

QUESTION 4

What is Required for Beatitude

Next we have to consider the things required for beatitude. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is delight required for beatitude? (2) Is it the delighting or the seeing which is more central to beatitude? (3) Is comprehending required for beatitude? (4) Is rectitude of will required for beatitude? (5) Is the body required for man's beatitude? (6) Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude? (7) Are any exterior goods required for beatitude? (8) Is the company of friends required for beatitude?

Article 1

Is delight required for beatitude?

It seems that delight (*delectatio*) is not required for beatitude:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, "The vision is faith's entire reward." But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, it is beatitude that is the reward or payment for virtue. Therefore, nothing other than the vision alone is required for beatitude.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, "Beatitude is a good that is sufficient by itself (*per se*)." But whatever stands in need of something else is not sufficient by itself. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 3, a. 8), the essence of beatitude consists in the act of seeing God, it seems that an act of delighting is not required for beatitude.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 7 says, "The operation of happiness [read: beatitude] must be unimpeded." But as *Ethics* 6 says, delight impedes the intellect's action; for it undermines the judgment of prudence. Therefore, delight is not required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that beatitude is "rejoicing in the truth (*gaudium de veritate*)."

I respond: There are four possible ways in which one thing is required for another:

In one way, it is required as a *precursor to* or *preparation for* (*praeambulum vel praeparatorium*) that thing, in the way that instruction (*disciplina*) is required for scientific knowledge.

In a second way, it is required in the sense that it *brings that thing to perfection* (*sicut perficiens aliquid*), in the way that a soul is required for a body's life.

In a third way, it is required as an *extrinsic aid*, in the way that friends are required for doing something.

In a fourth way, it is required as *something concomitant*, in the way that heat is said to be required for fire.

It is in this last way that delight is required for beatitude. For delight is caused by a desire's coming to rest in a good that has been attained. Hence, since beatitude is nothing other than the attaining of the highest good, beatitude cannot exist without a concomitant delight.

Reply to objection 1: By the very fact that a reward is given to someone, the will of the one who merits the reward comes to rest, and this is what it is to have delight. Thus, delight is included in the very notion of a reward's being given.

Reply to objection 2: The act of delighting is caused by the very act of seeing God. Therefore, he who sees God cannot 'stand in need' of delight.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 10 says, an act of delighting that is concomitant with an operation of the intellect strengthens that operation and does not impede it. For what we do with delight we do with more attentiveness and perseverance.

On the other hand, an extraneous act of delighting does impede the intellect's operation. It sometimes does this by distracting one's attention, since, as has been explained, we are more attentive to those things in which we take delight; and when we are intensely attentive to one thing, our attention is

necessarily withdrawn from anything else. But it also sometimes does this by contrariety, in the sense that a sensual delight that is contrary to reason impedes the judgment of prudence more than the judgment of the speculative intellect.

Article 2

Is the act of delighting more central to beatitude than the act of seeing?

It seems that the act of delighting (*delectatio*) is more central (*principalius*) to beatitude than the act of seeing (*visio*):

Objection 1: *Ethics* 10 says, “Delight is the perfection of an operation.” But the perfection is better than that which is perfected. Therefore, the act of delighting is more central (*potior*) than the intellect’s operation, i.e., the act of seeing.

Objection 2: What is more central (*potius*) is that for the sake of which something is desirable. But operations are desired for the sake of the delight they bring (*propter delectationem ipsarum*); hence, nature attaches delight to the operations necessary for conserving the individual and the species, so that these operations will not be neglected by animals. Therefore, in the case of beatitude the act of delighting is more central than the intellect’s operation, i.e., the act of seeing.

Objection 3: The act of seeing corresponds to faith, whereas the act of delighting (*delectatio*), i.e., the act of enjoying (*fruitio*), corresponds to charity. But as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13:13, charity is greater than faith. Therefore, the act of delighting, i.e., the act of enjoying, is more central than the act of seeing.

But contrary to this: A cause is more central than its effect. But the act of seeing is a cause of the act of delighting. Therefore, the act of seeing is more central than the act of delighting.

