Question 25: The object of charity 25,1:  Does the love of charity stop with God or extend as well to one's neighbor? The opening of the reply helps us to understand more precisely the sense in which acts and habits are specified by their objects: "A habit is diversified only insofar as it changes the species of the act. For every act of a single species pertains to the same habit. Now since the species of an act is taken from the object according to its formal aspect, acts that aim toward an aspect of an object and acts that aim toward an object under that aspect are the same in species. For example, the act of vision by which light is seen is the same as the act by which color is seen under the aspect of light. Now God is the aspect for loving one's neighbor, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he might be in God. Hence, it is obvious that the act by which God is loved is the same in species as the act by which our neighbor is loved." The upshot, then, seems to be that by the act of charity we love our neighbors insofar as they are seen as related to God as rational creatures and (either actually or potentially) as sons and daughters of God who share in beatitude with us. Further, we are motivated to love them by our love of God in the way that we love the friends of our friends because they are the friends of our friends. So, too, by charity we love our neighbors because God loves them and wants us to love them. Moreover, what we will for them is that they love God in the way that brings them true happiness. 25,2:  Should charity be loved out of charity? On the surface this seems to be a strange question. (One is reminded of St. Augustine telling us that in his youthful days he was in love with love.) What does it mean? As the objections point out, charity itself is neither God nor neighbor; nor is it an object of friendship--at least it seems not. Furthermore, we don't share beatitude in common with charity. St. Thomas notes that love is reflective. Just as we can know that we know, so too we can love that we love. Moreover, charity is a special type of love or friendship, which we can value as a great good and will for our neighbors. Thus out of charity we can love or will charity (love of concupiscence) for those whom we love (love of friendship). As St. Thomas puts it in the reply to the first objection, "Loving God and neighbor includes loving charity. For we love God and neighbor insofar as we love (amo) the fact that we and our neighbor love (diligo) God, that is, insofar as we have charity." 25,3:  Should irrational creatures likewise be loved out of charity? Irrational creatures cannot be our friends, that is, they cannot be those for whom we have charity. It is only metaphorically, and not properly, that irrational creatures can be said to possess goods or to share our lives. Furthermore, charity is founded on the sharing of eternal beatitude, which irrational creatures are not capable of sharing. So charity as friendship does not extend to them. Still, we can will them as goods for others. For instance, we can will out of charity that irrational creatures be preserved for God's glory and for the use or enjoyment of our neighbor. To love them in this way is to love them out of charity. 25,4:  Should a human being love himself out of charity? This discussion gets us into some interesting areas. How does self-love figure into the life of the saint? St. Thomas claims, first of all, that we have something "greater than friendship" for ourselves, because we have unity or identity--and not just union--with ourselves. "Hence, just as unity is a principle of union, so too the love by which one loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For we have friendship with others by the fact that we relate to them in the same way that we relate to ourselves." This is worth pondering. Again, charity is principally my friendship with God and secondarily my friendship with God's friends, myself included. We will return to some of the background questions in the section on the order of love. 25,5:  Should a human being love his own body out of charity? A strange question, no? Well, first of all, there are seemingly good reasons for answering no. You can't be friends with your body (though by now we pretty much know the answer to that one); St. Paul asks for liberation from "this body of death"; and the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, of which the soul, and not the body, is the subject. St. Thomas first distinguishes the body in its own proper nature from the "body of death" referred to by St. Paul, that is, the body in its corruption of guilt and punishment (including concupiscence) which has resulted from sin. Contrary to what the Manicheans claimed, the body is not created by an evil principle. Rather, it is created by God and is good in itself. "Hence, it is possible to use in service to God." So we ought to love our body--though not its corruption--out of charity. Of course, we do not love our body as the object of friendship, but out of love for ourselves as an object which is part of us. 25,6:  Should sinners be loved out of charity? Who are the sinners here? Everyone in a state of mortal sin? Only very, very wicked people? I'll leave that question for further reflection. In any case, some of the previous arguments seem to militate against loving sinners out of charity. For instance, how can one have a sinner as a friend when friendship is based on sharing beatitude and, by implication, rectitude of will or virtue? (After all, friends are supposed to will and rejoice over the same things!!) In addition, the Psalms contain many imprecations against one's enemies precisely because they are sinners. St. Thomas in effect says that we must hate the sin but love the sinner. More specifically, we must love sinners because they share with us a nature that is given by God and potentially beatified by God. On the other hand, we are not to love sin. "Therefore, in respect of their guilt, whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or mother or relatives, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in sinners, their being sinners, and to love them as human beings capable of beatitude; and this is to love them truly, out of charity, for God's sake." This passage requires deep reflection, because it tells us a lot about the nature of charity and about what it means to love others out of charity and "for God's sake." The reply to the second objection is especially interesting: "As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the benefits of friendship as long as there is hope of their being cured. Rather, we should give them more help in regaining their virtue than we would in regaining their money if they have lost it, since virtue is more closely connected with friendship than is money. But when they fall into very great wickedness and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them familiarities of friendship. Thus according to divine and human law, sinners such as these, whose harming others is assumed to be more likely than their being cured, are to be put to death. And yet a judge does this not out of hatred for them, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which the common good is preferred to the life of an individual person. Moreover, the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, either by way of expiation of his guilt if he is converted, or by way of putting an end to his sin, if he is not converted, since he is thereby deprived of the power to sin any more." What do you think? What of the fact that Jesus associated with sinners. The reply to the fifth objection has this to say: "The weak should avoid associating with sinners, because of the imminent danger that they might be subverted by them. But for those who are perfect and whose corruption is not to be feared, it is commendable that they should associate with sinners in order to convert them. This is why Our Lord ate and drank with sinners (Mt. 9:11-13). Yet all should avoid the company of sinners, as far as fellowship in sin is concerned. 