the sense of the man’s believing that God is the one who justifies men through the mystery of the Christ (*quod homo credit Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi*).

Article 5

Is a movement of free choice with respect to sin required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of free choice with respect to sin is not required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Charity suffices by itself for erasing sin—this according to Proverbs 10:12 (“Charity covers all sins”). But the object of charity is not sin. Therefore, a movement of free choice with respect to sin is not required for the justification of a sinner.

Objection 2: One who is going forward should not pay attention to what is behind him—this according to the Apostle in Philippians 3:13 (“Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching myself forth to the things that are before me, I press on toward the mark, to the prize of my lofty vocation”). But to someone who is going forward toward justice, his past sins are behind him. Therefore, he should forget about them, and he should not “stretch himself” toward them (*nec in ea se extendere debet*) through a movement of free choice.

Objection 3: In the justification of a sinner it is not the case that one sin is forgiven without the others, since “it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God.” Therefore, if in the justification of a sinner there had to be a movement of free choice with respect to sin, then he would have to think of all his sins. But this seems absurd, both because this sort of thought would require a long time and also because the man would not be able to have forgiveness for the sins he has forgotten about. Therefore, a movement of free choice against sin is not required for the justification of a sinner.

But contrary to this: Psalm 31:5 says, “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and You have forgiven the wickedness of my sin.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the justification of a sinner is a certain movement by which the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Therefore, the human mind must be related to both extremes in its movement of free choice, just as a body that is moved in place by some mover is related to the two termini of the movement. Now it is clear that in the case of the local movement of bodies, a body that is being moved moves away from the terminus *a quo* and moves toward the terminus *ad quem*. Hence, when the human mind is being justified, it must, through its movement of free choice, move away from sin and move toward justice. But in the case of a movement of free choice, *moving away from* and *moving toward* have to do with hatred and desire (*accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium*). For as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, when commenting on the passage, “The mercenary flees, etc.” (John 10:12), “Our affections are movements of the mind: joy is the mind’s extending outward (*diffusio*) and fear is the mind’s fleeing. You go forward in mind when you desire something; you flee in mind when you are afraid.” Therefore, in the justification of a sinner there must be two movements of free choice: by the first one tends through his desire toward God’s justice, and by the second he detests sin.

Reply to objection 1: It belongs to the same virtue to move toward one of the two opposites and to move away from the other. And so just as it belongs to charity to love God, so it likewise belongs to charity to detest the sins through which the soul is separated from God.

Reply to objection 2: As for the things that are behind him, a man should not go back to them through love; rather, he should forget them in the sense of not being attached to them. Yet he ought to keep them in mind (*debet eorum recordari per considerationem*) in order to detest them, since it is in this way that he withdraws from them.

Reply to objection 3: In the time that precedes justification, a man must detest each sin which he has committed and remembers. From this sort of thought process there follows in the soul a certain movement of detesting all sins in general, among which are also included his now forgotten sins. For a man in this state is so disposed that he would also be sorry for the sins he does not remember if they were present to his memory. And this is a movement that occurs in justification (*iste motus concurrat ad*

iustificationem).

Article 6

Should the forgiveness of sins be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that the forgiveness of sins should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: An entity's substance is not counted among those things required for the entity; for instance, *man* should not be counted along with *soul* and *body*. But as has been explained (a. 1), the justification of a sinner is itself the forgiveness of sins. Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

Objection 2: The inpouring of grace is the same as the forgiveness of sin (*culpae remissio*), just as the act of illuminating is the same as the expulsion of darkness. But the same thing should not be counted along with itself, since *one* is opposed to *many*. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt should not be counted along with the inpouring of grace.