I respond: The Philosopher poses this problem in *Ethics* 10 and leaves it unresolved.

However, if one considers the matter carefully, it must necessarily be the case that the intellect’s operation, which is the act of seeing, is more central than the act of delighting. For the act of delighting consists in the will’s coming to rest in a certain way (*consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis*). But the will comes to rest in something only because of the goodness of the thing in which it comes to rest. Therefore, if the will comes to rest in some operation, then the will’s coming to rest proceeds from the operation’s goodness. But it is not the case that the will seeks the good for the sake of coming to rest; for if that were so, then the act of will itself would be the end—which is contrary to what was premised. Rather, the reason why it seeks to come to rest in the operation is that the operation is its good. Hence, it is clear that the very operation that the will comes to rest in is a more central good than is the will’s coming to rest therein.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same place, “Delight perfects the operation in the way that comeliness perfects youth,” i.e., it follows upon youth. Hence, delight is a perfection that is concomitant with the act of seeing, and it is not a perfection in the sense that it makes the act of seeing to be perfect within its own species.

Reply to objection 2: Sentient apprehension does not attain to the general notion of the good; instead, it attains to some particular good that is pleasurable. And so in the case of the sentient appetite that exists in animals, operations are sought for the sake of pleasure (*propter delectationem*).

By contrast, the intellect apprehends the universal notion of the good, whose attainment is followed by delight. Hence, the intellect intends the good more centrally than the delight. And hence it is that God’s intellect, which instituted nature, attached the delights for the sake of the operations.

Now a thing should not be judged simply in accord with the order of the sentient appetite; instead, it should be judged in accord with the order of the intellectual appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Charity does not seek the good it loves for the sake of delight; instead, its taking delight in an acquired good that it loves is consequent to it. And so it is not the act of delighting that is related to charity as an end, but instead the act of seeing, through which the end first becomes present to it.

Article 3

Is comprehending required for beatitude?

It seems that comprehending is not required for beatitude:

Objection 1: In *Ad Paulinum De Vivendo Deum* Augustine says, “To attain to God with the mind is great beatitude, but to comprehend Him is impossible.” Therefore, there is beatitude without comprehending.

Objection 2: Beatitude is a man’s perfection with respect to the intellective part [of his soul], in which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, qq. 79ff.), there are no powers other than the intellect and the will. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by the act of seeing God (*per visionem Dei*), whereas the will is sufficiently perfected by the act of delighting in Him (*per delectationem in ipso*). Therefore, it is not the case that an act of comprehending is required as some sort of third thing.

Objection 3: Beatitude consists in an operation. But operations are specified by their objects. Now there are two general objects, viz., the true and the good, with the true corresponding to the act of seeing and the good corresponding to the act of delighting. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of comprehending is required as, so to speak, a third thing.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 9:24 the Apostle says, “Run in such a way as to comprehend (*ut comprehendatis*).” But spiritual running terminates in beatitude, as he himself says at the end of 2 Timothy (“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice”). Therefore, comprehending is required for beatitude.

I respond: Since beatitude consists in attaining the ultimate end, what is required for beatitude has to be taken from man’s very ordering toward his end.

Now man is ordered toward his intelligible end partly through his intellect and partly through his will: through his *intellect*, insofar as there exists in the intellect beforehand an *imperfect cognition* of the end; and through his *will*, first through *love* (*per amorem*), which is the first mover of the will toward something, and, second, through a real relation of the lover to what is loved. There can be three such relations: (a) sometimes what is loved is present to the lover, and in that case what is loved is no longer sought after; (b) sometimes what is loved is not present but is impossible to attain, and in that case it is likewise not sought after; and (c) sometimes what is loved is possible to attain, but it is elevated beyond the ability of the one who seeks it (*est elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis*), so that it cannot be had immediately—and this is the relation of *the one who hopes to what he hopes for*, which is the only relation that induces the seeking of the end (*sola habitudo facit finis inquisitionem*).

