

QUESTION 2

The Things That Man's Beatitude Lies In

Next we have to consider beatitude: first, what it lies in (question 2); second, what it is (questions 3-4); and third, how we can attain it (question 5).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does beatitude lie in riches? (2) Does beatitude lie in honors? (3) Does beatitude lie in fame or glory? (4) Does beatitude lie in power? (5) Does beatitude lie in a bodily good? (6) Does beatitude lie in pleasure? (7) Does beatitude lie in a good of the soul? (8) Does beatitude lie in a created good?

Article 1

Does man's beatitude lie in riches?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in riches (*consistit in divitiis*):

Objection 1: Since beatitude is man's ultimate end, it lies in what most dominates man's affections. But riches are like this, since Ecclesiastes 10:19 says, "All things obey money (*pecuniae obediunt omnia*).” Therefore, man's beatitude lies in riches.

Objection 2: According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods." But it seems that in money (*in pecuniis*) all things are possessed, since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, money (*nummus*) was invented in order to be a guarantee (*fideiussor*), as it were, that a man might have whatever he wanted in exchange for it. Therefore, beatitude lies in riches.

Objection 3: Since the desire for the highest good never goes away (*numquam deficiat*), it seems to be unlimited (*infinitum*). But this is what one finds especially in the case of riches, since, as Ecclesiastes 5:9 says, "An avaricious man (*avarus*) shall not be satisfied with money." Therefore, beatitude lies in riches.

But contrary to this: Man's good lies more in keeping (*in retinendo*) beatitude than in giving it away (*in emittendo*). But as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2, "Riches flourish more by being poured out than by being amassed; for avarice always creates loathsome men, while generosity creates illustrious men." Therefore, beatitude does not lie in riches.

I respond: It is impossible for man's beatitude to lie in riches. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, there are two kinds of riches, viz., *natural* riches and *artificial* riches. Natural riches—e.g., food (*cibus*), drink (*potus*), clothing (*vestimenta*), means of transportation (*vehicula*), housing (*habitacula*), and other things of this sort—are those by which a man is assisted in meeting his natural needs (*ad defectus naturales tollendos*). On the other hand, artificial riches are those such as money (*denarii*), which do not in their own right assist nature, but which human art has introduced to be, as it were, a measure of items for sale in order to facilitate buying and selling (*propter facilitatem commutationis*).

Now it is obvious that man's beatitude cannot lie in natural riches. For riches of this sort are sought for the sake of something else, viz., to sustain man's nature, and so they cannot be a man's ultimate end, but are instead ordered toward the man himself as an end. Hence, in the order of nature all things of this sort are lower than man and are made for the sake of man—this according to Psalm 8:8 ("You have subjected all things under his feet").

On the other hand, artificial riches are sought only for the sake of natural riches, since they would not be sought except that things necessary for one's way of life (*necessariae ad usum vitae*) are bought with them. Hence, artificial riches have even less of the character of an ultimate end.

Therefore, it is impossible that beatitude, which is a man's ultimate end, should lie in riches.

Reply to objection 1: All bodily things "obey money" in the eyes of the multitude of the foolish, who are acquainted only with the bodily goods that can be acquired with money. But one's judgment

about human goods should be taken from the wise and not from the foolish, just as one's judgment about tastes should be taken from those whose sense of taste is well-disposed.

Reply to objection 2: What can be had with money are all the things that are for sale, but not spiritual goods, which cannot be sold. Hence, Proverbs 17:16 says, "What good is it for a fool to have riches, seeing that he cannot buy wisdom?"

Reply to objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not unlimited, since at some fixed point they are sufficient for nature. But the desire for artificial riches is indeed unlimited, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, it is subject to a disordered concupiscence that knows no bounds.

However, the desire for the highest good is different from this unlimited desire for riches. For the more perfectly the highest good is possessed, the more it itself is loved and other things disdained. For the more it is had, the better it is known. This is why Ecclesiasticus 24:29 says, "They that eat me shall yet hunger."