Objection 3: The forgiveness of sins follows upon a movement of free choice—with respect to God and with respect to sin—in same the way that an effect follows upon a cause. For sins are forgiven though faith and contrition. But an effect should not be enumerated with its cause, since things that are enumerated together in the sense of being divided off from one another are at the same level by nature (*simul natura*). Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

But contrary to this: In the enumeration of what is required for a thing, the end, which is the most important aspect in each thing, should not be omitted. But the forgiveness of sins is the end in the justification of a sinner. For Isaiah 27:9 says, “This all the fruit: that his sin should be taken away.” Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

I respond: There are four items counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner, viz., (a) the inpouring of grace, (b) the movement of free choice with respect to God through faith, (c) the movement of free choice with respect to sin, and (d) the forgiveness of guilt.

The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), justification is a certain movement by which the soul is moved by God from a state of sin into a state of justice (*movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum iustitiae*). But there are three things required in every movement by which something is moved by another: (a) the motion of the mover itself (*motio ipsius moventis*), (b) the movement of the thing to be moved (*motus mobilis*), and (c) the consummation of the movement, i.e., the attainment of the end. Thus, on the part of God's motion, there is the inpouring of grace; on the part of free choice as moved, there are its two movements, i.e., the moving away from the terminus *a quo* and the moving toward the terminus *ad quem*; and the consummation, i.e., the arrival at the terminus of this movement, is connoted by ‘the forgiveness of sins’, since it is in the forgiveness of sin that justification is consummated.

Reply to objection 1: The justification of a sinner is said to be the forgiveness of sins itself in the sense in which every movement takes its species from its terminus. And yet, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 5), many other things are required for this terminus.

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible ways to think of the inpouring of grace and the forgiveness of guilt:

The first way is with respect to the very *substance of the act*. And in this sense they are the same act, since it is by the same act that God both bestows grace and forgives sin (*eodem actu Deus et largitur gratiam et remittit culpam*).

They can also be thought of as regards the *objects [of the act]*. And in this sense they differ from one another in accord with the difference between the guilt that is removed and the grace that is poured in. It is in this same way that generation and corruption differ among natural things, even though the act of generating one thing is the act of corrupting another (*quamvis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius*).

Reply to objection 3: The enumeration in question is not a division of a genus into its species; in that sort of enumeration the things enumerated must be on the same level (*oportet quod sint simul*). Rather, it is an enumeration of the different things that are required for the completion of something. In this sort of enumeration it is possible for one thing to be prior and another posterior; for among the principles and parts of a composite thing, one can be prior to another.

Article 7

Does the justification of a sinner occur instantaneously or successively?

It seems that the justification of a sinner occurs successively and not instantaneously:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), a movement of free choice is required for the justification of a sinner. But the act of free choice is to choose, and, as was established above (q. 13, a. 1), this requires the deliberation of counsel. Therefore, since deliberation involves a certain sort of discursive reasoning, which itself contains successiveness, it seems that the justification of a sinner is successive.

Objection 2: A movement of free choice does not take place without an act of considering (*absque actuali consideratione*). But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, a. 4), it is impossible to have intellectual understanding of many things simultaneously. Therefore, since the justification of a sinner requires a movement of free choice with respect to diverse objects, viz., God and sin, it seems that the justification of a sinner cannot be instantaneous (*non possit esse in instanti*).

Objection 3: A form that admits of greater and lesser degrees is received successively in a subject, as is clear in the case of whiteness and blackness. But as was explained above (q. 112, a. 4), grace admits of greater and lesser degrees. Therefore, it is not received all at once (*subito*) in a subject. Therefore, since an inpouring of grace is required for the justification of a sinner, it seems that the justification of a sinner cannot take place instantaneously.

Objection 4: The movement of free choice that accompanies the justification of a sinner is meritorious, and so it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit; this will be explained below (q. 114, a. 2). But a thing acquires a form before it operates in accord with that form. Therefore, grace is first poured in and then free choice is moved with respect to God and with respect to detesting sin. Therefore, justification does not occur all at once as a whole (*non est tota simul*).