Now there are certain elements in beatitude itself answering to the three things just noted. For the *perfect cognition* of the end answers to the *imperfect cognition*; the *presence of the end itself* answers to the *relation of hope*; and, as was explained above (a. 2), the *act of delighting* in the already present end follows upon the *love* (*consequitur dilectionem*).

And so for beatitude it is necessary for these three things to come together, viz., *the act of seeing* (*visio*), which is the perfect cognition of the intelligible end; *comprehending* (*comprehensio*), which implies the presence of the end; and the act of *delighting* or *enjoying* (*delectatio vel fructio*), which implies the lover’s coming to rest in what is loved.

Reply to objection 1: There are two senses of ‘comprehending’:

The first sense is the inclusion of what is comprehended in that which comprehends it, and in this sense whatever is comprehended by something finite is itself finite. Hence, in this sense God cannot be comprehended by any created intellect.

In the second sense ‘comprehending’ names nothing other than embracing a thing that is now had with its presence (*tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae*), as when someone who attains a thing is said to comprehend it when he is embracing it. And it is in this sense that comprehending is required for beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: Just as hope and love involve the will because the same will loves something and tends toward it when it is not had, so too comprehending and delighting involve the will because the same will possesses something and comes to rest in it.

Reply to objection 3: The comprehending is not an operation in addition to the seeing, but is instead a certain relation to the end once it is had. Hence, the very act of seeing, or the thing seen insofar as it is there with its presence, is the object of the comprehending.

Article 4

Is rectitude of will required for beatitude?

It seems that rectitude of will is not required for beatitude:

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 3, a. 4), beatitude consists essentially in an operation of the intellect. But rectitude of will, through which men are called ‘clean’, is not required for the perfect operation of the intellect; for in *Recontrationes* Augustine says, “I do not approve of what I said in the prayer, ‘God, who does not will any but the clean to know the truth ...’. For it can be replied that many who are not clean also know many truths.” Therefore, rectitude of will is not required for beatitude.

Objection 2: What is prior does not depend on what is posterior to it. But the intellect’s operation is prior to the will’s operation. Therefore, beatitude, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of will.

Objection 3: What is ordered toward something as toward an end is not necessary once the end has been attained, e.g., a ship after it has arrived at the port. But rectitude of will, which exists through virtue, is ordered toward beatitude as toward an end. Therefore, once beatitude has been attained, rectitude of will is unnecessary.

But contrary to this: Matthew 5:8 says, “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” And Hebrews 12:14 says, “Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.”

I respond: Rectitude of will is required for beatitude both as something antecedent to it and as something concomitant with it (*et antecedenter et concomitanter*).

Rectitude of will is required as *something antecedent* because it exists through an appropriate ordering toward the ultimate end. But the end is related to what is ordered toward the end in the way that form is related to matter. Hence, just as matter cannot attain to a form unless it is disposed in the right way for that form, so nothing attains an end unless it is ordered in the right way toward that end. And so no one can arrive at beatitude unless he has rectitude of will.

Rectitude of will is required as *something concomitant* because, as has been explained (q.3, a. 8), ultimate beatitude consists in seeing God’s essence, which is the very essence of goodness. And so the will of the one who is seeing God’s essence must love whatever he loves in relation to God (*sub ordine ad Deum*), just as the will of someone who is not seeing God must love whatever he loves in relation to the general notion he has of the good (*sub communi ratione boni quam novit*). And it is this very thing that gives the will rectitude (*quod facit voluntatem rectam*). Hence, it is clear that beatitude cannot exist

without a rectified will (*sine recta voluntate*).

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the cognition of a truth that is not the very essence of goodness.

Reply to objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by some act of the intellect, and yet some acts of the will are prior to some acts of the intellect. For the will tends toward the final act of the intellect, which is beatitude. And so the right sort of inclination of the will is a prerequisite for beatitude in the way that the right sort of movement on the part of an arrow is a prerequisite for its striking the target.

Reply to objection 3: Not everything that is ordered toward an end ceases when the end is attained; rather, all that ceases is that which, like a movement, involves a notion of imperfection. Hence, the instruments of a movement are not necessary after it arrives at its end, but the right sort of ordering toward the end is necessary.