By contrast, it is just the opposite with the desire for riches and for temporal goods in general. For once these goods are possessed, they are disdained, and other goods are desired. This is what is meant in John 4:13 when our Lord says, "Whoever drinks of this water [read: temporal goods] will thirst again." The reason for this is that their insufficiency is better understood once they are possessed. And so this very fact shows their imperfection, and it also shows that the highest good does not lie in them.

Article 2

Does man's good lie in honors?

It seems that man's good lies in honors:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude (*beatitudo*), or happiness (*felicitas*), is a reward for virtue. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, honor seems especially to be what the reward of virtue is. Therefore, beatitude lies especially in honor.

Objection 2: Beatitude, which is a perfect good, seems especially to be whatever belongs to God and to the most excellent beings. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, honor is one of those things. Likewise, in 1 Timothy 1:17 the Apostle says, "To the only God be honor and glory." Therefore, beatitude lies in honor.

Objection 3: Beatitude is whatever is especially desired by men. But nothing seems to be more desirable to men than honor; for men suffer losses in all other things in order not to suffer any loss of honor. Therefore, beatitude lies in honor.

But contrary to this: Beatitude exists in the one who is blessed (*in beato*). However, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 1, honor exists not in the one who is being honored, but rather in the one doing the honoring, who shows reverence for the one being honored. Therefore, beatitude does not lie in honor.

I respond: It is impossible for beatitude to lie in honor. For honor is shown to someone because of some excellence on his part. And so honor is a sign of and testimony to the excellence that exists in the one being honored. But it is a man's excellence that is especially involved in beatitude (*maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem*), which is man's perfect good, and in the parts of beatitude, i.e., in those goods which participate in beatitude. And so honor can, to be sure, follow upon beatitude, but beatitude cannot lie principally in honor.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same place, honor is not a reward for virtue in the sense that virtuous men act for the sake of honor; rather, it is in place of a reward that they receive honor from men—as if from men who have nothing greater to give them. Indeed, the real reward for virtue is beatitude itself, and it is for the sake of beatitude that virtuous men act. Moreover, if they did

act for the sake of honor, then this would no longer be virtue, but ambition instead.

Reply to objection 2: Honor is due to God and to the most excellent beings as a sign of or testimony to a preexistent excellence and not because the honor itself makes them excellent.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, it is out of a natural desire for beatitude, which gives rise to honor, that men happen especially to desire honor. This is why men seek to be honored especially by the wise, in light of whose judgment they come to believe themselves to be excellent or happy.

Article 3

Does man's beatitude lie in glory or fame?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in glory [or fame]:

Objection 1: Beatitude seems to lie in what is rendered to the saints because of the tribulations they suffered in the world. But this is glory; for in Romans 8:18 the Apostle says, "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore, beatitude lies in glory.

Objection 2: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is diffusive of itself. But it is through glory that man's good is especially diffused into the knowledge of others, since, as Ambrose says, glory is nothing other than "clear knowledge accompanied by praise (*clara notitia cum laude*)." Therefore, man's beatitude lies in glory.

Objection 3: Beatitude is the most stable of goods. But fame or glory seems to be like this, since it is through fame or glory that a man in some sense attains eternity. Hence, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, "You seem to propagate immortality for yourselves when you consider your fame in times to come." Therefore, man's beatitude lies in fame or glory.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is man's true good. But it is possible for fame or glory to be false; for as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Many men have acquired a great name from the false opinions of the crowd. Can anything be thought more shameful? For those who are falsely lauded must blush to hear their own praises." Therefore, it is not the case that man's beatitude lies in fame or glory.

I respond: It is impossible for man's beatitude to lie in fame or glory. For as Ambrose puts it, glory is nothing other than "clear knowledge accompanied by praise." Now a thing that is known is related in one way to human cognition and in a different way to God's cognition.

For human cognition is caused by the things known, whereas God's cognition is a cause of the things known. Hence, the perfection of the human good, which is called beatitude, cannot be caused by human knowledge; instead, it is human knowledge of someone's beatitude that proceeds from and is in some sense caused by human beatitude itself, either inchoative beatitude or perfect beatitude. And so man's beatitude cannot lie in fame or glory.

