

Important Introductions in the *Prima Secundae*

Introduction to the *Prima Secundae*

Since, as Damascene puts it, man is said to be made to the image of God insofar as ‘image’ signifies “what is intellectual and free in choosing and has power in its own right (*intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum*),” now that we have talked about the exemplar, viz., God (Part 1, Questions 1-43), and about the things that proceed from God’s power in accord with His will (Part 1, questions 44-119), it remains for us to consider His image, i.e., man, insofar as he himself is a principle of his own works in the sense of having free choice and power with respect to those works.

Question 1:

Here we must consider first the ultimate end of human life (questions 1-5) and then the things through which man is able to arrive at that end or to deviate from it (questions 6-114); for it is on the basis of the end that one must ascertain the character of what is ordered to that end. And since the ultimate end of human life is beatitude, it is necessary first to consider the ultimate end in general (question 1) and then to consider beatitude (questions 2-5).

Question 6:

Since, therefore, one has to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, we must next inquire about human acts, so that we might know the acts by which one arrives at beatitude or by which the journey toward beatitude is impeded. But because operations and acts have to do with singulars, every practical science (*operativa scientia*) is brought to completion in the consideration of particulars (*in particulari consideratione*). Therefore, since moral theory (*moralis consideratio*) concerns human acts, it has to deal with them first in general (qq. 6-114) and then in particular (*ST* 2-2).

As regards the general consideration of human acts, what comes up first for consideration are the human acts themselves (qq. 6-48) and, second, their principles (qq. 49-114).

Among human acts some are proper to man, and some are common to man and the other animals. Since beatitude is proper to man, the acts that are properly human are more closely related to beatitude than are the acts that are common to man and the other animals. Therefore, we must first consider the acts which are proper to man (qq. 6-21) and, second, the acts which are common to man and the other animals and which are called the passions of the soul (qq. 22-48).

As regards the first topic, there are two things that come up for consideration: first, the nature of human acts (*de conditione humanorum actorum*) (qq. 6-17) and, second, the distinctions among them (*de distinctione eorum*) (qq. 18-21).

Now since what are properly called human acts are those acts that are voluntary—for the will is a rational appetite and is proper to man—we must consider human acts insofar as

they are voluntary. Therefore, what needs to be considered first is the voluntary and the involuntary (qq. 6-7); second, the acts that are voluntary in the sense of being elicited by the will itself in such a way that they belong immediately to the will (qq. 8-16); and, third, the acts which are voluntary in the sense of being commanded by the will and which belong to the will through the mediation of other powers (q. 17).

And since voluntary acts have certain circumstances according to which they are judged, what needs to be considered first is the voluntary and the involuntary (q.6) and, after that, the circumstances of the acts in which the voluntary and the involuntary are found (q. 7)

Question 8:

Next, we have to consider voluntary acts themselves in particular. First, we have to consider the acts that belong immediately to the will in the sense that they are elicited by the will itself (questions 8-16), and, second, the acts that are commanded by the will (question 17). Now the will is moved both toward the end and toward the means to the end (*in ea quae sunt ad finem*). Therefore, we first have to consider acts of the will by which it is moved toward the end (questions 8-12), and then acts of the will by which it is moved toward the means to the end (questions 13-16).

There seem to be three acts of the will with respect to the end, viz., to will (*velle*), to enjoy (*frui*), and to intend (*intendere*). Therefore, we will first consider the will (*voluntas*) (questions 8-10); second, the act of enjoying (*fruitio*) (question 11); and, third, the act of intending (*intentio*) (question 12). Concerning the first point, there are three things to consider: (a) what the objects of will are (*quorum voluntas sit*) (question 8), (b) what the will is moved by (*a quo moveatur*) (question 9), and (c) the manner in which the will is moved (*quomodo moveatur*) (question 10).

Question 18:

Next we have to consider the goodness and badness of human acts: first, the way in which a human action is good or bad (questions 18-20) and, second, what follows from the goodness or badness of human acts, viz., merit and demerit, sin and guilt (question 21).