Article 5

Is the body required for beatitude?

It seems that the body is required for beatitude [or being blessed]:

Objection 1: The perfection of virtue and of grace presuppose the perfection of nature. But beatitude is the perfection of virtue and of grace. Now the soul without the body does not have the perfection of nature, since the body is by nature a part of a human nature, and every part is imperfect when separated from its whole. Therefore, the soul cannot be blessed (*beata*) without the body.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), beatitude is a certain operation. But a perfect operation follows upon perfect *esse*, since nothing operates except insofar as it is a being in actuality. Therefore, since the soul does not have perfect *esse* when it is separated from the body—just as no part at all is perfect when it is separated from its whole—it seems that the soul cannot be blessed without the body.

Objection 3: Beatitude is man's perfection. But the soul is not a man without the body. Therefore, beatitude cannot exist in the soul without the body.

Objection 4: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, the operation of happiness that beatitude consists in is unimpeded. But a separated soul's operation is impeded, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, "There is in the soul a certain desire to rule the body, and it is in a sense held back by this desire from moving with full force (*tota intentione*) toward the highest heaven," that is, toward seeing God's essence. Therefore, the soul cannot be blessed without the body.

Objection 5: Beatitude is a sufficient good and so puts desire to rest. But this good cannot belong to a separated soul, since, as Augustine says, it still desires to be united to the body. Therefore, a soul that is separated from its body cannot be blessed.

Objection 6: A man is equal in beatitude to the angels. But as Augustine says, the soul without the body is not equal to the angels. Therefore, the soul without the body is not blessed.

But contrary to this: Apocalypse 14:13 says, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord."

I respond: There are two sorts of beatitude: the one, which is had in this life, is imperfect, and the other, which consists in the act of seeing God, is perfect.

Now it is clear that for the sort of beatitude that belongs to this life the body is necessarily required. For the beatitude that belongs to this life is an operation of the intellect, either the speculative intellect or the practical intellect. But in this life the intellect's operation cannot exist without phantasms, which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, aa. 6-7), exist only in a corporeal organ. And so the beatitude that can be had in this life depends in some way on the body.

But as regards the perfect beatitude that consists in the act of seeing God, some have claimed that this beatitude cannot come to the soul when it exists without the body, and they assert that the souls of the saints, which are separated from their bodies, do not arrive at this beatitude until Judgment Day, when they regain their bodies.

But it is clear both from authority and from reason that this claim is false.

It is clear from authority because in 2 Corinthians 5:6 the Apostle says, “As long as we remain in the body, we are wandering away from the Lord.” And he shows the reason for this wandering when he adds, “For we walk by faith and not by sight (*per fidem et non per speciem*).” From this it is clear that as long as someone walks by faith and not by sight, lacking the vision of God’s essence, he is not yet present to God. By contrast, the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are present to God; this is why he adds, “But we are confident and have a good intention to wander away from the body and to be present to the Lord.” Hence, it is clear that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, walk by sight and see God’s essence, wherein lies true beatitude.

This same point is also clear from reason. For the intellect needs the body for its operation only because of the phantasms, in which it perceives intelligible truth; this was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, a. 7). But as was also explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 3), it is obvious that God’s essence cannot be seen through phantasms. Hence, since man’s perfect beatitude consists in seeing God’s essence, man’s perfect beatitude does not depend on the body. Thus, the soul can be blessed without the body.

But notice that there are two ways in which something pertains to a thing’s perfection. The first way is by constituting that thing’s *essence*, in the way that the soul is required for man’s perfection. In a second way, what is required for a thing’s perfection is what pertains to its *well-being* (*ad bene esse eius*), in the way that bodily attractiveness or quickness of wit pertains to a man’s perfection.