By contrast, a man's good depends on God's cognition as its cause. And so the cause which a man's beatitude depends on is the glory he has from God (*gloria quae est apud Deum*)—this according to Psalm 90:15-16 ("I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation").

There is also another thing to take into consideration, viz., that human ideas (*humana notitia*) are often mistaken, especially with respect to singular contingent things like human acts. And, therefore, human glory is often fallacious. By contrast, since God cannot make a mistake, the glory that comes from Him (*eius gloria*) is always true. This is why 2 Corinthians 10:18 says, "He is approved whom God commends."

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is speaking here of the glory that comes from God in the

presence of His angels and not about the glory that comes from men. Hence, Mark 8:38 [cf. Luke 12:8] says, “The Son of Man will acknowledge him in the glory of His Father in the presence of His angels.”

Reply to objection 2: The good of a man that exists in the cognition of the multitude through fame or glory must—if the cognition is indeed true—be derived from a good that exists within the man himself, and so it presupposes either perfect or inchoative beatitude.

On the other hand, if the cognition is false, then it does not agree with reality, and so there is no good that is found in him by reason of his popular acclaim (*cuius fama celebris habetur*).

Hence, it is clear that there is no way in which fame can make a man blessed (*beatum*).

Reply to objection 3: Fame lacks stability and is, in fact, easily destroyed by false rumors. And if it does at times persevere in a stable manner, this is incidental. By contrast, beatitude has stability in its own right and forever (*habet stabilitatem per se et semper*).

Article 4

Does man’s beatitude lie in power?

It seems that [man’s] beatitude lies in power:

Objection 1: All things tend toward being similar to God (*appetunt assimilari Deo*) insofar as He is their ultimate end and their first principle. But powerful men, because of the likeness of their power, seem to be especially conformed to God. Hence, they are called ‘gods’ even in Scripture, as is clear from Exodus 22:28 (“You shall not speak ill of the gods”). Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

Objection 2: Beatitude is a perfect good. But it is most perfect for a man to be able to rule others as well—a function that belongs to those who have been established in power. Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

Objection 3: Since beatitude is maximally desirable, what is opposed to it is by all means to be avoided. But what men especially flee from is servitude, which is counterposed to power. Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is a perfect good. But power is especially imperfect. For as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, “A man’s power cannot expel the bites of care or avoid the prickles of dread.” And later he adds, “Do you think a man is powerful when he is surrounded by men who are afraid of him but whom he himself fears even more?” Therefore, beatitude does not lie in power.

I respond: It is impossible for beatitude to lie in power, and this for two reasons:

First, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, power has the character of a principle, whereas beatitude has the character of an ultimate end.

Second, power is open both to what is good and to what is evil (*potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum*), whereas beatitude is man’s proper and perfect good. Hence, some sort of beatitude would be more able to lie in the *good use* of power, which occurs through virtue, than in power itself.

Moreover, there are four general arguments that can be adduced to show that beatitude does not lie in any of the exterior goods discussed thus far:

The first of these arguments is that since beatitude is a man’s highest good, it is incompatible with any sort of evil. But all of the goods discussed thus far are found both in good men and in bad men.

The second argument is that since, as is clear from *Ethics* 1, beatitude is sufficient by its very nature (*per se sufficiens*), it must be the case that once beatitude is attained, no good which is necessary for a man is lacking. But after each of the goods discussed thus far has been attained, there are still many goods lacking that are necessary for a man, e.g., wisdom, bodily health, and others of this sort.

The third argument is that since beatitude is a perfect good, no evil can come to anyone because

of beatitude. But this does not apply to the goods discussed thus far; for Ecclesiastes 5:12 says that riches are sometimes kept “to the detriment of their owner.” And the same thing is obvious in the case of the other three goods.

The fourth argument is that a man is ordered toward beatitude by interior principles, since he is naturally ordered toward it. But the four goods discussed thus far come from exterior causes, and very often from fortune. This is why they are called ‘goods of fortune’.