Objection 5: If grace is poured into the soul, then there must be an instant at which it first exists in the soul. Similarly, if guilt is forgiven, then there must be a last instant at which a man is subject to the guilt. But these cannot be the same instant, since in that case opposites would exist in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, they must be two successive instants, between which—according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 6—there has to be a temporal interval (*inter quae oportet esse tempus medium*). Therefore, justification occurs successively and not all at once as a whole.

But contrary to this: The justification of a sinner is effected through the grace of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit comes all of a sudden—this according to Acts 2:2 (“And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming”), where a Gloss on this passage says, “The grace of the Holy Spirit knows no tardy endeavors.” Therefore, the justification of a sinner is instantaneous and not successive.

I respond: The whole of the justification of a sinner consists at the beginning in the inpouring of grace (*tota originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione*), since it is through this inpouring of grace that free

choice is moved and that guilt is forgiven. But the inpouring of the grace occurs in an instant and without successiveness.

This is so because the reason why a given form is not impressed on a subject all at once is that its subject is not disposed and the agent needs time to dispose the subject. And so we see that a substantial form is acquired by its matter as soon the matter is disposed by the preceding alteration; and, for the same reason, a diaphanous body is illuminated all at once by an actively illuminating body because it is disposed in its own right for receiving light.

Now it was explained above (q. 112, a. 2) that in order for God to infuse grace, He does not require any disposition other than the disposition that He Himself effects. But He makes this sort of disposition sufficient for receiving grace—sometimes all at once and sometimes little by little and successively, as was explained above (*ibid.*). The fact that a natural agent is unable to dispose its matter all at once stems from the fact that there is a certain lack of proportion to the agent's power on the part of that which is resisting it in the matter, and because of this we see that the stronger the agent's power, the more quickly the matter is disposed. Therefore, since God's power is infinite, He is able to dispose any created matter whatsoever all at once for a form, and He is able to do this all the more to a man's free choice, the movement of which can be instantaneous in accord with its nature.

So, then, the justification of a sinner is effected by God instantaneously.

Reply to objection 1: The movement of free choice that accompanies the justification of a sinner is a consent to detesting sin and to approaching God, and this consent does indeed occur all at once.

Now it sometimes happens that this consent is preceded by some sort of deliberation, but the deliberation is not itself part of the substance of justification; instead, it is a path toward justification, in the same way that a local motion is a path to illumination and that an alteration is a path to generation.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, a. 5), nothing prevents someone from having actual intellective understanding of two things simultaneously to the extent that they are in some sense one. For instance, we simultaneously understand the subject and predicate insofar as they are united in the ordering of a single affirmation. And in the same way free choice can be moved simultaneously toward two objects insofar as the one is ordered to the other. But the movement of free choice with respect to sin is ordered to the movement of free choice with respect to God, since a man detests sin because it is contrary to God, whom he wills to adhere to. And so in the justification of a sinner free choice simultaneously detests sin and turns itself toward God, in the same way that a body approaches one place by simultaneously withdrawing from another place.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that a form admits of greater and lesser degrees is not a reason for its not being received all at once in matter. For otherwise light would not be received all at once in the air, given that the air can be illuminated to greater and lesser degrees. Rather, as has been explained, the reason should be taken from the side of the disposition of the matter or subject.

Reply to objection 4: At the very instant at which a form is acquired, the entity begins to operate in accord with that form; for instance, as soon as fire is generated, it moves upward. And if the thing's movement is instantaneous, then the movement is completed in that same instant.

Now the movement of free choice, i.e., *to will*, is instantaneous and not successive. And so the justification of a sinner does not have to be successive.

Reply to objection 5: The succession of two opposites in the same subject has to be thought of in one way in things that are subject to time and in another way in things that lie beyond time (*supra tempus*).