On the first point, there are three topics to consider: first, the goodness and badness of human acts in general (question 18); second, the goodness and badness of interior acts (question 19); and, third, the goodness and badness of exterior acts (question 20).

Question 22:

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48).

In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their

subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

Question 26:

Next we have to consider the passions of the soul individually, first the passions of the concupiscible power (questions 26-39) and, second, the passions of the irascible power (questions 40-48).

The first consideration will have three parts. For, first, we will consider love (*amor*) and hatred (*odium*) (questions 26-29); second, sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) and withdrawal (*fuga*) (question 30); and, third, pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain or sadness (*dolor vel tristitia*) (questions 31-39).

As regards love, there are three things to consider: first, love itself (question 26); second, the cause of love (question 27); and third, the effects of love (question 28).

Question 40:

Next we have to consider the passions of the irascible part of the soul: first, hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*) (question 40); second, fear and daring (questions 41-45); and, third, anger (questions 46-48).

Question 49*:

After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles (questions 49-89), secondly of extrinsic principles (questions 90-114). The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q77, seqq., it remains for us to consider habits in general (questions 49-54): in the second place we shall consider virtues (questions 55-70) and vices and other like habits (questions 71-89), which are the principles of human acts.

Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits (question 49); second, their subject (question 50); third, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption (questions 51-53); fourth, how they are distinguished from one another (question 54).

Question 55*:

We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said (Q54, A3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues (questions 55-67), and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits (questions 68-70); in the second place, of bad habits, namely of

vices and sins (questions 71-89).

Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue (question 55); (2) its subject (question 56); (3) the division of virtue (questions 57-62); (4) the cause of virtue (question 63); (5) certain properties of virtue (questions 64-67).

Question 57*:

We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues (question 57); (2) the moral virtues (questions 58-61); (3) the theological virtues (question 62).

Question 58*:

We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues (question 58); (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter (questions 59) ; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others (questions 60-61).

Question 64*:

We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue (question 64), (2) the connection between virtues (question 65), (3) equality of virtues (question 66), (4) the duration of virtues (question 67).

Question 71:

Next we have to consider vices and sins (*vitia et peccata*). On this topic there are six things to consider: first, vices and sins in themselves (question 71); second, the distinctions among them (question 72); third, a comparison of sins and vices to one another (question 73); fourth, the subject of sin (question 74); fifth, the causes of sin (questions 75-84); and, sixth, the effects of sin (questions 85-89).

Question 75:

Next we have to consider the causes of sin: first, in general (question 75) and, second, in particular (questions 76-84).

Question 76*:

We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin (questions 76-78); (2) its external causes (questions 79-83); and (3) sins which are the

causes of other sins (question 84). In view of what has been said above (A2), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance (question 76), which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite (question 77); thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will (question 78).

Question 81*:

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission (question 81); (2) of its essence (question 82); (3) of its subject (question 83).

Question 85*:

We must now consider the effects of sin (questions 85-87); and (1) the corruption of the good of nature (question 85); (2) the stain on the soul (question 86); (3) the debt of punishment (question 87).

Question 90:

We next have to consider the exterior principles of acts. Now the exterior principle that inclines us toward evil is the devil, whose temptations were discussed in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 114). On the other hand, the exterior principle that moves us toward the good is God, who both instructs us with law and assists us with grace. Hence, we must first discuss law (questions 90-108) and then grace (questions 109-114).

On the topic of law, we must first consider law itself in general (questions 90-92) and then the parts of law (questions 93-108).

Now there are three things to consider about law in general: first, the essence of law (question 90); second, the different kinds of law (question 91); and, third, the effects of law (question 92).

Question 93:

We next have to consider each type of law individually. We will consider, first, the eternal law (question 93); second, the natural law (question 94); third, human law (questions 95-97); fourth, the Old Law (questions 98-105); and, fifth, the New Law, i.e., the Law of the Gospel (questions 106-108). As for the law of the stimulant to sin (*lex fomitis*), enough was said above during the discussion of Original Sin (questions 81-83).

Question 109*

We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God (questions 109-111); secondly, its cause (question 112); thirdly, its effects (questions 113-114).