Hence, it is clear that beatitude cannot in any way lie in the goods discussed thus far.

Reply to objection 1: God’s power is His goodness, and so He can use His power only in the right way (*non nisi bene*). But the same does not hold in the case of men. Hence, it is not enough for a man’s beatitude that he become similar to God with respect to power, unless he also becomes similar to Him with respect to goodness.

Reply to objection 2: Just as the best situation is for someone to use his power well in ruling a multitude, so the worst situation is for him is to use his power badly. And so power is open both to good and to evil.

Reply to objection 3: Servitude is an obstacle to the good use of power. This is why men naturally avoid it—and not because man’s highest good lies in power.

Article 5

Does man’s beatitude lie in any bodily good?

It seems that man’s beatitude lies in some bodily good:

Objection 1: Ecclesiasticus 30:16 says, “There are no riches above the riches of the health of the body.” But beatitude lies in what is the best. Therefore, it lies in the health of the body.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, Dionysius says that to exist (*esse*) is better than to live (*vivere*), and to live is better than the other things that follow upon it. But a man needs bodily health in order to exist and to live. Therefore, since beatitude is man’s highest good, it seems that bodily health is especially pertinent to beatitude.

Objection 3: The more general (*communius*) something is, the higher the principle it depends upon, since the higher a cause is, the more things its power extends to. But just as an efficient cause’s causality is thought of as having to do with an inflowing (*secundum influentiam*), so an end’s causality has to do with an appetite (*secundum appetitum*). Therefore, just as the first efficient cause is a cause that flows into all things (*influit in omnia*), so an ultimate end is a cause that is sought after by all things (*desideratur ab omnibus*). But existence itself (*ipsum esse*) is what is most sought after by all things. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists especially in those things that pertain to his existence, e.g., bodily health.

But contrary to this: With respect to beatitude, man is more excellent than all the other animals. But with respect to bodily goods, he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, he is surpassed by the elephant in length of life, by the lion in strength, and by the deer in speed. Therefore, man’s beatitude does not lie in bodily goods.

I respond: There are two reasons why it is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in bodily goods:

First, it is impossible for the ultimate end of a thing that is ordered toward something else as an end to be the conservation of that same thing in existence (*in esse*). Thus, a ship’s captain (*gubernator*) does not intend as an ultimate end the preservation of the ship that has been entrusted to him; for the ship is ordered toward something else as an end, viz., toward sailing. Now just as a ship is entrusted to the captain to direct, so man is entrusted to his own will and reason—this according to Ecclesiasticus 15:14 (“God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”). But it is obvious

that man is ordered toward something else as his end, given that man is not the highest good. Hence, it is impossible for the ultimate end of human reason and will to be the conservation of human existence (*conservatio humani esse*).

Second, even if it were granted that the end of human reason and will is the conservation of human existence, it would still not be possible to claim that man's end is a bodily good. For human existence lies in the soul and the body. And, as was shown above (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2), even though the body's existence depends on the soul, the human soul's existence does not depend on the body; and the body itself exists for the sake of the soul in the way that matter exists for the sake of form and in the way that instruments exist for the sake of the mover, in order that the mover might exercise its actions through them. Hence all bodily goods are ordered toward the goods of the soul as toward their end. Hence, it is impossible for beatitude, which is the ultimate end, to lie in the goods of the body.

Reply to objection 1: Just as the body is ordered toward the soul as its end, so exterior goods are ordered toward the body itself. And so it is reasonable to prefer the good of the body to exterior goods, which are signified in this passage by "riches"—just as it is reasonable to prefer the good of the soul to all the goods of the body.

Reply to objection 2: Existence (*esse*) taken absolutely—i.e., insofar as it includes within itself all the perfection of being—surpasses life and all the goods that follow upon it, since existence (*esse*) in this sense contains within itself all the ensuing goods (*sic ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia subsequencia*). And it is in this sense that Dionysius is speaking.