Therefore, even though the body is irrelevant to the perfection of human beatitude in the first way, it is nonetheless relevant in the second way. For since a thing’s operation depends on its nature, when the soul is more perfect in its own nature, it will to that extent have more perfectly the proper operation in which happiness (*felicitas*) consists. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, having asked “whether this highest beatitude can be bestowed on the spirits of the dead without their bodies,” Augustine replies, “They cannot see the incommutable substance in the way that the holy angels do, either for some other more hidden reason or because they have a natural desire to rule their bodies.”

Reply to objection 1: Beatitude is the perfection of the soul on the part of its intellect, with respect to which the soul transcends the body’s organs, whereas beatitude is not the perfection of the soul insofar as the soul is the natural form of the body. And so the first sort of perfection of nature, in accord with which beatitude befits the soul, remains—even though the sort of perfection of nature it has insofar as it is the form of the body does not remain.

Reply to objection 2: The soul is related to its *esse* in a way different from the way in which other parts are related to their *esse*.

For the *esse* of a whole does not belong to any of its parts; hence, when a whole is destroyed, either (a) the parts cease to exist altogether, in the way that the parts of an animal cease to exist when the animal is destroyed, or (b) if the parts remain, then they have a different *esse* in actuality, in the way that a part of a line has an *esse* different from that of the line as a whole.

By contrast, the *esse* of the composite remains with the human soul after the destruction of the body—and this because the *esse* of the form is the same as the *esse* of the matter, and this *esse* is the *esse* of the composite. But as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2), the soul subsists in its own *esse*. Hence, it follows that after its separation from the body it still has its complete (*perfectum*) *esse* and so it can have its perfect operation—even though it does not have the complete nature of the species (*licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei*).

Reply to objection 3: Man’s beatitude has to do with the intellect, and so as long as the intellect

remains, beatitude can exist within it. Similarly, an Ethiopian's teeth, with respect to which the Ethiopian is said to be white, can be white even after they have been extracted.

Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which one thing is impeded by another.

The first way is by *contrariety*, in the way that coldness impedes the action of heat, and this sort of impediment to an operation is incompatible with happiness.

The second way is in the manner of a *shortage* (*per modum cuiusdam defectus*), viz., when the impeded thing does not have everything that is required for its complete perfection (*ad omnimodam sui perfectionem*). This sort of impediment to an operation is not incompatible with happiness, though it is incompatible with its complete perfection. This is the sense in which being separated from the body is said to hold the soul back "from moving with full force" toward seeing God's essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment itself, as is possible, also overflows into the body (*dirivetur ad corpus per redundantiam*). And so as long as the soul itself enjoys God in the absence of the body, its desire is put to rest in what it has, yet in such a way that it nonetheless still wants its own body to participate in it.

Reply to objection 5: The separated soul's desire is completely put to rest as regards what is desired, since it has that which suffices for its own desire. But it is not totally at rest as regards the one who has the desire, since it does not possess the relevant good in every way in which it wants to possess it. And so, when it regains its body, beatitude increases in its extent, though not in its intensity (*beatitudo crescit non intensive sed extensive*).

Reply to objection 6: What he says in that place, viz., that "the spirits of the dead do not see God in the way that the angels do," should not be taken to imply a *quantitative* inequality (*non est intelligendum secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis*), since even now some of the souls of the blessed have been assumed into the higher orders of angels and see God more clearly than the lower angels do (cf. *ST* 1, q. 108, a. 8). Rather, it implies a *proportional* inequality (*secundum inaequalitatem proportionis*), since the angels, even the lowest ones, have the entire perfection of beatitude that they are ever going to have, whereas this is not the case with the separated souls of the saints.

Article 6

Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude?

It seems that the perfection of the body is not required for man's perfect beatitude:

Objection 1: The perfection of the body is a certain corporeal good. But it was shown above (q. 2) that beatitude does not lie in corporeal goods. Therefore, it is not the case that some perfect disposition on the part of the body is required for man's beatitude.

Objection 2: As has been shown (q. 3, a. 8), man's beatitude consists in the act of seeing God's essence. But as has been explained (a. 5), the body does not contribute anything to this operation. Therefore, there is no sort of disposition on the part of the body that is required for beatitude.