25,7:  Do sinners love themselves? There are three senses of loving oneself, each involving our loving what we take ourselves to be: The first way is common to everyone and involves our loving ourselves because of what we are by nature, viz., individual substances or persons who have a human nature. The second way is common to those who are good and involves loving ourselves as rational beings with an interior life that should involve bringing the passions under the dominion of reason and rejoicing in past, present, and future spiritual goods. This is the proper way to love onself. The third way is common to bad people and involves loving the 'exterior' rather than the 'interior' person. St. Thomas describes it as follows: "The wicked do not wish preserve the integrity of the inward person, nor do they desire spiritual goods for him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their own company by entering into their own hearts, because they find there present, past and future evils, which they abhor; nor are they at peace with themselves, because of the gnawings of conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: 'I will reprove thee and set before thy face.' In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love themselves in that way." In the reply to the first objection, which is that self-love is a principle of sin and as such should be eschewed by everyone, St. Thomas says that the sort of self-love that is proper to the wicked is a principle of sin that reaches right up to contempt of God, because the wicked desire exterior goods in such a way as to disdain spirtual goods. This helps fill in the picture of self-love. 25,8:  Is it a requirement of charity that one's enemies be loved ? There are three ways to consider love of one's enemies: Loving one's enemy insofar as he is one's enemies: This is perverse and incompatible with charity, because it is in effect to love what is--or at least seems to us to be--evil in another. Loving one's enemy in general insofar as we share a common nature with him: This is demanded by charity, since enemies are included among the neighbors whom we are called upon to love. Loving one's enemy in particular, so as to be moved by a special act of love (dilectio) with respect to him: This is not absolutely demanded by charity, because charity does not demand the impossible task of having each neighbor individually as the object of an act of love. But it is a sign of perfection for one to a particular enemy in this way (as, e.g., by going out of one's way to pray in particular for some enemy). "For if we loved a given man very much, we would love his children even if they were unfriendly towards us. On the other hand, it is a demand of charity that we be prepared to love this enemy in particular if it should become necessary for some reason or because of some special need they have. In the reply to the second objection St. Thomas notes that it should displease us that others are our enemies, and so it is proper to hate them insofar as they are enemies or to hate the fact that they are enemies. But to love them out of charity is compatible with this, because it is to love them insofar as they share the same nature and (at least potentially) the same beatitude with us. 25,9:  Is it a requirement of charity that one exhibit the signs and effects of love to one's enemy? We are required to show to our enemies the general signs of love that we are required to show to all our neighbors in general. For instance, if I were to got out of my way to exclude you from a general prayer for all the faithful, that would be a sin against charity. On the other hand, we are not required (except in cases of special needs) to show to our enemies signs of love that are reserved for special people. However, it is a sign of perfection to love one's enemies in this way, as long as we are not in danger of being corrupted by them. "For in such a case not only are we wary of being dragged down into hatred by the injuries inflicted on us, but we are resolve to make our enemy love us on account of our kindliness." 25,10:  Should we love the angels out of charity? Because we share the beatitude in common with the angels, we should love them out of charity. A common species is not necessary for the love of charity. We can have "fellowship of minds" with the angels. (If you don't understand this, then you don't have a close enough relationship with your guardian angel.) 25,11:  Should we love the demons out of charity? The demons are another story, since they do not share in eternal beatitude, even though they do share an intelligent nature. Thus, we cannot will eternal beatitude for them. We can, however, love their nature in the way that we love irrational beings, willing that they endure for God's glory. In this sense they are useful to us for increasing in charity. "The utility which accrues to us from the demons results not from their intention but from the ordination of divine providence. And so we are not induced by this to have their friendship, but rather we are induced to be friends of God, who turns their perverse intention to our utility." 25,12:  Are the following four objects properly counted as the objects of charity: God, neighbor, our own bodies, and ourselves ? St. Thomas asks this question in ourder to connect up with St. Augustine's taxonomy of the objects of love in De Doctrina Christiana. What he will try to do is to give a logical reconstruction of what St. Augustine says within the account of the object of love that he has developed in question 25. He first states by way of summary that the friendship of charity is based on the sharing of everlasting beatitude. So the objects of love are such because of their relationship to this sharing. God is the principle or cause who pours this beatitude into us, whereas human beings and angels directly participate in it, and our bodies share in it indirectly through its overflowing from the soul. So God is lovable as the source of beatitude, and those who share in it are lovable either by being identical with onself or by being fellow sharers in beatitude.