However, if *esse* itself is thought of as participating in this or in that thing, where these things do not capture the whole perfection of being (*non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi*) but instead have imperfect existence (*esse*), viz., the existence (*esse*) of some creature, then it is clear that existence (*esse*) itself in this sense is more eminent when taken with an added perfection. Hence, Dionysius himself says in the same place that living things are better than [merely] existing things, and intelligent things are better than [merely] living things.

Reply to objection 3: Given that the end corresponds to the principle, this argument proves that the ultimate end is the first principle of being, in whom exists every perfection of being and whose likeness [all things] seek in due proportion—some with respect just to *esse*; some with respect to living-*esse*; and some, a few, with respect to living-*esse* and intelligent-*esse* and beatified-*esse*.

Article 6

Does man's beatitude lie in delight or pleasure?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in delight (*delectatio*) or pleasure (*voluptas*):

Objection 1: Since beatitude is the ultimate end, it is not desired for the sake of anything else; instead, other things are desired for its sake. But this feature seems especially to belong to delight (*delectatio*); for, as *Ethics* 10 points out, "it is ridiculous to ask someone why he wants to be delighted (*propter quid velit delectari*).” Therefore, beatitude consists especially in pleasure and delight.

Objection 2: As the *Liber de Causis* says, "a first cause makes a stronger impression than a secondary cause." But the end's influence has to do with the desire for it. Therefore, that which especially moves one's appetite seems especially to have the character of an ultimate end. But this is pleasure (*voluptas*). An indication of this is that pleasure (*delectatio*) absorbs a man's will and reason to such an extent that it makes him disdain other goods. Therefore, it seems that the ultimate end, which is beatitude, consists especially in pleasure (*in voluptate*).

Objection 3: Since desire is for the good, that which all things desire seems to be the best thing. But all things desire delight (*delectatio*)—both the wise and the foolish, and even things that lack reason.

Therefore, delight (*delectatio*) is the best thing. Therefore, beatitude, which is the highest good, lies in pleasure (*voluptas*).

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, “Anyone who chooses to look back on his past excesses will understand that pleasures have a sad ending. And if pleasures can make a man blessed, there is no reason not to say that even brute animals are blessed.”

I respond: As *Ethics* 3 says, “Because corporeal delights (*delectationes corporales*) are known to more people, they have taken the name ‘pleasures’ (*voluptates*) for themselves”—even though there are other, more powerful, delights. Nevertheless, beatitude does not principally lie in them.

For within each thing, what pertains to its essence is different from its proper accidents; for instance, in the case of man, his being a rational mortal animal is different from his being capable of laughing. Thus, one should notice that every delight is a sort of proper accident which follows upon beatitude or upon some part of beatitude. For someone delights in having a good which befits him—regardless of whether he has it in reality, or in his hopes, or at least in his memories. Now if the fitting good in question is a perfect good, then it is human beatitude itself, whereas if it is an imperfect good, then it is a certain participation in beatitude—either a proximate participation, or a remote one, or at least an apparent one. Hence, it is clear that not even the very delight which follows upon the perfect good is itself the essence of beatitude; instead, it is a certain consequence of beatitude, like a *per se* accident.

Moreover, corporeal pleasure cannot follow upon the perfect good even in the way just explained. For corporeal pleasure follows upon a good that is apprehended by the sensory power, which is a power of the soul insofar as it uses the body. But the good which pertains to the body and which is apprehended by the sensory power cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul exceeds the measure of corporeal matter, the part of the soul that is unrestricted by a corporeal organ (*ab organo corporeo absoluta*) has a sort of unlimitedness (*quaedam infinitas*) with respect to the body and with respect to the parts of the soul that are concretized with the body (*partium animae corpori concretarum*)—in the way that immaterial things are in a sense unlimited (*infinita*) in relation to material things by reason of the fact that form is in some sense contracted to and limited by matter. Thus, a form that is free of matter is in some sense unlimited (*infinita*). And so the sensory power, which is a corporeal power, has cognition of the singular, which is made determinate by matter, whereas the intellect, which is a power free of matter, has cognition of the universal, which is abstracted from matter and contains infinitely many singulars within itself. Hence, it is clear that a good which befits the body and which causes corporeal delight through the sensory power’s apprehension is not man’s perfect good, but is, as it were, minimal in comparison to the good of the soul. Hence, Wisdom 7:9 says, “All gold, in comparison to wisdom, is as a little sand.” So, then, corporeal pleasure is neither beatitude itself nor a *per se* accident of beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: The reason why delight is desired is the same as the reason why beatitude is desired—and this is nothing other than the repose of desire in the good (*quietatio appetitus in bono*). Similarly, the natural power by which a heavy thing is borne downward is the same as the power by which it comes to rest there. Hence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so too delight is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, if ‘for the sake of’ is expressing a final cause. However, if it is instead expressing a formal cause or, better, an efficient cause (*causam motivam*), then in that sense delight is desirable for the sake of something else, viz., for the sake of the good which is the object of delight and which, as a result, is its principle and gives it its form. For the reason why delight is sought after is that it is repose in a good that is desired.