In things that are subject to time, there is no last instant (*non est dare ultimum instans*) in which the prior form exists in the subject, but instead there is a last temporal interval (*est dare ultimum tempus*) and a first instant at which the succeeding form exists in the matter or subject. The reason for this is that in time there cannot be one instant immediately preceding another instant, because, as is proved in *Physics* 6, the instants are not arranged consecutively in time (*instantia non consequenter se habeant in tempore*), just as the points in a line are not arranged consecutively. But a temporal interval terminates in

an instant. And so in the whole of the preceding temporal interval (*in toto tempore praecedenti*), in which something is being moved toward a given form, that thing is the subject of the opposite form; and in the last instant of that temporal interval, which is the first instant of the following temporal interval, the thing has the form that is the terminus of the movement.

However, it is different with things that lie beyond time. For if there is a succession of affections and intellectual conceptions (*succession affectuum vel intellectualium conceptionum*) in such a case—for instance, in angels—then a succession of this sort is measured not by continuous time, but instead by discrete time, in the same way that, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 53, a. 2), the things themselves that are being measured are not continuous. Hence, in such cases there is a last instant in which the first thing exists and a first instant in which what follows exists, and there does not have to be an intermediate time, since there is no continuous time to require this in such a case (*quia non est ibi continuitas temporis quae hoc requirebat*).

Now the human mind, which is what is justified, lies beyond time in its own right, but it is *per accidens* subject to time, viz., insofar as it has intellective understanding of something continuous and temporal in accord with the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species (*intelligit cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata in quibus species intelligibiles considerat*); this was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, aa. 1 and 2). And so, accordingly, the mind's change should be judged in accord with the condition of temporal movements—so, that, more specifically, we claim that there is a last temporal interval, but no last instant, in which guilt exists in the mind; on the other hand, there is a first instant in which grace exists in the mind, whereas guilt existed in it in the whole of the preceding temporal interval.

Article 8

Is the inpouring of grace first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that the inpouring of grace is not first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Withdrawing from evil is prior to approaching good—this according to Psalm 36:15 (“Turn away from evil and do good”). But the forgiveness of guilt (*remissio culpae*) has to do with withdrawing from evil, whereas the inpouring of grace has to do with pursuing the good. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt is naturally prior to the inpouring of grace.

Objection 2: The disposition for a form naturally precedes the form for which it is a disposition. But the movement of free choice is, as it were, a disposition for receiving grace. Therefore, it naturally precedes the inpouring of grace.

Objection 3: Sin prevents the soul from freely tending toward God. But removing that which prevents a movement is prior to the movement's ensuing. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt and the movement of free choice with respect to sin are naturally prior to the movement of free choice with respect to God and the inpouring of grace.

But contrary to this: A cause is naturally prior to its effect. But as was explained above (a. 7), the inpouring of grace is a cause of all the other things required for the justification of a sinner. Therefore, it is naturally prior to them.

I respond: The four things mentioned above that are required for the justification of a sinner are, to be sure, *simultaneous in time*, since, as has been explained (a. 7), the justification of a sinner is not successive; nevertheless, one is indeed prior to another in the *order of nature*:

The first among them in the order of nature is the inpouring of grace; the second is the movement of free choice with respect to God; the third is the movement of free choice with respect to sin; and the

fourth is the forgiveness of sin (*remissio culpa*).

The reason for this ordering is that in any movement what is naturally first is the motion of the mover itself (*motio ipsius moventis*); second is the disposition of the matter, i.e, the movement of the movable thing itself (*motus ipsius mobilis*); and last of all is the end or terminus of the movement in which the mover's motion terminates (*finis vel terminus motus ad quem terminatur motio moventis*). As was explained above (a. 6), the very motion of God the mover is the inpouring of grace, whereas the movement or disposition of the movable thing is the twofold movement of free choice; and, as is clear from what was said above (a. 6), the terminus or end of the movement is the forgiveness of sin.