Objection 3: The more abstracted the intellect is from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But beatitude consists in the most perfect possible operation of the intellect. Therefore, the soul has to be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, there is no sort of disposition on the part of the body that is in any sense required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is the reward for virtue; hence John 13:17 says, "You shall be blessed if you do these things." But what is promised to the saints as a reward is not just seeing God and delighting in Him, but also a certain good disposition on the part of the body. For the last chapter of Isaiah, verse 14, says, "You will see, and your heart will rejoice, and your bones will flourish like an herb." Therefore, a good disposition on the part of the body is required for beatitude.

I respond: If we are talking about the sort of human beatitude that can be had in this life, then it is clear that a good disposition on the part of the body is necessarily required for it. For according to the Philosopher, this sort of beatitude consists in the operation of perfect virtue. But it is obvious that a man can be impeded in every sort of virtuous operation by bodily infirmities (*per invaletudinem corporis*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about perfect beatitude, some have claimed that no particular disposition of the body is required for beatitude; in fact, they have claimed that what is required for beatitude is that the soul should be altogether separated from the body. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine quotes Porphyry as saying that “in order for the soul to be blessed, it must flee from all bodies.”

But this is wrong. For since it is natural for the soul to be united to its body, it cannot be the case that the soul’s perfection excludes the body’s natural perfection.

And so one should reply that for beatitude that is perfect in every way, a perfect disposition on the part of the body is required both as an antecedent and as a consequence.

It is required as an *antecedent* because, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “If the body is such that it is difficult and burdensome to rule—e.g., flesh that is corrupting and burdening the soul—then the mind is turned away from the vision that belongs to the highest heaven.” Hence, he concludes that since the body will be a spiritual body and no longer an animal body, a man will at that point be equal to the angels, and what was a burden to him will be to his glory.

On the other hand, it is required as a *consequence* because there will be an overflow of the soul’s beatitude into the body, so that the body itself will have its own perfection. Hence, in the letter *Ad Dioscorum* Augustine says, “God made the soul with such a potent nature that the vigor of incorruption overflows from its fullness of beatitude into the lower nature.”

Reply to objection 1: Beatitude does not lie in a corporeal good in the sense that such a good is the object of beatitude. But a corporeal good can make for a certain embellishment and perfection of beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: Even if the body does not contribute anything to the operation of the intellect by which God’s essence is seen, it could nonetheless impede that operation. And so the body’s perfection is required in order that it not impede the mind from being elevated.

Reply to objection 3: What is required for a perfect operation on the part of the intellect is an abstraction from this corruptible body, which burdens the soul, but not from the spiritual body, which will be totally subject to the spirit. This will be discussed in the Third Part of this work.

Article 7

Are exterior goods required for beatitude?

It seems that even exterior goods are required for beatitude:

Objection 1: What is promised to the saints as a reward is relevant to beatitude. But the saints are promised exterior goods such as food and drink, riches and a kingdom (*regnum*); for Luke 22:30 says, “... that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom,” and Matthew 6:20 says, “Lay up treasures for yourselves in heaven,” and Matthew 25:34 says, “Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom.” Therefore, exterior goods are required for beatitude.

Objection 2: According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But as Augustine says, exterior goods are human goods, even if they are the least among them. Therefore, even they are required for beatitude.

Objection 3: Matthew 5:12 says, “Your reward is great in heaven.” But ‘to be in heaven’ signifies being in a place. Therefore, at least an exterior place is required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Psalm 72:25 says, “For what have I in heaven? And, besides You, what do I desire upon earth?”—as if to say, I desire nothing other than what follows [in verse 28]: “It is good for me to adhere to God.” Therefore, no other exterior thing is required for beatitude.

I respond: For the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life exterior goods are required, not in the sense that they are part of the essence of beatitude, but in the sense that they are instruments serving beatitude, which, as *Ethics* 1 says, consists in the operation of virtue. For in this life a man needs bodily necessities both for the operation of contemplative virtue and for the operation of active virtue. For the latter, many other things are required as well, by means of which a man might perform the works of active virtue.