Reply to objection 2: The strong desire for sensible delight occurs because the operations of the sensory power, since they are the beginnings of our cognition (*principia nostrae cognitionis*), are more perceptible. Hence, sensible delights are also desired by more people.

Reply to objection 3: All men desire delight in the same way that they desire the good. Yet, as has been explained, they desire delight by reason of the good, and not vice versa. Hence, it does not

follow that delight is the greatest good in its own right (*maximum et per se bonum*). Rather, each delight follows upon some good, and there is a delight that follows upon that which is the greatest good in its own right.

Article 7

Does man's beatitude lie in a good of the soul?

It seems that beatitude lies in a good of the soul:

Objection 1: Beatitude is a certain human good. But man's good is divided into three, viz., exterior goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But as has been shown above (aa. 4-5), beatitude does not lie in the exterior goods or in the goods of the body. Therefore, it lies in the goods of the soul.

Objection 2: The one for whom we desire a good is such that we love him more than the good we desire for him; for instance, we love the friend for whom we desire money more than the money. But each individual desires every good for himself. Therefore, he loves himself more than all other goods. But beatitude is what he especially loves; this is obvious from the fact that all other goods are loved and desired for its sake. Therefore, beatitude lies in some good that belongs to the man himself. But it does not lie in the goods of the body. Therefore, it lies in the goods of the soul.

Objection 3: Perfection is something that belongs to what is perfected. But beatitude is a certain perfection of a man. Therefore, beatitude is something that belongs to the man. But as has been shown, it is not something that belongs to the body. And so it lies in the goods of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, "That in which the good life is constituted is to be loved for its own sake." But a man is not to be loved for his own sake; instead, whatever exists in a man is to be loved for the sake of God. Therefore, beatitude does not lie in any good of the soul.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8), 'end' has two senses, viz., (a) *the thing itself* that we desire to obtain, and (b) the *having*, i.e., the attaining or the possessing, of that thing (*usus seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei*).

Thus, if we are talking about man's ultimate end *as regards the thing itself* which we desire as our ultimate end, then it is impossible for man's ultimate end to be either the soul itself or anything that belongs to the soul.

For the soul, taken in itself, is like something that exists in potentiality, since it comes to be actually knowing from having been knowing in potentiality, and it becomes actually virtuous from having been virtuous in potentiality. But since the potentiality is for the sake of the actuality in the sense of being for the sake of what completes it, it is impossible that what is in potentiality in its own right should have the nature of an ultimate end. Hence, it is impossible for the soul itself to be its own ultimate end.

The same holds for anything that belongs to the soul, whether it be a power, a habit, or an act. For the good that is the ultimate end is a perfect good that satisfies the appetite (*bonum perfectum complens appetitum*). Now man's appetite, which is his will, is for a *universal* good. But any good that inheres in the soul itself is a participated good and, as a result, a *particularized* good. Hence, it is impossible that any of these goods should be man's ultimate end.

On the other hand, if we are talking about man's ultimate end *as regards the attaining or possessing of it*, i.e., as regards any sort of having of the very thing that is desired as an end, then something that belongs to a man's soul is pertinent to the ultimate end. For a man attains beatitude *through* his soul (*per animam*).