And so in the justification of a sinner the first thing in the natural ordering is the inpouring of grace. The second thing is the movement of free choice with respect to God. The third thing is the movement of free choice with respect to sin—for the one who is justified hates sin because it is contrary to God, and so the movement of free choice with respect to God naturally precedes the movement of free choice with respect to sin, since it is its reason and cause. And the fourth and last thing is the forgiveness of sin, since, as has been explained (aa. 1 and 6), this whole transmutation is ordered toward the forgiveness of sin as its end.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways to think about withdrawing from a terminus and approaching a terminus:

The first is on the part of the *thing moved*. In this sense, withdrawing from a terminus naturally precedes approaching a terminus. For the opposite that is being withdrawn from exists beforehand in the movable subject and what exists later is that which the movable thing reaches through its movement.

But on the part of the *agent*, the reverse holds. For the agent, through a form that preexists in it, acts to remove the contrary.

For instance, the sun through its light acts to remove darkness. And so on the sun's part, illuminating is prior to removing darkness, whereas on the part of the air to be illuminated, being purged of darkness is prior in the order of nature to acquiring light—even though the two of them are simultaneous in time.

Since the inpouring of grace and the forgiveness of sin are attributed to God as the one effecting justification, it follows that the inpouring of grace is prior in the order of nature to the forgiveness of sin. On the other hand, if we take the things attributed to the man as the one being justified, then the reverse holds. For the liberation from sin is prior in the order of nature to the acquisition of justifying grace.

An alternative reply is that one can claim that the termini of justification are sin as the terminus *a quo* and justice as the terminus *ad quem*, and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and the acquisition of justice.

Reply to objection 2: The subject's disposition is prior in the order of nature to the reception of the form, and yet it follows upon the agent's action, through which the subject itself is likewise disposed. And so the movement of free choice is prior in the order of nature to the acquisition of the grace, but it follows upon the inpouring of the grace.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Physics 2*, in the case of movements of the mind what is altogether first is the movement toward the principle of speculation or toward the end of action, whereas in the case of exterior movements the removal of impediments precedes the attainment of the end. And since the movement of free choice is a movement of the mind, it is moved with respect to God as an end naturally prior to being moved toward removing the impediment of sin.

Article 9

Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work?

It seems that the justification of a sinner is not God's greatest work:

Objection 1: Through the justification of a sinner one attains the grace for this life (*consequitur gratiam viae*). But through glorification one attains the grace of heaven (*consequitur gratiam patriae*), which is greater. Therefore, the glorification of angels or men is a greater work than the justification of a sinner.

Objection 2: The justification of a sinner is ordered toward the particular good of a single man. But as is clear from *Ethics* 1, the good of the universe is greater than the good of a single man. Therefore, the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of a sinner.

Objection 3: To make something from nothing, when nothing is cooperating with the agent, is greater than to make something from something with some cooperation on the part of the patient. But in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent, whereas in the justification of a sinner God makes something from something, i.e., He makes a just man from a sinner, and in this case there is some cooperation on the man's part, since, as has been explained (a. 3), there is a movement of free choice here. Therefore, the justification of a sinner is not God's greatest work.

But contrary to this: Psalm 144:9 says, "His tender mercies are over all His works." And there is a Collect that says, "O God, who does show forth your almightiness most by pardoning and having mercy ..." And in commenting on John 14:12 ("Greater works than these shall he do") Augustine says, "To make a just man from a sinner is a greater work than to create heaven and earth."

I respond: There are two ways in which a work can be called great:

In the first way, on the part of *the mode of acting*. And in this sense the greatest work is the work of creation, in which something is made from nothing.

In the second way, a work can be called great because of *the magnitude of what is effected*. And in this sense the justification of a sinner, which terminates in the eternal good of participation in God (*quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis*), is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates in the good of a mutable nature. This is why Augustine, after having claimed that it is greater to make a just man out of a sinner than to create heaven and earth, adds, "For heaven and earth will pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestined will remain forever."

However, there are two ways in which [an effect] is called 'great':

In one way, with respect to *absolute quantity*. And in this sense the gift of glory is greater than the gift of the grace that justifies a sinner.