However, goods of this sort are not required in any way for the perfect beatitude that consists in seeing God. The reason for this is that all exterior goods of the sort in question are either required for sustaining the animal body, or else they are required for certain operations which we carry out by means of the animal body and which are appropriate for human life. By contrast, the perfect beatitude that consists in seeing God will exist either in a soul without a body or else in a soul united to a body that is spiritual and no longer animal. And so exterior goods of the sort in question are not required in any way for this sort of beatitude, since such goods are ordered toward animal life.

Moreover, as is clear from what has been said (q. 3, a. 5), in this life it is contemplative happiness, rather than active happiness, that comes closer to a likeness of perfect beatitude, given that it is more similar to God. This is why, as *Ethics* 10 says, contemplative happiness stands in less need of bodily goods of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: All these corporeal promises that are contained in Sacred Scripture are to be understood metaphorically, since in the Scriptures spiritual things are usually designated through corporeal things, so that, as Gregory puts it in one of his homilies, “from the things we know, we rise up to desire what is unknown.” For instance, ‘food’ and ‘drink’ stand for the delight of beatitude, ‘riches’ stands for the sufficiency by which God will suffice for man, and ‘kingdom’ stands for a man’s being lifted up to union with God.

Reply to objection 2: The goods in question, which serve animal life, do not belong to the spiritual life in which perfect beatitude consists. And yet within that beatitude there will be a collection of all goods, since whatever good is found in those things is such that all of it will be had in the source of all goods.

Reply to objection 3: According to Augustine in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, it is not being asserted that the reward of the saints exists in the corporeal heavens; rather, ‘heaven’ means the height of spiritual goods.

Still, a corporeal place, viz., the empyrean heaven, will be present to the blessed, not because beatitude demands it, but in keeping with a certain fittingness and suitability.

Article 8

Are friends necessary for beatitude?

It seems that friends are necessary for beatitude:

Objection 1: In the Scriptures our future beatitude is often designated by the name ‘glory’. But glory consists in a man’s good being brought to the attention of many. Therefore, the company of friends (*societas amicorum*) is required for beatitude.

Objection 2: Boethius says, “There is no good such that it is delightful (*iucunda*) to possess it without company (*sine consortio*).” But delight (*delectatio*) is required for beatitude. Therefore, the company of friends is likewise required.

Objection 3: Charity is perfected in beatitude. But charity extends to loving God and neighbor. Therefore, it seems that the company of friends is required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 7:11 says, “All good things have come to me together with her,” i.e., together with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. And so nothing else is required for beatitude.

I respond: If we are talking about the happiness (*felicitas*) that belongs to the present life, then, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, the happy man needs friends—not, to be sure, for the sake of their usefulness, since he is self-sufficient (*sibi sufficiens*); nor for the sake of pleasure, since he has within himself perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but instead for the sake of good action, so that, namely, he might do good to them, delight in seeing them do good, and be aided by them in doing good. For a man needs the assistance of friends in order to do well, both in the works of the active life and in the works of the contemplative life.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the perfect beatitude that will exist in heaven (*in patria*), then the company of friends is not necessarily required for beatitude, since a man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God.

However, the company of friends does make for the well-being of beatitude. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “In order to be blessed, spiritual creatures are aided intrinsically only by the creator’s eternity, truth, and charity. However, extrinsically—if they should be said to be aided—they are perhaps aided by just one thing, viz., by seeing one another and rejoicing over their fellowship in God.”

Reply to objection 1: The glory that is essential to beatitude is that which a man has in the eyes of God and not in the eyes of men.

Reply to objection 2: This passage applies when what one has in the relevant good is not fully sufficient. But this cannot be said in the case under discussion, since in God a man has enough of every good.

Reply to objection 3: The perfection of charity is essential to beatitude with respect to loving God, but not with respect to loving one’s neighbor. Hence, if there were just one soul enjoying God, then he would be blessed even without having a neighbor to love.

However, if one assumes that a neighbor is present, then love of that neighbor follows from loving God perfectly. Hence, friendship is related concomitantly, as it were, to perfect beatitude.