Therefore, the very thing that is desired as the end is what beatitude *lies in* and what *makes one blessed*, but it is the *attainment of that thing* which is called *beatitude*. Hence, one should say that

beatitude is something that belongs to the soul, but that what beatitude lies in is something outside of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as the division in question includes all the goods that are desirable to a man, what is called ‘a good of the soul’ includes not only [the soul’s] powers, habits, and acts, but also its objects, which are extrinsic to it. And in this sense there is nothing to prevent one from saying that what beatitude lies in is a certain good of the soul.

Reply to objection 2: As regards what is proposed here, the relevant point is that beatitude is especially loved as a *desired good* (*bonum concupitum*), whereas a friend is loved as the *one for whom* the good is desired; and in this latter sense a man loves himself as well. Hence, the character of the love is not the same in the two cases.

Now when we treat charity below (*ST* 2-2, q. 26), there will be room to consider the question of whether a man might love something above himself (*supra se*) with a love of friendship.

Reply to objection 3: Since beatitude itself is a perfection of the soul, it is a certain good that inheres in the soul. But as has been explained, what beatitude lies in, i.e., what makes one blessed, is something outside the soul.

Article 8

Does man’s beatitude lie in a created good?

It seems that man’s beatitude lies in some created good:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that God’s wisdom “joins the ends of the first things to the principles of the secondary things.” This can be taken to mean that the high point for a lower nature is to attain the low point of a higher nature. But man’s highest good is beatitude. Therefore, since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 1), an angel is higher than a man in the order of nature, a man’s beatitude seems to lie in his attaining in some way the status of an angel (*aliquo modo attingit ad angelum*).

Objection 2: The ultimate end of a thing lies in what is complete in relation to it (*in suo perfecto*); hence, a part exists for the sake of the whole as its end. But the whole universe of creatures, which is called the ‘greater world’, is related to a man, who in *Physics* 7 is called a ‘lesser world’, in the same way that what is complete is related to what is incomplete (*sicut perfectum ad imperfectum*). Therefore, man’s beatitude lies in the whole universe of creatures.

Objection 3: A man is made blessed (*beatus*) by the fact that his natural desire comes to rest. But man’s natural desire does not extend to a greater good than he himself is able to take possession of. Therefore, since man is not capable of a good that exceeds the limits of all of creation (*limites totius creaturae*), it seems that man can be made blessed by some created good. And so man’s beatitude lies in some created good.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Just as the soul is the life of the flesh, so God is man’s blessed life (*beata vita*)—God, of whom it is said, ‘Blessed the people whose God is the Lord’ (Psalm 143:15).”

I respond: It is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in any created good. For beatitude is a perfect good that puts the appetite totally to rest—it would not be the ultimate end otherwise, i.e., if something remained to be desired. But the object of the will, which is man’s appetite, is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can put man’s will to rest except the universal good. But the universal good is found only in God and not in any created good, since every creature has participated goodness. Hence, only God can satisfy man’s will—this according to Psalm 102:5 (“He satisfies your desire with good things”). Therefore, it is in God alone that man’s beatitude lies.

Reply to objection 1: The high point of man does indeed attain to the low point of angelic nature by a sort of likeness. Yet man does not rest there as in his ultimate end. Instead, he gets all the way to the universal source itself of goodness, i.e., to Him who is the universal object of beatitude for all the blessed insofar as He is the infinite and perfect good.

Reply to objection 2: If a given whole is not the ultimate end but is instead ordered toward a further end, then the ultimate end of a part of it is not the whole itself but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is related as a part to a whole, is not the ultimate end. Instead, it is ordered toward God as its ultimate end. Hence, it is God Himself, and not the good of the universe, that is man's ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: There is a created good, in the sense of something *intrinsic to and inherent in* man, that is not less than the good that man is capable of. Nevertheless, this created good is indeed less than some good, in the sense of an *object*, which man is capable of and which is infinite. Moreover, the participated good of an angel, or of the whole universe, is a finite and contracted good.