In the second way, something is called great by a *proportionate quantity (magnum quantitate proportionis)*, in the way that a mountain might be called 'small' and a grain 'great'. And in this sense the gift of grace that justifies a sinner is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, since the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the sinner, who deserved punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just man, who is deserving of glory by the very fact that he has been justified. This is why, in the same place, Augustine says, "Let him who is capable of it judge whether it is greater to create the angels just than to justify sinners. Certainly, if they both involve equal power, the latter involves greater mercy."

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of a single individual, as long as both are assumed to be in the same genus. But the good of grace that belongs to a single individual is greater than the good of nature of the whole universe.

Reply to objection 3: This argument proceeds from the side of the mode of acting, according to which creation is God's greatest work.

Article 10

Is the justification of a sinner a miraculous work?

It seems that the justification of a sinner is a miraculous work:

Objection 1: Miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous works. But as is clear from Augustine in the place cited above, the justification of a sinner is greater than all other miraculous works. Therefore, the justification of a sinner is a miraculous work.

Objection 2: A movement of the will exists in the soul in the way that a natural inclination exists in natural entities. But when God does something contrary to the inclination of nature in natural entities, it is a miraculous work—as when He gives sight to the blind or resuscitates the dead. But a sinner’s will tends toward evil. Therefore, since, in justifying a man, God moves him toward the good, it seems that the justification of a sinner is miraculous.

Objection 3: Just as wisdom is a gift from God, so too is justice. But it is miraculous that someone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore, it is miraculous that a sinner should be justified by God.

But contrary to this: Miraculous works are beyond natural power. But the justification of a sinner is not beyond natural power; for in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to men, whereas having grace belongs to the faithful.” Therefore, the justification of a sinner is not miraculous.

I respond: There are three things usually found in miraculous works:

The first is on the part of the *agent’s power*, since the work is able to be effected only by God’s power. And, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 8), such works are miraculous absolutely speaking, since they have a hidden cause. In this sense, both the justification of a sinner and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, any work that can be effected by God alone, can be called miraculous.

Second, in certain miraculous works one finds that the induced form is *beyond the natural power of the matter involved*; for instance, the resuscitation of the dead is beyond the natural power of the body involved. And in this regard, the justification of a sinner is not miraculous, since the soul is naturally capable of grace (*naturaliter anima est gratiae capax*). For by reason of the fact that the soul is made to the image of God, it is, as Augustine says, capable of God through grace.

In the third way, one finds in miraculous works something outside of the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when someone sick suddenly attains perfect health outside of the usual course of healing that is effected by nature or by skill. And in this regard, the justification of a sinner is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For it is the usual and customary course of justification that when God moves the soul interiorly, the man turns toward God first by an imperfect conversion and later comes to a perfect conversion, since, as Augustine puts it, “the inchoate charity merits an increase, and when it is increased, it merits to be perfected.” Sometimes, by contrast, God moves the soul so vehemently that it immediately attains a sort of perfection of justice, as happened in the conversion of Paul, which was also accompanied exteriorly by a miraculous prostration. And this is why Paul’s conversion is festively commemorated in the Church.

Reply to objection 1: Even if certain miraculous works are lesser than the justification of a sinner with respect to the goodness that occurs, they are nonetheless beyond the usual order of such effects. And this is why they have more of the character of a miracle.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the case that there is a miraculous work whenever a natural thing is moved in a way contrary to its inclination; otherwise, it would be miraculous for water to be heated or for a rock to be thrown upward. Rather, there is a miraculous work when this happens outside the order of a proper cause that is apt to do this sort of thing. But no cause other than God is able to justify a sinner, just as no cause other than fire is able to heat water. And this is why the justification of a sinner by God

is not, in this respect, miraculous.

Reply to objection 3: A man is apt to acquire wisdom and knowledge from God through his own talent and study (*per proprium ingenium et studium*), and so when a man is made wise or knowledgeable outside of this manner, it is miraculous. But a man is apt to acquire justifying grace through God's working and not through his own work. Hence, the cases are not parallel.